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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary sex discrimination jurisprudence accepts as one
of its foundational premises the notion that sex and gender are two
distinct aspects of human identity. That is, it assumes that the
identities male and female are different from the characteristics
masculine and feminine. Sex is regarded as a product of nature,
while gender is understood as a function of culture. This disaggre-
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gation of sex from gender represents a central mistake of equality
jurisprudence.
Antidiscrimination law is founded upon the idea that sex,
conceived as biological difference, is prior to, less normative than,
and more real than gender. Yet in every way that matters, sex bears
an epiphenomenal relationship to gender; that is, under close
examination, almost every claim with regard to sexual identity or
sex discrimination can be shown to be grounded in normative
gender rules and roles. Herein lies the mistake. In the name of
avoiding "the grossest discrimination," that is, "treating things that
are different as though they were exactly alike,"1 sexual equality
jurisprudence has uncritically accepted the validity of biological
sexual differences. By accepting these biological differences,
equality jurisprudence reifies as foundationalfact that which is really
an effect of normative gender ideology. This jurisprudential error
not only produces obvious absurdities at the margin of gendered
identity, but it also explains why sex discrimination laws have been
relatively ineffective in dismantling profound sex segregation in the
wage-labor market,2 in shattering "glass ceilings" that obstruct
women's entrance into the upper echelons of corporate manage-
ment,3 and in increasing women's wages, which remain a fraction
of those paid men.4
'Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971); see also Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1980) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause does not
require "things which are different in fact ... to be treated in law as though they
were the same" (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) (quoting Tigner
v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940))). See generally Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108-09 (1975) (arguing in the context of
the Equal Protection Clause that "even the just state must make some distinctions,
must treat some things differently from others").
2 See U.S. Census, 1990: Census of Population and Housing, Equal Employment
Opportunity File [Online] (1990), available in Telnet: info.umd.edu (select InforM U.S.
Census) [hereinafter 1990 U.S. Census].
3 See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A REPORT ON THE GLASS CEILING INITIATIVE 13 (1991).
4 Although women's wages have steadily climbed relative to men's wages over the
last 20 years, there still remains a significant gap in earnings between men and
women. For people earning hourly wages, the gap in earnings is 20.6%; for people
earning weekly wages, the gap is 24.6%; and for people earningannual wages, the gap
is 29.4%. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, No. 93-5, FACTS ON WORKING
WOMEN 1 (1993). The gap in earnings between white men, on the one hand, and
black and hispanic women, on the other, is significantly larger than that between men
and women generally. See id. at 3. With respect to people with professional degrees,
however, hispanic women and black men earn considerably less than all other groups
of people. See id. at 7. This fact illustrates an important point that has been
developed more fully elsewhere, that neither as an empirical nor theoretical matter
should sexism be discussed in isolation from racism. See Kimberl Crenshaw,
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The targets of antidiscrimination law, therefore, should not be
limited to the "gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes"5
but should also include the social processes that construct and make
coherent the categories male and female. In many cases, biology
operates as the excuse or cover for social practices that hierarchize
individual members of the social category "man" over individual
members of the social category "woman." In the end, biology or
anatomy serve as metaphors for a kind of inferiority that character-
izes society's view of women.
The authority to define particular categories or types of people
and to decide to which category a particular person belongs is a
profoundly powerful social function. While the state has always
performed this role, its actions have rarely been subject to equal
protection scrutiny. Given the epiphenomenal relationship between
identity and equality, the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII
should apply with equal force to acts of classification as well as to
disparate treatment of classes.' Rather than accepting sexual
differences as the starting point of equality discourse, sex discrimi-
nation jurisprudence should consider the role that the ideology of
sexual differences plays in perpetuating and ensuring sexual
hierarchy.
A reconceptualization of the two most fundamental elements of
sexual equality jurisprudence is necessary to correct this foundation-
al error. First, sexual identity-that is, what it means to be a woman
and what it means to be a man-must be understood not in
deterministic, biological terms, but according to a set of behavioral,
performative norms that at once enable and constrain a degree of
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 139, 166.
' Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
6Janet Halley made a similar plea for an expansion of the scope of the Equal
Protection Clause as it relates to lesbians and gay men:
The equal protection clause [sic] requires courts to scrutinize not classes but
acts of classification-not preexisting, given biological groupings of human
persons but governmental determinations that certain persons shall belong
and others shall not belong to a special favored or disfavored group. At
issue in an equal protection case is not merely the government's power to
redistribute benefits and burdens, but also its power to create and
perpetuate social classifications.
Janet E. Halley, Misreading Sodomy: A Critique of the Classification of "Homosexuals" in
Federal Equal Protection Law, in BODY GuARDs 351, 356 (Julia Epstein & Kristina
Straub eds., 1991).
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human agency and create the background conditions for a person
to assert, I am a woman. To say that someone is a woman demands
a complex description of the history and experience of persons so
labeled. This conception of sexual identity ultimately provides the
basis for a fundamental right to determine gendered identity
independent of biological sex.
Second, what it means to be discriminated against because of one's
sex must be reconceived beyond biological sex as well. To the
extent that the wrong of sex discrimination is limited to conduct or
treatment which would not have occurred but for the plaintiff's
biological sex, antidiscrimination law strives for too little. Notwith-
standing an occasional gesture to the contrary, courts have not
interpreted the wrong of sex discrimination to reach rules and
policies that reinforce masculinity as the authentic and natural
exercise of male agency and femininity as the authentic and natural
exercise of female agency.
In order to explore these fundamental issues of equality,
difference, and identity, I will ask a seemingly simple question:
What is the wrong of sex discrimination? Is it the unfair consider-
ation of biological differences between males and females? The
resort to archaic notions about the skills, abilities, or desires of men
and women? The perpetuation of stereotypical notions of masculin-
ity and femininity? Or the unwelcome instigation of sexual behavior
in inappropriate settings, such as the workplace? Close examination
reveals that both the case law and the theory of sex discrimination
draw in kaleidoscopic fashion from each of these formulations to
determine what it means to be discriminated against because of
one's sex.7 The result is an unstable conception of both who it is
that deserves equal protection of the laws and what it would mean
to treat her fairly. While instability is not an intrinsic flaw in the
doctrine, the theory's surface chaos masks a deeper reality within
sexual equality jurisprudence-that the wrong of sex discrimination
is premised upon a right of sexual differentiation, that is, a
fundamental belief in the truth of biological sexual difference. This
belief in the truth of sexual identity inevitably reifies masculinity as
the natural expression of male subjectivity and femininity as the
natural expression of female subjectivity. In accepting this belief,
the law has played a significant role in perpetuating, rather than
dismantling, sexual inequality.
" See infra part II.
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In the end, the answer to the question "what is the wrong of sex
discrimination?" depends upon one's theory of what it means to be
discriminated against because of one's sex. A complete account of
what it means to be discriminated against because of one's sex must
include an account of the term "sex." Defining sex in biological or
anatomical terms represents a serious error that fails to account for
the complex behavioral aspects of sexual identity. In so doing, this
definition elides the degree to which most, if not all, differences
between men and women are grounded not in biology, but in
gender normativity. Ultimately, there is no principled way to
distinguish sex from gender, and concomitantly, sexual differentia-
tion from sexual discrimination.
The metaphysics of sexual difference has always been fundamen-
tal to the law's consideration of the rights of women. In an effort
to imbue the category "female" with positive meaning, many cultural
feminists make the same mistake-confusing, or at least conflating,
maleness with masculinity and femaleness with femininity.
According to this theory of sex, gender, and authenticity, women
who act like men do so either because of false consciousness or as
a strategic assimilative choice necessary for success in male-
dominated arenas.' This sexual syntax reflects a deep cultural need
for and investment in real differences between men and women.
Nowhere is this need greater than at service academies and other
military institutions," whose educational missions and organiza-
8 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39, 42 n.22, 62 n.113 (1985)
(exploring the possibility that women have had to adopt a male voice or language in
order to succeed in a male-dominated world).
oSeeJUDrrH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER (1994).
At a rock and roll dance at West Point in 1976, the year women were
admitted to the prestigious military academy for the first time, the school's
administrators "were reportedly perturbed by the sight of mirror-image
couples dancing in short hair and dress grey trousers," and a rule was
established that women cadets could dance at these events only if they wore
skirts. Women recruits in the U.S. Marine Corps are required to wear
makeup-at a minimum, lipstick and eye shadow-and they have to take
classes in makeup, hair care, poise, and etiquette. This feminization is part
of a deliberate policy of making them clearly distinguishable from men
Marines.
Id. at 26 (citation omitted); see also CAROL BARKALOW, IN THE MEN'S HOUSE (1990)
(recounting the experience of the first woman admitted to West Point Academy).
'0 See e.g., CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS, GENDER DIFFERENCES AT WORK: WOMEN AND
MEN IN NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS 47-48 (1989). "Army and Marine Corps men
are not allowed to use umbrellas while in uniform, although women in all the services
are. Why the difference? ... [U]mbrella use by men was vetoed because senior
1995]
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tional cultures are committed to the socialization of "a few good
men" in the ways of masculinity. Shannon Faulkner's recent
experience at the Citadel" reflects this ethos: a female cadet is a
contradiction in terms.
Of course, the now-discredited view, expressed in Bradwell v.
Illinois,2 that men and women inhabit separate spheres according
to a divine order represents the low water mark of women's equality
jurisprudence.'1 Yet, the Supreme Court's current doctrine
affording women quasi-suspect class status14 and the availability
under Title VII of a complete defense to a showing of sex discrimi-
nation when sex-based employment practices reflect bona fide
occupational qualifications 5 represent a continued investment in
and reification of sexual difference as the grounds for sexual
equality jurisprudence.
In Part I of this Article, I will explore the way in which courts
and legislatures use sexual classifications and expose the inconsis-
tencies of this practice. These classifications often share a common
point of confusion with regard to what is meant by "sex" when the
law proscribes discrimination "because of one's sex." Notwithstand-
officers thought the practice 'too wimpy.'" Id.
" See infra text accompanying notes 346-57.
12 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
13 See id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits
it [sic] for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the
family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in
the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to
say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the
family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct
and independent career from that of her husband....
... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
Id.
14 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (following the equal protection
analysis in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), that gender classifications must serve
important governmental objectives and be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives).
's Title VII states:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire
and employ [an] employee[]... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988).
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ing observations by courts16 and commentators1 7 to the contrary,
there is a rich legislative and political history to Title VII and sex-
based equal protection litigation which helps explain why we have
inherited a jurisprudence that is often caught between a commit-
ment to formal sexual equality and a visceral belief in real differ-
ences between men and women which the law should take into
account. This confusion is compounded by the fact that the term
"sex" when used in the law often means any one or a combination
of the following: biological sex (female or male), core gender
identity (woman or man)," gender role identity (feminine or
masculine), or sexual behavior (genital or reproductive behavior).
Consistently applied doctrine might use these distinctions to
distinguish the wrong of sexual discrimination from the right of
sexual differentiation, yet the case law reveals confused and often
inconsistent holdings with regard to the meanings and legitimacy of
sex-based classifications.
In Part II, I will show the absurdity of disaggregating sex from
gender by looking at the law's treatment of sex discrimination at the
margins-that is, the legal treatment of discrimination claims
brought by transgendered people. In these cases the law clearly has
produced and enforced a truth of sexual difference. I will also
consider a number of legal settings, both civil and criminal, in which
the law has played an active role in essentializing male and female
identity and in policing the boundaries of acceptable male and
female behavior. In this regard, the law has had a performative
effect upon sexual identity, inscribing rather than describing what
it means to be female and what it means to be male according to
commonly accepted social norms, rather than biology or anatomy.
While the cases in Part II illustrate how sex discrimination does
not take place on the level of biology, the cases in Part III amply
demonstrate how biology is used as a post hocjustification for sexual
identity claims.
16 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (stating that the
prohibition against sex discrimination was added to Title VII "at the last minute,"
thus leaving "little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition
against discrimination based on 'sex'").
17 See Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1167 (1971) [hereinafter Developments]
(describing how the prohibition against sex discrimination was added as a floor
amendment in the House without any prior hearings or debate and without even a
minimum of congressional investigation).
"8 See infra note 25.
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In Part IV, I will argue that the disaggregation of sex from
gender is simply wrong as an historical matter. By providing a brief
survey of the history of sexual classification, I will show how our
contemporary conception of the sexes, as two opposite beings,
immutably different in kind, is a relatively modern notion. Prior to
the Enlightenment, the difference between male and female was
understood vertically, as a matter of degree between two points
along the continuum of humanity. In contrast to our thinking
today, the pre-Enlightenment logic of difference considered sex a
mutable characteristic, whereas gender was an essential, immutable,
and fixed trait.
In Part V, I will demonstrate that the insights from the margins
concerning the disaggregatory error of sexual equalityjurisprudence
apply with equal force to the more difficult cases of sexual identity
and discrimination at the center. I will examine outcomes in Title
VII cases challenging workplace grooming regulations, the composi-
tion of all-male military academies, and the sexual segregation of
the wage-labor market to illustrate again how the disaggregation of
sex from gender represents the central mistake of antidiscrimination
jurisprudence.
Finally, I will argue that equality jurisprudence must abandon its
reliance upon a biological definition of sexual identity and sex
discrimination and instead should adopt a more behavioral or
performative conception of sex. The wrong of sex discrimination
must be understood to include all gender role stereotypes whether
imposed upon men, women, or both men and women in a particular
workplace. This reconceptualization of the meaning of sex reflects
the notion that we all possess a degree of sexual agency beyond the
rigid determinism of biology, or the bleak overdeterminism of
strong constructionism. This agency is exercised, however, within
a legal and social domain that sets both the terms and limits of
acceptable male and female behavior. Where the law serves to
constrain the range of permissible, or even coherent, sexual
meanings, it becomes an instrument of discrimination itself.
Therefore, law generally, but the law of equality particularly, must
resist the essentializing impulses that constrain both sexual equality
and sexual agency. Such a theory suggests that sexual equality
jurisprudence should include a commitment to a fundamental right
to determine one's gender independent of one's biological sex.
Such a fundamental right should exist both for the transgendered
person who seeks a harassment-free workplace or the benefits of
heterosexual marriage and for the male senior associate in a law
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firm who wants neither to be ridiculed by his male colleagues nor
penalized when he comes up for partner because he requests time
off from work to care for his newborn child.
I. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX: INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY AND THE PROBLEM OF CATEGORY MISTAKES
The depth of confusion over the meaning of sex discrimination
permeates the law. In 1994, the Supreme Court held that "gender,
like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and
impartiality," 9 thereby extending Batson v. Kentucky20 to forbid
gender-based peremptory challenges in criminal trials.2' "The
message it sends to all those in the courtroom, and all those who
may later learn of the discriminatory act, is that certain individuals,
for no reason other than gender, are presumed unqualified by state
actors to decide important questions upon which reasonable persons
could disagree."
22
Justice Scalia, with characteristically sharp tongue, accused the
Court of a serious nomenclaturial error:
Throughout this opinion, I shall refer to the issue as sex discrimi-
nation rather than (as the Court does) gender discrimination. The
word "gender" has acquired the new and useful connotation of
cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical
characteristics) distinctive to the sexes. That is to say, gender is to
sex as feminine is to female and masculine to male. The present
case does not involve peremptory strikes exercised on the basis of
femininity or masculinity (as far as it appears, effeminate men did
not survive the prosecution's peremptories). The case involves,
therefore, sex discriminations plain and simple.
23
Justice Scalia's reasoning, albeit somewhat caustic, reflects common
assumptions about the difference between sex and gender. Sex-
male and female-is physical, biological, and immutable; while
gender-masculinity and femininity-is cultural, attitudinal, and
mutable.24 Presumably, for Justice Scalia, by their very mutability
19J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994).
20 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
21 See id. at 85-86 (striking down a prosecutor's use of racially based peremptory
challenges and holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment grants a defendant "the right to be tried by ajury whose members are
selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria").
22..E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428.
23 Id. at 1436 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24 SeeJEAN LiPMAN-BLUMEN, GENDER ROLES AND POWER 53-66 (1984).
1995]
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and cultural contingency, gender-based distinctions are not what
"discrimination on the basis of sex" was intended to reach. So when
the law proscribes discrimination on the basis of sex, what is the
target of the jurisprudential gaze? Sex-based thinking that discrimi-
nates on the basis of gender role identity (femininity/masculinity)?
Biological sex (female/male)? Core gender identity (woman/
man)?2 5 Or sexual behavior (genital or reproductive behavior)?
Furthermore, what should the target be?
In the early 1970s, when the U.S. Supreme Court first began
seriously to examine the justiciability of women's equal protection
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, it understood that it was
doing so in response to "arbitrary legislative choice[s]"2 6 that
reflected "a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,"
27
and "an attitude of 'romantic paternalism'" 28 grounded in "gross,
stereotyped distinctions between the sexes." 29 These stereotypes
were found either to "foster[] 'old notions' of role typing,"
3 0
further "archaic and overbroad generalizations, " 3t or perpetuate
inaccurate and "outdated misconceptions concerning the role of
females in the home rather than in the 'marketplace and world of
ideas.'"
32
These early sex discrimination cases toyed with the notion of
granting women suspect-class status3 3 but finally settled upon a
middle-level standard of scrutiny.3 4 These cases were primarily
concerned with fit: the justification for a sex-based classification
21 Core gender identity ("I am a woman," "I am a man") should be distinguished
from sexual identity ("She is female," "He is male"). Core gender identity is "an
individual's own feeling of whether she or he is a woman or a man, or a girl or a
boy." SUZANNE J. KESSLER & WENDY MCKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHOD-
OLOGICAL APPROACH 8 (1978). Genitals can, although they need not, play a role in
one's sense of gender identity. More important is the acceptance of one's gender as
a sociopolitical construction that is both communicated to others and lived out
through masculinity or femininity.
26 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
2" Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 685.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
32 Boren, 429 U.S. at 198-99 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975)).
" See e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688 ("[Wle can only conclude that classifications
based on sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are
inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.").
' See Boren, 429 U.S. at 197 ("To withstand challenge ... classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.").
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had to match closely the purpose of the statute which contained the
classification. Thus, the Court held in Craig v. Boren that
[i]n light of the weak congruence between gender and the
characteristic or trait that gender purported to represent, it was
necessary that the legislatures choose either to realign their
substantive laws in a gender-neutral fashion, or to adopt proce-
dures for identifying those instances where the sex-centered
generalization actually comported with fact."
It was this fact of sexual difference that justified less-than-
heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications. In other words,
the Court built its sex-based equality jurisprudence on the presump-
tion that, on a fundamental level, males and females are not
similarly situated-they are in fact different kinds of beings.3 6 The
"high visibility of the sex characteristic" 37 must be distinguished,
therefore, from the highly visible characteristics which differentiate
people on the basis of race. Sexual difference is a different kind of
difference than racial difference for the purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause. Whereas virtually every classification based upon
skin color or race is rendered invalid when filtered through the
heightened scrutiny standard, only the grossest sexual stereotypes
and archaic notions are filtered out by the larger holes in the
intermediate screen. These holes reflect the legitimate consider-
ations of real and demonstrated differences between the sexes, thus
creating and protecting a zone of sexual difference, and concomi-
tantly, sexual identity. Thus, the Court stated that
[t]here are both real and fictional differences between women and
men.... It is now well recognized that employment decisions
cannot be predicated on mere "stereotyped" impressions about the
characteristics of males or females. Myths and purely habitual
assumptions about a woman's inability to perform certain kinds of
work are no longer acceptable reasons for refusing to employ
qualified individuals, or for paying them less.38
For better 39 or for worse,40 the traditional aspiration of racial
35 Id. at 199.
36 See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1980) (stating that "this
Court has consistently upheld statutes where the gender classification is not invidious,
but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in
certain circumstances .... As the Court has stated, a legislature may 'provide for the
special problems of women'" (citations omitted)).
37 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
"8 Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978).
39 See, e.g.,JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THING OFJUDICIAL REvIEw
1995)
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equality jurisprudence is color-blind thinking, based upon the
presumption that whatever real differences exist between the races-
skin color or blood-these differences can almost never legitimately
justify differential treatment of people. 1 In contrast, because the
sexes are not similarly situated, one would never characterize the
aspiration of sexual equality jurisprudence as sex-blind thinking.
42
This conception of male and female as two kinds of beings,
similarly situated for some purposes, dissimilarly situated for others,
sets up discriminatory treatment as a kind of category mistake or
descriptive error. Discrimination occurs when false or stereotypical
differences are mistaken for real differences, and thereby similar
cases are mistaken as dissimilar.4
135-79 (1980) (stating that racial considerations are suspect because they illegitimately
distort reality, thereby causing an otherwise fair system to malfunction); Paul Brest
& Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REv. 855, 859 (1995)
(discussing the reconciliation of group-based affirmative action programs with "the
strong tradition of liberal individualism in American political thought"); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1959)
(arguing that courts can and must decide cases according to neutral principles).
40 See, e.g., PATRICIAJ. WILLIAMS, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal
Equal Opportunity, in THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 98, 98-130 (1991)
(discussing narrative reflections on the built-in race, sex, and class biases of traditional
paradigms of equality); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049, 1052 (1978) (discussing how the color-blindjurisprudence, while it "holds out
a promise of liberation[,] ... refrain[s] from delivering on the promise"); Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991)
(arguing that "the United States Supreme Court's use of color-blind constitutionalism
... fosters white racial domination"); Charles R. Lawrence III, Race, Multiculturalism,
and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 826 (1995) ("The law's
prevailing paradigm for achieving racial equality failed us then, and it fails us now,
because it is not first about the eradication of white supremacy.").
41 This formulation of the legal significance of racial difference has backed many
"benign" state actors into a corner, leaving them with few ways to distinguish racial
differentiation from racial discrimination. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547,632 (1990) (Kennedy,J., dissenting) ("Once the Government takes the step,
which itself should be forbidden, of enacting into law the stereotypical assumption
that the race of owners is linked to broadcast content, it follows a path that becomes
ever more tortuous."), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995); United States v. Starrett City Assoc., 840 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir. 1988)
(invalidating the benign use of racial housing practices designed to maintain racial
integration).
42 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410, 2423 (1994)
(stating that in only three cases are male/female distinctions legitimate).
4 Richard Epstein has made the same point, in reverse, in support of his program
to repeal antidiscrimination laws on the ground that they abridge the freedom of
contract and distort what would otherwise be normatively neutral labor market
arrangements:
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The Supreme Court's brand of sexual realism, which builds
equality up from a ground of difference and regards "sex... [as] an
immutable characteristic,"4 4 although not quite suspect,45 is
curious both for its ubiquity and for its opacity in equality jurispru-
dence. While suggesting that sex is highly visible,41 the Court never
makes clear what it means when it speaks of the characteristic that
is sex. Clearly the pervasiveness of discrimination against women
can be attributed, in part, to the fact that women, like people of
color, are an identifiable group.4 ' But are those characteristics that
make us recognizable to others the same characteristics that make
up the category "woman"? To put it slightly differently, is the
category "female" transparent, or are the signs of femaleness, which
we recognize as merely signifiers of a deeper, more essential
identity, not fully revealed in the signs? To push the problem even
further, if what we recognize as the signs of femaleness are merely
superficial attributes that signify "female," should we understand
these superficial attributes to be the archaic myths and stereotypes
that distract attention from the real nature of woman? Or do the
signs embody some intrinsic truth about who or what women really
are?
These questions with respect to what it means to be female, how
we come to recognize another person as female, and how we
distinguish true signs of sex from inaccurate ones are deeply
implicated, but rarely explicated, in the jurisprudence of sex
equality. Deep foundational assumptions about the relationship
between sexual identity, sexual difference, and sexual equality give
meaning to equalityjurisprudence's conception of the wrong of sex
[I]f there is a rigid equality of men and women in certain occupational
categories, then we should draw, if anything, the inference that the powerful
hand of the state is responsible for maintaining the rigid system of
proportionality. Treating unlike cases alike is not consistent with any social
norm of equality.
Richard A. Epstein, Gender Is for Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 998 (1992).
44 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
"' See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
41 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. The importance of visibility to the equal
protection doctrine is stressed by many equality theorists. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra
note 42, at 2429 ("The motivating idea behind an anticaste principle is that without
good reason, social and legal structures should not turn differences that are both highly visible
and irrelevant from the moral point of view into systemic social disadvantages.").
47 Of course, given the history of racial classification statutes and the ambiguity
over the meaning of"true sex," the fact that women are easily identifiable is a highly
normative fact; that is, the process by which we read particular signs as unambigu-
ously signifying "female" or "black" is deeply cultural, contingent, and value-laden.
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discrimination. These assumptions find their origin not in the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in the Reed, Frontiero, and Boren
cases, but rather in the early struggles among feminists and within
Congress that led to the initiation of constitutional sex discrimina-
tion litigation and the inclusion of "sex" in Title VII.
A. The Legislative and Political History of
"Discrimination Because of Sex"
When faced with the task of interpreting the meaning of the sex
discrimination protections contained in Title VII, courts and
commentators inevitably recite the observation that we cannot know
what Congress intended when they included "sex" in Title VII
because it was added to the bill on the floor as an eleventh hour
subterfuge to "'clutter up' Title VII so that it would never pass at
all."4" As compared with the rich legislative and political history
associated with the meaning and scope of Reconstruction era race
4s Developments, supra note 17, at 1167 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 2581 (1964)
(statement of Rep. Green)); see also Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64
(1986) (finding that "[tihe prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added
to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of Representatives," and that
as a result "we are left with little legislative history to guide us"); Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
"was primarily concerned with race discrimination," and that the "sex amendment was
the gambit of a congressman seeking to scuttle adoption of the Civil Rights Act"), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th
Cir. 1982) ("The amendment adding the word 'sex' to the Civil Rights Act was
adopted one day before the House passed the Act without prior legislative hearings
and little debate."); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1977) (noting that there was no hearing or debate on the addition of "sex" to
Title VII and that "[t]here is a dearth of legislative history" on that section); Barker
v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 404 n.4 (6th Cir. 1977) (McCree, J.,
dissenting) ("The provision on sex discrimination in employment reportedly was
added at the last moment by opponents of the prohibitions of [sic] race discrimina-
tion, in an unsuccessful attempt to sink the bill by overloading it with unpopular
provisions."); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 1975)
(noting that "[t]he legislative history pertaining to the addition of the word 'sex' to
the Act is indeed meager," and that the addition "was offered ... with the intent to
undermine the entire Act"), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.) (noting "that there is little legislative history to
guide ... interpretation"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); CHARLES WHALEN &
BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964
CML RIGHTS AcT 115-17 (1985) (describing the events in Congress surrounding
Judge Howard Smith's attempt to defeat the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by proposing
an amendment adding the word "sex" to Title VII); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43
STAN. L. REv. 813, 816-17 (1991) (explaining that the lack of legislative history
regarding the addition of the word "sex" to Title VII is due to the fact that it was
added one day before passage of the Act).
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discrimination protections, "[t]he passage of the amendment
[adding 'sex' to Title VII], and its subsequent enactment into law,
came without even a minimum of congressional investigation into
an area with implications that are only beginning to pierce the
consciousness and conscience of America." 49  Therefore, many
judges faced with interpreting the meaning and scope of the sex
discrimination protections contained in Title VII believed that they
were writing on a blank slate.
While this belief that there was a lack of congressional thinking
about the meaning of sex discrimination has become true by virtue
of repetition, it ignores a rich congressional legislative history
concerning the equal rights of women.5" The courts eventually
found that the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII embody rights
that are both defined and bounded by a notion of real sexual
differences. This finding merely reflects the results of a political
and legal compromise struck by leaders in the women's community
and in Congress after years of bitter debate about both what it
means to be a woman and what it means to treat women fairly.
The first Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was introduced into
Congress in 1923,51 but it was not given serious congressional
attention until the 1940s. During World War II, women were
encouraged to enter the traditionally male wage-labor market to
replace male workers who had left their jobs to serve in the
military.52 Passage of the ERA was regarded by some feminists and
49 Developments, supra note 17, at 1167.
o See Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism As a Maker
of Public Policy, 9 LAw & INEQ. J. 163, 165-72 (1991) (discussing how congressional
consideration of the Equal Rights Amendment and debate over the inclusion of
women in employment discrimination legislation predated the inclusion of "sex" in
Title VII).
"1 S.J. Res. 21, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 65 CONG. REC. 150 (1923) ("Men and women
shall have equal rights throughout the United States and every place subject to its
jurisdiction. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation."). Note that the original ERA was drafted more similarly to the 13th than
the 14th Amendment. For a discussion of the change in the text, see infra note 66.
52 Between 1940 and 1944, the number of women in industry increased by almost
500%. By March of 1944, nearly one-third of all women over the age of 14 were in
the wage-labor market. See Cynthia E. Harrison, Prelude to Feminism: Women's
Organizations, the Federal Government and the Rise of the Women's Movement 1942
to 1968, at 47 (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University). At the
end of the war, there was significant public anxiety that women would refuse to
relinquish their jobs to the men who held the jobs before the war. In response, the
government gave veterans the right to displace wartime workers, and child-care
funding was terminated. See THE CHRONICLES OF OKLAHOMA 308 (Bob L. Blackburn
ed., 1984); WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, No. 246, EMPLOYED MOTHERS
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members of Congress as both recognition of and compensation for
the war-time work that thousands of "Rosie the Riveters" per-
formed, while American men fought fascism abroad. Reported to
the floor of the Senate for the first time in May of 1942, the ERA
was most aggressively lobbied for by the National Women's Party
(NWP) which enlisted the support of well-known women such as
Georgia O'Keefe, Margaret Sanger, Pearl Buck, Helen Hayes,
Katherine Hepburn, Margaret Mead, and Congresswomen Margaret
Chase Smith and Clare Boothe Luce.
5 3
The ERA, however, engendered passionate opposition from
various quarters. The Women's Bureau of the Department of
Labor, together with Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins, maintained
that the amendment was "abstract and impractical [because] women
and men were not identical and their interests could not therefore
be equal."5 4 Mary Anderson, Director of the Women's Bureau,
maintained that the ERA "masquerades as a progressive measure,
... [but] it is really detrimental to the interests of women and the
social order."5 5 Other administration officials argued that the ERA
would occasion "'highly undesirable' changes in the social security
system; equal induction into the armed services; changes in the
workmen's compensation laws; upheaval in support laws; and repeal
of 'reasonable protective legislation' with consequent social loss."'6
As momentum in favor of the ERA grew in the years following
1942, so did the intensity of its opposition." Most notably, the
AND CHILD CARE 19 (1953). As a result, women were laid off in large numbers to
allow veterans to resume their high payingjobs; many women who remained in the
wage-labor market resumed their prewar low-wagejobs in traditionally female clerical
occupations. See WILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN: HER CHANGING
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL ROLEs, 1920-1970, at 176-86 (1972); see also U.S.
CIVIL SERV. COMM'N, 63D ANNUAL REPORT, THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE IN
FEDERAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION 14 (1946) (noting that the proportion of
"women in paid civilian employment in the executive branch of the Federal
Government" declined from 38% in 1945 to 28% in 1946).
" See Harrison, supra note 52, at 53-54.
54 Id. at 57-58.
55 Id. at 58.
' Id. at 57 (comments of Douglas B. Maggs, Solicitor of the Department of
Labor).
17 The membership and leadership of the National Women's Party was almost
entirely white. Black women's organizations, however, were deeply split over the
ERA. The National Association of Colored Women, generally regarded as an elite
middle-class organization, supported the ERA, while the National Council of Negro
Women, founded by Mary McLeod Bethune, opposed it out of a concern for
protective labor legislation: "We are being rocked to sleep by a trick phrase-one
dear to us as to other underprivileged groups, and therefore calculated to dull our
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First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, was strongly opposed to the amend-
ment.5 8 Rather than launch a negative campaign against the ERA,
Mrs. Roosevelt suggested that opponents adopt a more positive
strategy. She urged the Women's Bureau of the Department of
Labor to undertake a study of state laws that differentiated between
men and women in order to determine which ones discriminated
against women and should be changed and which ones differentiat-
ed in an appropriate and justifiable manner but would be invalidat-
ed by the ERA. 9 For Mrs. Roosevelt and other opponents of the
ERA, the problem with the amendment lay in its conflation of
equality and identity.60 Men and women were not identical for all
purposes, and in certain contexts it was desirable to treat men
and women differently (protective wage and hour laws, laws
imposing a legal obligation on the husband to support his family,
the tender years doctrine, and ages of majority).62
Those who opposed the ERA joined forces under the guise of
the National Committee to Defeat the Un-Equal Rights Amendment
(NCDURA). The NCDURA was made up of over forty organizations
including the American Civil Liberties Union, most of the major
associations of organized labor, including the American Federation
ability for discriminating between what is good and what appears to be good." Id. at
56 n.9 (citing letter from Elizabeth Christman to Mary McLeod Bethune (Oct. 25,
1944)).
" For an example of this opposition, see 92 CONG. REC. 9401 (1946), a joint
statement issued by ten national women leaders led by Eleanor Roosevelt and Frances
Perkins.
59 See Harrison, supra note 52, at 60.
60 As Senators Andrews (D. Fla.) and Eastland (D. Mo.) stated, "The irrefutable
laws of nature cannot by changed by Congress." CHAS 0. ANDREWS & JAMES 0.
EASTLAND, MINORITY VIEWS IN OPPOSITION TO FAVORABLE REPORT, EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT, S. REP. No. 1013, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946).
61 As Douglas B. Maggs, Solicitor of the United States Department of Labor,
stated:
The amendment itself, without the aid of legislation enacted to enforce it,
will strike down as unconstitutional and invalid all provisions in existing and
future laws which, on the basis of assumed or accepted differences between
the sexes, give men or women rights which are not accorded in equal degree
to the other sex.., in seeking to achieve an illusory equality it will result
in women losing deserved advantage.
SAM HOBBS, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO EQUAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND
WOMEN, H.R. REP. No. 2196, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1948) (quoting Douglas B.
Maggs).
62 "The proposed amendment would erase from the statute books laws relating to
widows' pensions, the right of dependent wives and children to the support of the
husband and father, alimony, and guardianship." Id. at 4.
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of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the
International Ladies Garment Workers Union, as well as the League
of Women Voters, the YWCA, and the National Councils of Jewish,
Catholic, and Negro Women.6 3 The views of Felix Frankfurter
were heavily relied upon by the forces that opposed the amend-
ment.64 Unfortunately, Mrs. Roosevelt's positive strategy proved
unsuccessful because "even members of this committee could not
agree on which laws discriminated against women unfairly."65
When momentum in Congress seemed to be in favor of the
amendment's passage in 1947,6 opponents of the ERA devised a
new strategy: the NCDURA sought a more positive image by
renaming itself the National Committee on the Status of Women
(NCSW), and arranged for the introduction into Congress of a
substitute bill (Status Bill) that would undermine the ERA. The
Status Bill set forth "[t]hat it is the declared policy of the United
States that in law and its administration no distinctions on the basis
of sex shall be made except such as are reasonably justified by
differences in physical structure, or biological or social function."
6
7
63 See MINORITY VIEWS IN OPPOSITION TO FAVORABLE REPORT, EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT, S. REP. No. 1013, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 app. (1946); Equal Rights
Amendment: Hearings on S.J Res. 61 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-98 (1945) [hereinafter Hearings on S. Res. 611
(statement of Mrs. Ted Silvey, Representative of the ACLU and Executive Vice
Chairman of NCDURA); Harrison, supra note 52, at 65-66.
"Justice Frankfurter stated:
The legal position of women cannot be stated in a single simple formula,
because her life cannot be expressed in a single simple relation.... Only
those who are ignorant of the nature of the law, and of its enforcement, or
indifferent to the exacting aspects of woman's life, can have the naivet6, or
the recklessness, to sum up woman's whole legal position in a meaningless
and mischievous phrase about "equal rights." Nature made man and woman
different: the law must accommodate itself to the immutable differences of
nature. For some purposes men and women are persons .... subjecting
them to the same duties and conferring upon them the same rights. But for
other vital purposes men and women are men and women-and the law
must treat them as men and women, and therefore, subject them to
different and not the same rules of legal conduct.
Hearings on S.J. Res. 61, supra note 63, at 82.
6 Harrison, supra note 52, at 65.
In 1946, the language of the ERA was changed to include, inter alia, a state
action requirement: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress and the several
States shall have power, within their respectivejurisdictions, to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation." 92 CONG. REc. 9223 (1946).
67 H.R. 1972, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1948). Section 2 of the bill would establish
a Commission on the Legal Status of Women which would conduct a study of "the
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The Status Bill was wholeheartedly supported by Eleanor Roose-
velt,6" the Washington Post,9 all seven women members of Con-
gress,"0 the major labor unions, the ACLU, the League of Women
Voters, the National Councils of Jewish, Catholic, and Negro
Women, Mary McLeod Bethune, Francis Perkins, Roscoe Pound,
Susan B. Anthony II, and the President of Vassar College, among
many others. 1  The Status Bill's supporters also included an
impressive list of lawyers, law professors, and current and past law
school deans from twenty-one law schools who presented their
objections to the ERA to the House in a letter prepared by Harvard
Law professor Paul Freund.72 The Status Bill's supporters, however,
economic, civil, social, and political status of women, and the nature and extent of
discriminations based on sex throughout the United States." Id. § 2.
6 See Harrison, supra note 52, at 81-82.
69 In an editorial voicing their opposition to the ERA and their support for the
Status Bill, the editors of the Washington Post wrote:
The proposal to establish complete legislative equality between the
sexes by an amendment to the Constitution is utterly impractical and
undesirable. Such an amendment would jeopardize protective labor
legislation for women, compel rewriting of State laws governing family and
property relations, and probably relieve husbands and fathers of legal
obligations to support their families. It would have far-reaching and most
demoralizing effects upon society.... [It would also be] essentially
destructive ....
To our way of thinking [the Status Bill] is the intelligent method of
procedure.
Road to Equality, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1947, at 6.
"0 See, e.g., Hearings on the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution and
Commission on the Legal Status of Women, Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on
theJudiciaty, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1948) [hereinafter Hearings on the Equal Rights
Amendment]. "I agree thoroughly with my friends who support the equal-rights
amendment. We disagree, however, on how to bring about this change.... The
problem, as I see it, is one of time and of holding gains already won." Id. at 196
(statement of Rep. Helen G. Douglas); see also id. at 198 (statement of Rep. Mary T.
Norton) ("Reasonable distinctions in law are needed to equalize the burdens and
responsibilities women carry as mothers and as workers."); id. at 200 (statement of
Rep. Frances P. Bolton) ("For many years there has been introduced in to each
succeeding Congress an amendment that proposes to set up equal rights. I have
never been able to agree with this particular suggested solution.").
n For a complete list of the Status Bill supporters, see id. at 120-24.
The lawyers and legal scholars who opposed the ERA but endorsed the Status
Bill stated:
[The ERA would impose] a rule of rigid equality [that would invalidate a]
wide variety of laws and rules of the common law [which reflected the]
variety of relationships in which women stand in the community [relating
to widows' allowances, the obligation of family support and grounds for
divorce, the age of majority and the right of annulment of marriages, and
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were never able to disabuse either a majority of Congress or the
public of the view that it was nothing more than a ploy to defeat the
ERA.7 Thus, advocates of equality for women were polarized into
two intractable camps: those who advocated formal equality with
men and those who regarded a sexual difference principle as a
necessary precondition to equality. 4 This same schism with regard
to the nature of sexual equality was also present in Congress:
Republicans primarily supported the ERA and its formulation of
sexual equality,7" while Democrats, including the congressional
women's delegation, opposed the ERA because it would invalidate
desirable state laws which reflected the real differences between
men and women.
76
the maximum hours of labor for women in protected industries].
... We believe the women's status bill to embody the soundest and most
workable program yet presented for securing full statutory recognition of
the proper legal status of women.
Id. at 124-27.
s The Status Bill never received the hoped-for support from the ERA supporters,
notwithstanding the unrelenting efforts of the NCSW and the National Women's
Party to achieve rapprochement with ERA supporters, including a strategy in early
1949 to amend the Status Bill to read: "No distinction on the basis of sex shall be
made except such as are reasonably justified by differences in physical structure, or
by maternal function." Harrison, supra note 52, at 91. Congresswoman Helen G.
Douglas, sponsor of the new Status Bill, commented that "[r]ecent efforts by the
Equal Status bill supporters to draft a bill which would be acceptable to both sides
collapsed because the E.R.A. women would not yield on any point." Id.
' This division foreshadowed the debate between difference and sameness
feminists which took place some 30 years later. See e.g., Ruth Milkman, Women's
History and the Sears Case, 12 FEMINIST STUD. 375, 394 (1986) (noting the conflicting
positions among feminist historians over whether the Sears case should be viewed
from the perspective of "equality and difference"); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality
Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175,
196 (1982) ("My own feeling is that, for all its problems, the equality approach is the
better one.... [A]s our experience with single-sex protective legislation earlier in this
century demonstrated, what appear to be special 'protections' for women often turn
out to be, at best, a double-edged sword.").
7' Republicans consistently took the lead in support of the ERA, having included
it in their national political platforms before the Democrats reluctantly did so. See
Harrison, supra note 52, at 63. The ERA garnered support from surprisingly
conservative quarters: States Rights Democratic Party leader, Sen. Strom Thurmond,
gave it his strong endorsement. See id. at 88.
76 As Rep. Estes Kefauver (D. Tenn.) stated:
I have always found, as a practical matter, that there are considerable
differences between a woman and myself .... "Women are no more like
men than a spiral is like a straight line".... Law is properly concerned
about the basic unit of society, the family. The question of rights must be
linked with the question of responsibilities. Laws favoring women because
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Not until the early 1960s was a compromise finally struck
between these two factions. In August of 1962, Senator Pauli
Murray developed a strategy that she hoped would be acceptable to
both sides in the ERA debate. Rather than continuing a losing
battle to pass an amendment to the Constitution, she suggested a
shift to the courts. Prior to this time, feminists believed that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied only
to instances of race discrimination, and so they never seriously
considered constitutional litigation as a viable strategy. Murray
believed that the time was right to present to the Supreme Court
the question of sex discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause." What is more, she felt that this strategy would satisfy
feminists of every stripe:
The problem as Murray viewed it was not that some laws distin-
guished between men and women, but that those laws that did
failed to take into account differences between groups of women,
such as those with children and those without. A ruling under the
Fourteenth Amendment would provide flexibility to maintain
appropriate laws relating to women, while abolishing those that
simply hampered women's right to function in the public
sphere.
78
In the end, Murray argued that the Fourteenth Amendment could
be used to invalidate arbitrary classifications based upon sex, just as
it had with regard to race,79 but that such a strategy would not
result in "the total equality sought by advocates of the Equal Rights
Amendment.""0
In the end, Murray's litigation strategy garnered enough support
from a broad spectrum of feminists and culminated in the Supreme
Court's decisions in Reed v. Reed,"' Frontiero v. Richardson,1
2
of their unique contribution to the family have always seemed justified by
society as a whole.
Hearings on the Equal Rights Amendment, supra note 70, at 194-95.
' Harrison, supra note 52, at 365-66.
7 Id. at 366.
" Sadly, some National Women's Party members criticized the proposal on the
ground that Murray, an African-American woman, "was primarily concerned with the
movement for racial equality and that she apparently intended to 'hitch that wagon
to our Equal Rights Amendment star' which would 'spell disaster for our hopes.'" Id.
at 371. Indeed, in a profound misconception of the political and historical
relationships between the black and women's civil rights movements, one NWP
member maintained that "the black civil rights groups wanted to use the E.R.A.
struggle 'as a springboard for their own propaganda.'" Id.
Ro Id. at 368.
S 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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Schlesinger v. Ballard,"3 and Craig v. Boren.84 These cases pio-
neered the application of the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses to sex discrimination cases and thereby created a federal
constitutional right to equality, while at the same time distinguish-
ing sex discrimination cases from race discrimination cases on the
basis of the real differences that differentiate men from women. At
least for the time being, the pursuit of this litigation had the
salutary effect of diminishing the perceived need for an ERA.
While feminists pursued this novel litigation strategy, President
Kennedy took the position that the federal government, as an
employer, should take the moral high ground with regard to equal
employment opportunity. Shortly after his election, he issued
Executive Order 10,925, s s which established the President's
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and required that
federal contractors agree not to discriminate on the basis of race,
creed, color, or national origin. 6 The Kennedy administration
considered including sex discrimination protections in the executive
order, but ultimately rejected the idea because doing so "meant
ignoring the impact of family responsibilities upon women workers
and their employers [and because they could not] envision forcing
private employers to share with women the costs of taking time out
from work to raise families.""7 Both the administration and the
President's Commission on the Status of Women ("PCSW")
regarded race and sex discrimination as different kinds of problems
which required different kinds of solutions.
8 8
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
419 U.S. 498 (1975).
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
3 C.F.R. § 448 (1959-1963), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 631 (1975).
86 See id.
87 Harrison, supra note 52, at 412.
" Of course, this view of race and sex discrimination reflected the unspoken
assumption that the subject of sex-discrimination protections is a white woman, while
the subject of race-discrimination protections is a black man. The discrimination that
black women suffer because they are black women is completely ignored. See Paulette
M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 365,371-72 ("[This perspective] proceeds from the premise that, although racism
and sexism share much in common, they are nonetheless fundamentally unrelated
phenomena-a proposition proved false by history and contemporary reality. Racism
and sexism are interlocking, mutually-reinforcing components of a system of
dominance rooted in patriarchy."); Crenshaw, supra note 4, at 140 (describing how
discrimination against black women is not merely the aggregation of racism and
sexism, but rather an entirely different kind of bias grounded in the history of the
treatment of black women).
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In 1962, the chair of the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the
House Committee on Education and Labor introduced into the
House a fair employment practices bill that would prohibit discrimi-
nation in private employment on the basis of "race, religion, color,
national origin, ancestry, age or sex.""9 However, when the
NAACP and the Departments of Justice and Labor objected to
including women in the bill, "sex" was dropped in order to give the
PCSW time to study the problem and suggest more appropriate
solutions.
90
A comprehensive civil rights act was not given serious attention
until 1963. When the law that we now know as the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 was introduced into the House in June of 1963, it did not
include sex in the list of prohibited forms of discrimination. The
National Women's Party and other supporters of the ERA began a
campaign to have sex included in the bill. To this end, they sought
support from their long-time congressional allies, including many
conservative southerners. ERA supporters Martha Griffiths (D.
Mich.) and Katherine St. George (R. N.Y.) decided to endorse the
sex amendment to Title VII but thought the best strategy would be
to have Howard Smith (D. Va.), a conservative pro-ERA southerner,
make the motion. For Smith, it was a win/win strategy: either the
sex amendment would defeat the Civil Rights Act-a regulation of
private business which he opposed-or it would amount to the
passage of the ERA-a measure that he had always supported.91
Unfortunately, when Smith made his motion to add sex to the
civil rights bill, his remarks were quite sexist and provoked an
equally sexist response from Emanuel Celler (D. N.Y.), the chief
sponsor of the Civil Rights Act and opponent of the amendment
adding sex to the bill.9" When the two men had finished their
discussion, all but one of the women members of the House spoke
" H.R. 262, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962). This bill was introduced by Rep.James
Roosevelt (D. Cal.).
90 See Equal Employment Opportunity: Hearings on H.L 262 Before the Special
Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
817 (1962) (statement of Rep. Charles E. Goodell (D. N.Y.)) ("We have had testimony
from some other people representing the NAACP that said they favor legislation on
age and sex barring discrimination, but that they would like to see it in separate
legislation."); see also id. (statement of Rep. Adam C. Powell (D. N.Y.)) (noting that
"[t]he Commonwealth of Puerto Rico... passed a bill of this nature" and that "after
the bill became law, the ladies demanded to use the men's room"); Harrison, supra
note 52, at 405.
" See Harrison, supra note 52, at 472-73.
9 See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-78 (1964) (statements of Reps. Smith and Celler).
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in favor of the amendment. Edith Green (D. Ore.), who had
previously moved to have sex stricken from the 1962 Equal
Employment Opportunity Bill, was the only woman to speak in
opposition to the sex amendment. In her opinion, race discrimina-
tion was more severe than sex discrimination, and biological
differences between women and men could justify sex-specific
employment practices.
9 3
TheJohnson administration, following the Kennedy administra-
tion's lead, did not support the ERA but wanted to avoid a confer-
ence committee on the Civil Rights Act and, therefore, pressed the
Senate to pass a bill identical to the House bill. Pauli Murray, then
a professor at Yale Law School, lobbied hard for the passage of a
Senate bill that included sex and circulated a memorandum "which
maintained that omitting 'sex' would weaken the civil rights bill by
once again dividing the interests of oppressed groups in the society
and by neglecting the problems of black women."94 Ultimately,
President Johnson signed a Civil Rights Act that included sex
discrimination among the prohibited employment practices.
9 5
While the inclusion of "sex" in Title VII could be regarded as a
victory for ERA supporters who eschewed the notion of sexual
difference, in the end it was interpreted and enforced by an
administrative agency9 6 and courts that were unpersuaded by the
analogy of sex to race discrimination. That the courts, administra-
tive agencies, and litigants presumed an undisputed domain of
sexual difference as a necessary precondition to any discussion
93 See id. at 2575-84.
' Harrison, supra note 52, at 480.
95 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1) (1988).
' Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") Commissioner Aileen
Hernandez, the only women on the early EEOC, reported that the subject of sex
discrimination "elicited either 'boredom' or 'virulent hostility'" from her fellow
commissioners. Harrison, supra note 52 at 497. While the EEOC aggressively sought
to ban racially segregated employment advertisements in newspapers, it carved out
a special rule for sexually segregated employment advertisefients, requiring only that
newspapers "publish a disclaimer which told readers that the headings were not
intended to be discriminatory but only reflected the fact that somejobs were of more
interest to one sex than another." Id. at 498-99. This rule anticipated the successful
defense articulated by Sears Roebuck in EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp.
1264, 1308 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). Further, a
Commissioner stated that "[t]here seems to be a widely held misconception that this
Commission can or would overturn state protective legislation. This is not the
case.... If there is a clear conflict between the laws, we would not ask that [an
employer] violate the state law." Harrison, supra note 52, at 501-02; see also id.
(statement of EEOC chair Franklin Roosevelt, Jr.) ("[EEOC] guidelines would not
result in the massive assault on sex-segregated jobs.").
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about equality occludes both the importance of the first order
decision to divide humanity into two different kinds of beings and
the degree to which a theory of identity, or difference, constrains a
theory of equality. Notwithstanding the affirmative work of pro-
ERA congressional representatives and feminists to include "sex" in
the Civil Rights Act, the amendment was generally derided as "a
mischievous joke perpetrated on the floor of the House of Repre-
sentatives."" The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
executive director, Herman Edelsberg, maintained that it was a
"'fluke' which had been 'conceived out of wedlock.'" 8
The EEOC, the courts, many members of Congress, and many
feminists believed that Title VII's otherwise unequivocal language
with regard to sex-based discrimination should be read differently
than the similar language pertaining to race-based discrimination.
9
9
These groups were committed to the integrity of a domain of
biological difference that differentiated the sexes and that justified
many sex-based classifications and policies employed by government
and by private employers. Yet the debates that predated and
accompanied both the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the litigation of sex discrimination cases under the Fourteenth
Amendment reveal that the sexual differences that were both
recognized and protected in the name of biology were really
normative gender roles. Sex-based protective wage and hour rules,
divorce, childrearing, and familial support obligations cannot be
justified by resort to biological differences between men and
women, but rather by cultural norms about the proper social roles
for men and women.
Sex and Nonsense, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 4, 1965, at 10.
I Harrison, supra note 52, at 503. Edelsberg also "reportedly circulated a
suggestion that the EEOC seal depict a brown rabbit and a white rabbit 'couchant'
with the legend 'vive le difference.'" Id. at 499-500.
9 Contrast the creative textual interpretations of the otherwise unequivocal term
"sex" in Title VII with the straightforward interpretation of the 1874 addition of the
words "and laws" to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), the
Court held that the words "and laws" mean what they say:
Congress was aware ofwhat it was doing, and the legislative history does not
demonstrate that the plain language was not intended. Petitioners'
arguments amount to the claim that had Congress been more careful, and
had it fully thought out the relationship among the various sections [of the
Reconstruction Era civil rights acts] it might have acted differently. That
argument can best be addressed to Congress ....
Id. at 8 (footnotes omitted).
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B. The Analogy to Racial Identity
The history of the Court's treatment of race as a legal category
is helpful in understanding the meaning of sex as a legal category.
One of the fundamental holdings of Plessy v. Ferguson00 was that
states had the legitimate authority to determine the criteria for
membership in the races "white" and "colored," 1 ' an authority
antecedent and necessary to the states' ability to segregate racially
all persons within their jurisdiction. Congress exercised the same
power, unmolested by equal protection objections, when it classified
newly patriated Mexicans as white persons in the treaty ending the
Mexican-American War and annexing what later became the state
of Texas. 10 2 The Supreme Court affirmed the legitimacy of this
kind of state-sponsored racial triage in Gong Lum v. Rice"' when
it refused to recognize any Fourteenth Amendment ramifications to
the State of Mississippi's decision to classify a Chinese girl as
colored instead of white for the purposes of racially segregated
school assignments." 4  While Brown v. Board of Education10 5 may
100 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
101 As the Court stated in Plessy:
It is true that the question of the proportion of colored blood necessary to
constitute a colored person, as distinguished from a white person, is one
upon which there is a difference of opinion in the different States.... But
these are questions to be determined under the laws of each State and are
not properly put in issue in this case.
Id. at 552. This holding echoed the California Supreme Court's decision in People v.
Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 404 (1854), where it held that Chinese people were to be treated
legally as "Negroes," not whites, for the purposes of a statute that set forth that "[no
Indian or Negro shall be allowed to testify as a witness in any action in which a White
person is a party."
10" Cf. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex.,
art. IX, 9 Stat. 922, 930 (stating that Mexicans who remain on lands annexed by the
United States shall be entitled "to the enjoyment all the rights of citizens of the
United States," including "the free enjoyment of their liberty and property, and...
the free exercise of their religion without restriction").
10' 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
104 See id. at 87 ("The decision is within the discretion of the state in regulating its
public schools and does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment."). The states'
power to define the parameters of racial categories and then to assign races to
particular individuals, often over a person's objections, was reflected in several state
constitutions. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 3 (repealed 1966) ("The term
'colored children,' as used in this section, shall be construed to mean children of
African descent. The term white children shall include all other children."). Most
states, however, chose to define racial categories legislatively, see, e.g., Rev. Code of
Ala. 1867, tit. 1, ch.1, § 2(4) (repealed 1975) (defining the term "mulatto"); Laws of
Ky. 1865, ch. 556, § 3 (describing negroes and mulattoes as those who are of "pure
negro blood, and those descended from a negro to the third generation inclusive").
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have invalidated the states' authority to act in certain race-conscious
ways, it left undisturbed the states' underlying power to engage in
106classificatory acts.
It is against this background of legitimate racial differentiation
that race-based equal protection jurisprudence has evolved.
Curiously though, this paradigm of racial difference shares
something in common with the evolution of equality jurisprudence.
Historically, blood has operated both metaphorically and
metonymically0 7 to fix racial identity as something real, essential,
and immutable.' Indeed, by tying racial identity to the myth of
sanguinary pedigree, courts and legislatures created a racial rule of
differentiation.. 9 that allowed them to regard race as a natural,
See generally CHARLES S. MAGNUM,JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 1-17 (1940)
(noting that the various legal definitions of race reflect the various approaches to the
problems of race relations); GILBERT T. STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN
AMERICAN LAw 12-25 (AMS Press 1969) (1910) (stating that the legal categorization
of race is one of the most perplexing issues that has faced legislators and judges);
Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-
Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1994) (noting that modern preferential
programs make it necessary for the law to "intelligibly define the nature and
boundaries of the groups to whom remedial preferences are addressed").
l0s 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
" The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the legitimacy of congressional acts
of classification as well. See St. Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
Based on the history of § 1981, we have little trouble in concluding that
Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of
persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of
their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Such discrimination is racial
discrimination that Congress intended § 1981 to forbid, whether or not it
would be classified as racial in terms of modern scientific theory.
Id. at 613.
107 Metonymy is the principle by which "one well-understood or easy-to-perceive
aspect of something [is used] to stand either for the thing as a whole or for some
other aspect or part of it." GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS
77 (1987). A helpful and oft-cited example is that in which one waiter says to the
other "the ham sandwich wants his check," where the ham sandwich stands for a
diner eating a ham sandwich.
"0 9 But cf Cadwell, supra note 88, at 378 ("[G]iven the variability of so-called
immutable racial characteristics such as skin color and hair texture, it is difficult to
understand racism as other than a complex of historical, sociocultural associations
with race."); see also id. at 383 (suggesting "that hair texture, rather than skin color,
determines racial classification").
109 D. Marvin Jones borrowed H.L.A. Hart's notion of a "rule of recognition" to
describe the cultural rules that constitute race as a characteristic of human difference
as opposed to mere morphological characteristics. "[T]he term 'rules of
recognition'. ., is as helpful in understanding race as a linguistic rule as it is in
understanding the nature of legal rules." D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible:
Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 GEO. L.J. 437, 448 n.42 (1993). In fact, Hart
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not a political, category."n In this way, the law could encounter
intended that "rule of recognition" refer to those secondary or meta-rules within a
community that determine which practices within the community count as law.
"Wherever such a rule of recognition is accepted, both private persons and officials
are provided with authoritative criteria for identifying primary rules of obligation."
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97 (1961). WhatJones means by racial "rules
of recognition" is more akin to anthropologist Mary Douglas's notion of schema:
As perceivers we select from all the stimuli falling on our senses only those
which interest us, and our interests are governed by a pattern-making
tendency, sometimes called schema. In a chaos of shifting impressions, each
of us constructs a stable world in which objects have recognisable shapes,
are located in depth, and have permanence .... The most acceptable cues
are those which fit most easily into the pattern that is being built up.
Ambiguous ones tend to be treated as if they harmonised with the rest of
the pattern. Discordant ones tend to be rejected. If they are accepted the
structure of assumptions has to be modified. As learning proceeds objects
are named. Their names then affect the way they are perceived next'time:
once labeled they are more speedily slotted into the pigeon-holes in future.
As time goes on and experiences pile up, we make a greater and
greater investment in our system of labels. So a conservative bias is built in.
It gives us confidence.
MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND
TABOO 36 (1966); cf. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(1970) (discussing changes in original rules or "paradigm" in the context of scientific
study).
... Zora Neale Hurston described the acquisition of racial identity as both a
transitory and geopolitical result of busing:
But changes came in the family when I was thirteen, and I was sent to
school inJacksonville. I left Eatonville, the town of the oleanders, as Zora.
When I disembarked from the river-boat atJacksonville, she was no more.
It seemed that I had suffered a sea change. I was not Zora of Orange
County any more, I was now a little colored girl. I found it out in certain
ways. In my heart as well as in the mirror, I became a fast
brown-warranted not to rub nor run.
ZORA N. HURSTON, How It Feels to Be a Colored Me, in I LOVE MYSELF WHEN I AM
LAUGHING ... AND THEN AGAIN WHEN I AM LOOKING MEAN AND IMPRESSIVE: A
ZORA NEALE HURSTON READER, 152, 153 (Alice Walker ed., 1979). Reflecting on
Hurston's writing about racial difference, BarbaraJohnson wrote:
If I initially approached Hurston out of a desire to re-referentialize
difference, what Hurston gives me back seems to be difference as a
suspension of reference. Yet the terms "black" and "white," "inside" and
"outside," continue to matter. Hurston suspends the certainty of reference
not by erasing these differences but by foregrounding the complex
dynamism of their interaction.
BarbaraJohnson, Thresholds of Difference: Structures of Address in Zora Neale Hurston,
CRITICAL INQUIRY, Autumn 1985, at 278, 289. Henry Louis Gates,Jr. has similarly
sought to debunk the problematic notion that racial identity resides in some pre-
social or prelinguistic sphere:
Who has seen a black or red person, a white, yellow, or brown? These
terms are arbitrary constructs, not reports of reality. But language is not
only the medium of this often insidious tendency; it is its sign. Current
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raced people with clean hands, that is, without any normative
responsibility for what it means to have a race or the process by
which individuals come to be raced. Accordingly, our modern,
liberal conception of racial equality is one that recognizes racial
difference yet declares that race shall not be a legitimate basis upon
which to distribute social costs and benefits.
Sex, however, is different. We have inherited a jurisprudence
of sexual equality that seeks to distinguish, as its primary function,
inaccurate myths about sexual identity from true-and therefore pre-
political-characteristics of sex that are factually significant. As with
race, the law uses rules of differentiation to achieve this goal. Yet
unlike race, the law reserves a large area for legitimate sex-based
regulation-an area bounded by the notion of factually real and
legally relevant sexual differences. These rules usually remain
unstated, lurking in the background, posing as natural givens, while
legal reasoning takes place in the foreground, producing solutions
to problems of sex discrimination dependent upon the legitimacy of
the essential background assumptions that constitute both the
players and the playing field upon which this reasoning process
takes place.
111
This inclination to accept sexual differences as the material
point from which legal theory should begin is not unique to the
judiciary. Most feminist theorists take as their starting point what
language use signifies the difference between cultures and their possession
of power, spelling out the distance between subordinate and superordinate,
between bondsman and lord in terms of their "race."
Henry L. Gates, Jr., Editor's Introduction: Writing "Race" and the Difference It Makes,
CRITICAL INQUIRY, Autumn 1985, at 1, 6.
. Steven Winter made a similar observation:
[V]irtually all law takes place in the foreground. What I mean is that legal
reasoning typically transpires without the least awareness of the background
assumptions that render it intelligible. This is not the product ofignorance,
inattentiveness, or false consciousness. It is, rather, an ordinary matter of
psychological and intellectual efficiency.
Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX.
L. REV. 1881, 1882 (1991) (footnote omitted). Yet efficiency hardly captures what is
interesting and, I dare say, powerful about the law's relationship to intelligibility. The
background assumptions that make legal reasoning intelligible should not be
distinguished from law, but should rather be considered as an integral part of what
law produces. Winter correctly points to the importance of Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty's notion ofsedimentation-"the alluvial build-up of categories and conceptions
deposited by the flow of our interactions and experiences in the physical and social
world"-but ignores the accretive role of law in producing similar sedimentation. Id.
at 1883 n.7.
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one might call "the body of law." The so-called Equality Femi-
nists112 take the position that differences between men and
women, while real, should be deemed an irrelevant consideration in
schools, employment, courts, and legislatures. Like Justice
O'Connor in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., n s they maintain that
sexual equality will be achieved only when we focus upon the
identity of interests shared by men and women, rather than on the
underlying facts that make us different." 4 On the other hand, the
Difference Feminists" 5 argue that inequality is the result of a
failure to recognize factually and normatively significant differences
between the sexes and criticize the liberal model for demanding that
all people assimilate to a male norm cloaked in neutral clothing.
11 6
In effect, the Equality Feminists regard the difference between
male and female bodies as "a problem in need of a solution,"
11 7
while the Difference Feminists emphasize the trans-historical
importance of the embodied female subject as the object of
liberation discourse."' In either case, the sexed body plays a
prominent and foundational role in equality jurisprudence.
Whether one sets up the evil of sex discrimination as the consid-
eration of factually real yet legally irrelevant sexual differences or
as the failure to consider factually real and legally relevant sexual
differences, the female body plays an important role in the con-
'12 See Ann Snitow, A Gender Diary, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 9 (Marianne Hirsch
& Evelyn F. Keller eds., 1990).
113 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994); see also supra note 108 and accompanying text
(discussing how race is regarded as a natural category).
114J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he import of our
holding is that any correlation between ajuror's gender and attitudes is irrelevant as
a matter of constitutional law.").
"' See, e.g., Jane Flax, Beyond Equality: Gender, Justice and Difference, in BEYOND
EQUALrIY AND DIFFERENCE 193, 193 (Gisela Bock & Susan James eds., 1992).
Domination arises out of an inability to recognize, appreciate and nurture
differences, not out of a failure to see everyone as the same. Indeed, the
need to see everyone the same in order to accord them dignity and respect
is an expression of the problem, not a cure for it.
Id.
"" See Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV.
2479,2480 (1994) (explaining the difference between the "sameness" and "difference"
theories of feminism).117 Snitow, supra note 112, at 24.
118 See, e.g., Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S LJ. 81, 85 (1987)
(arguing that the "dismissal of women's gender specific sufferingby the legal culture"
is a result of the failure "to understand the difference-not the sameness-of [women's]
subjective, hedonic lives").
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ception of the wrong of sex discrimination. It is this foundation of
sexual identity and difference that needs to be reexamined, both for
its truth value as well as for its effect upon equality jurisprudence.
II. THE ABSURDITY OF A BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATION
TO SEX DISCRIMINATION
When an employer refuses to hire, or a school refuses to admit,
a female applicant because of her sex, one way of understanding the
situation is to say that the female applicant was discriminated
against because of the fact of her sex.119 This interpretation of the
meaning of "sex" in Title VII and in Equal Protection jurisprudence
comports with the gut sense of the meaning of sexual difference
which Justice Scalia identified inj.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B."2'
The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to mean that "sex
... [is] not relevant to the selection, evaluation or compensation of
employees.""' But what is meant by sex? What qualities, character-
istics, attributes, or norms must employers disregard in their
present and future employees? How can the Court at once tolerate
sexual differentiation and proscribe sexual discrimination?
In the absence of specific direction from the Supreme Court,
and in the belief that Congress left no legislative history with regard
to the meaning of sex discrimination,'22 many lower courts have
read Title VII to render certain sexual facts-biological facts-
irrelevant to the employment relationship. Setting forth what they
believe to be the "plain meaning" of the term, a number of courts
have held that "'sex' in Title VII refers to an individual's distinguish-
ing biological or anatomical characteristics." 123 Under this interpre-
tation of the wrong of sex discrimination, a person has been the
victim of sex discrimination when she or he has been treated
119 That is, simply because she was female "plain and simple." J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex rel. T.B., 144 S. Ct. 1419, 1436 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120 See id.; supra note 23 and accompanying text.
1 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989).
1 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
125 Dobre v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. ("Amtrak"), 850 F. Supp. 284, 286
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that a pre-operative male-to-woman transgendered person, see
infra note 130, did not make out a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII when
her employer refused to allow her to use the women's bathroom, required a doctor's
note in order to wear women's clothing to work, refused to refer to her by her female
name, and moved her desk out of the view of the public); Holloway v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he term sex should be given
the traditional definition based on anatomical characteristics.").
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differently "because he is a man or because he is a woman," 24 that
is, because of an "anatomical" or "biological fact" of sexual
identity.
121
Under this formulation, the goal of Title VII is a biological
recognition followed by legal erasure of sexual difference, a goal
which characterized the litigation strategy of the plaintiffs in Reed
v. Reed.126  Then-attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg, together with
Allen R. Derr, Melvin L. Wulf, Pauli Murray, and Dorothy Kenyon,
argued that the state should not presume that women are less
qualified than men to serve as the administrators of estates because
doing so discriminates on the basis of "congenital and unalterable
biological traits of birth over which the individual has no control
and for which he or she should not be penalized."
127
Justice O'Connor mirrored this view of the wrong of sex
discrimination in her concurrence inj.E.B., taking for granted the
distinction between the legal and factual significance of sex: "[To
say that gender makes no difference as a matter of law is not to say
that gender makes no difference as a matter of fact.... [G]ender
is now governed by the special rule of relevance formerly reserved
for race." 121 Clearly, Justice O'Connor means biological sex when
she uses the term gender in this opinion. She regards sex as a
legally irrelevant, albeit factually real, factor in decision-making by
juries. 129  The absurdity of this view of the legal and factual
significance of biological sex becomes quite clear when the rule is
applied at the margins of sexual identity and equality.
A. Transgendered Title VII Plaintiffs and the Problem of
Membership in Sexual Categories
The notion that discrimination on account of one's sex means
discrimination because of one's biology is expressed most clearly in
cases in which transgendered5 9 people have sought protection
124 Terry v. EEOC, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1395 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
12 Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982); see also
Amtrak, 850 F. Supp. at 286 (stating that Title VII does not "prohibit an employer
from discriminating against a male because he wants to become a female").
126 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
127 Brief for Appellant, Reed v. Reed, 30 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1971).
121J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1432 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
129 In this respect Justice O'Connor echoes the view of Equality Feminists. See
supra notes 112, 117 and accompanying text.
" 0A note on terminology: I prefer the term transgendered to transsexual because
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under Title VII from employment discrimination. For example, in
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines,"8 ' the plaintiff was hired as a male pilot
by Eastern Airlines. Ulane later took a leave of absence to undergo
sexual reassignment surgery and was fired by Eastern when she
returned to work as a woman. She then filed a Title VII sex
discrimination action against her employer, alleging that she "'was
fired by Eastern Airlines for no reason other than the fact that she
ceased being a male and became a female.'"1 32  The Seventh
Circuit found that Title VII did not apply, reasoning that "it is
unlawful to discriminate against women because they are women
and against men because they are men.
" 1a3
[E]ven if one believes that a woman can be so easily created from
what remains of a man, that does not decide this case. If Eastern
had considered Ulane to be female and had discriminated against
her because she was female (i.e., Eastern treated females less
favorably than males), then the argument might be made that Title
VII applied .... 14
The court, therefore, concluded, "if the term 'sex' as it is used in
Title VII is to mean-more than biological male or biological female,
the new definition must come from Congress."
1 5
A federal trial court recently issued a similar ruling in Underwood
v. Archer Management Services, Inc.,1 31 in which a transgendered
transsexual accepts the medical and cultural emphasis on genitals as the essential
characteristic of gendered identity. It also implies that a biological transformation
can effect a change from man to woman or woman to man. In order to reflect this
understandingabout the complex relationship between bodies and gendered identity,
I will refer to male-to-woman and female-to-man transgendered persons, in place of
the more common male-to-female and female-to-male terminology. For present
purposes, I shall call "a transgendered woman" a person who was categorized as
physically male at birth, yet who regards herself as emotionally and psychologically
a woman and has undergone surgery to bring her body into conformity with her
gendered identity. A "pre-operative transgendered woman" is a person who regards
herself as a woman, yet has not undergone sexual transformative surgery. Similarly,
"a transgendered man" is a person categorized as female at birth, yet who regards
himself as emotionally and psychologically a man and who has undergone surgery to
bring his body into conformity with his gendered identity. See generally KATE
BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW 118-19 (1994) (describing transsexuality as a
"medicalized phenomenon"); GORDENE 0. MACKENZIE, TRANSGENDER NATION 55-56
(1994) (explaining the differences between transsexualism and transgenderism).
13 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985).
1s2 742 F.2d at 1082 (quoting Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee).
"I' Id. at 1085.
134 Id. at 1087.
1a5 Id.
136 857 F. Supp. 96 (D.D.C. 1994).
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woman claimed that her employer violated the District of Columbia
Human Rights Act's proscriptions against discrimination on the
basis of personal appearance, sex, and/or sexual orientation. The
court dismissed the sex discrimination cause of action, finding that
the plaintiff was not discriminated against "on account of her being
a woman."" 7 In so ruling, the court cited both the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation of the limits of sex discrimination in Ulane
and the rules issued jointly by the District of Columbia Office of
Human Rights and the District of Columbia Commission on Human
Rights which defined the term "sex" as "'[t]he state of being male
or female and conditions associated therewith[,] ... includ[ing] the
state of being a member of a sub-group of one sex, such as a
pregnant female.' 1'
The court, however, allowed the plaintiff to go to trial on the
question of whether she had been discriminated against on the basis
of her "personal appearance" because the complaint alleged that she
had been discharged because she "'retains some masculine
traits.' " 9  These "masculine" traits-hand and foot size, adam's
apple, cheek bones, and slight facial hair14q-were really male, not
"" Id. at 98. The court also dismissed the sexual orientation cause of action,
finding that the complaint was "utterly devoid of any reference to the Plaintiff's
sexual orientation, much less any discriminatory conduct on behalf of the Defendant's
discriminating against the Plaintiff's real or perceived preference or practice of
sexuality." Id.
Many people have confused transgendered people with transvestites and
homosexuals. There is an important foundational difference between the transvestite,
the transgendered person, and the homosexual. Cross-dressers are more interested
in keeping alive the contradiction between sex and gender, while transgendered
persons seek to harmonize the tension between inside and outside by surgically
retooling their body to suit their subjectivity or core gender identity. See supra note
25 (distinguishing between core gender identity and sexual identity). Homosexuality,
on the other hand, has to do with the sex, or gender, of one's sexual object choice.
The recent example of the Air Force's treatment of MajorJoanne DeGroat illustrates
this inclination to collapse transgenderism, transvestism, and homosexuality.
DeGroat, a pre-operative transgendered woman, began dressing as a woman when off-
duty, as is generally prescribed for a pre-operative transgendered person. She was
then discharged by the Air Force for "exhibit[ing] sexual perversion by attiring
himself in female clothing and subjecting himself to public view by attending church
on two occasions while dressed in such attire." Martin Gottlieb, Can Transsexualism
Be Curtailed?, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 24, 1994, at 7B; see Wes Hills, Transsexual
Officer Fights Dismissal, DAYrON DAILY NEWS, July 22, 1994, at IA. But see Note,
Patriarchy Is Such a Drag. The Strategic Possibilities of a Postmodern Account of Gender,
108 HARV. L. REV. 1973, 1988 (1995) (misreadingJudith Butler's analysis of drag by
conflating surface femininity with sexual desire directed towards males).
Underwood, 857 F. Supp. at 98 (citing D.C. Mun. Regs., tit. 4, § 599).
'
5 9 Id. (citing Complaint 1 9).
140 "If she walked right past you in a restaurant, you wouldn't think twice about
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masculine traits; they were understood, however, as masculine traits
inside a logic that conflates the male body with masculine norms.
This shows how reluctant courts are to extend sex-related discrimi-
nation statutes beyond the boundaries of biology. The court did
not allow the plaintiff to challenge her employer's bias against her
because her body-characterized as her personal appearance-did
not match her core gender identity. A more interesting and
expansive reading of sex discrimination, which the judge refused to
entertain when he dismissed the sex discrimination cause of action,
was bias against the plaintiff because her gender (her inside or core
identity) did not match what others believed about her body (her
outside or surface identity)-which is to say that a woman could have
a biologically male body. The dismissal of the sex discrimination
cause of action in Underwood reflects the notion that there is a right
way to do one's sex in accordance with commonly accepted social
norms that coercively harmonize inside (biological sex) and outside
(gender) in such a way that maleness collapses into masculinity and
femaleness into femininity. This case illustrates quite nicely the
tension between immutability, body, sex, and gendered identity.
According to the traditional view, the sexed body-one's inside-is
immutable, whereas gender identity-one's outside-is mutable. Yet
for the transgendered person, the sexed body-one's outside-is
regarded as mutable while one's gendered identity-one's inside-is
experienced as immutable.1
41
The transgender Title VII cases are particularly instructive
because they force courts into a two-step process that foregrounds
the relationship between identity and equality. In setting forth the
meaning of "discrimination because of his sex" the court must first
identify what kind of wrong Title VII was intended to remedy:
"discrimination against women because of their status as females
and discrimination against males because of their status as
males." 4' Then the court must clarify what it means by female
and male, woman and man. While many courts use the terms sex
and gender interchangeably, on a foundational level they all
embrace an essentially biological definition of the two sexual
categories.
the fact that she was a very beautiful woman." Telephone Interview with Wayne R.
Cohen, Counsel to Patricia Underwood (Sept. 12, 1994).
141 See infra part IV.
142 Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 176, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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B. The Myth of Biological Dimorphism
To understand the meaning of sex discrimination in the way the
Ulane, Dobre, Wood, Sommers, Grossman, and Holloway courts did is to
say that one must be discriminated against because of the quality
that essentially defines one's identity as a member of a protected
class. Thus, discrimination collapses into differentiation. Yet this
is a very curious way of characterizing the wrong of sex discrimina-
tion. When framed in this manner it becomes clear that this
interpretation simply fails to describe correctly what takes place
when a person is discriminated against because of her sex.
When women are denied employment, for instance, it is not
because the discriminator is thinking "a Y chromosome is necessary
in order to perform this kind of work." Only in very rare cases can
sex discrimination be reduced to a question of body parts.14
Indeed, even employers hiring individuals for jobs in which body
strength is a reasonable qualification have abandoned sex-based
hiring policies because most studies of male and female physical
skills and abilities have revealed more significant within-group
differences than between-group differences.
144
143 Arguably, the pregnancy discrimination cases raise this specter, since only
women can become pregnant. Yet under interrogation, many of these childbearing
discrimination cases collapse into gender discrimination cases because they turn on
the social rather than biological meaning of parenthood. See Barbano v. Madison
County, 922 F.2d 139, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that an employer may not
question a female applicant about whether she would become pregnant and quit);
Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 807-08 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (stating that
the termination of a parochial school librarian for an "out-of-wedlock" pregnancy
violates Title VII). But see Chambers v. Omaho Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 703-04
(8th Cir. 1987) (stating that the discharge of a pregnant unmarried staff member was
justified as a bona fide occupational qualification by the club's "role model rule").
One important Supreme Court sex discrimination case did, however, consider
the significance of biological differences between men and women in the workplace.
U.A.W. v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991), considered whether women
of childbearing ages could be employed under different terms and conditions than
men in jobs that involved potential exposure to toxic substances. See id. at 197-99.
Johnson Controls, however, can be understood to stand for the proposition that a
woman's capacity to become pregnant cannot be used as a proxy for sex discrimina-
tion when the prophylactic justification for barring women from the workplace has
not yet been shown not to apply with equal or similar force to men's reproductive
potentiality. See also Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464,473 (1981) (stating
that different ages of consent for men and women are justified "[b]ecause virtually
all of the significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage
pregnancy fall on the young female").
144 See CYNTHIA COCKBURN, MACHINERY OF DOMINANCE: WOMEN, MEN AND
TECHNICAL KNOW-How 229-36 (1985) (discussing variations within each gender); see
also ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES ABOUT
THE DISAGGREGATION OF SEX FROM GENDER
Nevertheless, biological dimorphism remains unquestioned in
the context of athletic sexual segregation on the assumption that it
would not be fair for women to compete with men, most of whom
are thought to be much stronger than women. Here again we
witness the notion of fairness or equality tightly yoked to presumed
notions of difference. What, however, is the justification for women
playing best-two-out-of-three set tennis, and men playing best-three-
out-of-five?
The tests that accomplish the sexual separation of male and
female athletes-chromosomes or genitalia-have absolutely nothing
to do with sports prowess.145 It would be just as rational, if not
more so, to group athletes within height or weight classes, as in
boxing, weight-lifting, and wrestling. Interestingly enough, studies
reveal that
[b]etween 1964 and 1984 women marathon runners have knocked
more than an hour-and-a-half off their running times, while men's
times during the same period have decreased by only a few
minutes .... If the gap between highly trained male and female
athletes were to continue to close at the current rate, in thirty to
WOMEN AND MEN 218 (1989) (stating that the "amount of variation among men and
among women is greater than that between the sexes"); IRIS M. YOUNG, THROWING
LIKE A GIRL AND OTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY 142
(1990) (noting that different male and female body comportment and athletic ability
can be explained by the phenomenology of the gendered modalities of lived bodies
as opposed to ahistorical feminine essences); Janet S. Hyde, Meta-Analysis and the
Psychology of Gender Differences, 16 SIGNS 55 (1990).
Some feminist scientists believe that many physical differences between the sexes
can be attributed to differences in lifestyles and physical activity as children. See
FAUSTO-STERLING, supra, at 218 ("[I]t remains possible (and only time will tell) that
at least some of the height and strength dimorphism between males and females
would diminish in a culture in which girls from infancy on engaged in the same
amount and kind of physical activity as boys.").
. See, e.g., Susan Birrell & Cheryl L. Cole, Double Fault: Renee Richards and the
Construction and Naturalization of Difference, 7 Soc. SPORTJ. 1, 1-10 (1990) (demon-
strating ways in which our culture, through technology, law, and the media, constructs
woman and produces particular notions of gender, sex, and difference). In her sex
discrimination case, Renee Richards alleged that it was unfair for the U.S. Tennis
Association (U.S.T.A.) to impose a chromosomal eligibility test for competition in the
women's division of the U.S. Open when the test did not reveal anything about her
tennis ability and was specifically adopted by the U.S.T.A. because it was the only test
that they knew she would fail. See Richards v. U.S.T.A., 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup. Ct.
1977). Testing for the illicit use of hormones or steroids is common in both amateur
and professional sports and does bear some relevance upon an athlete's ability to
perform. Hormonal testing, however, is not used to differentiate women from men,
but rather to ferret out "cheaters" within already established sexual categories.
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forty years men and women would compete in these sports on an
equal basis.
146
This scientific evidence notwithstanding, we unquestioningly accede
to the "natural" division of men's and women's athletics and the
concomitant differential in prize money, sponsorships, and fame
that it produces.
So both gendered identity and gendered equality are the effect
of a cultural metaphysics that "start[s] out with two social categories
('women,' 'men'), [and] assume[s] they are biologically different
('female,' 'male')." 4 7 As Judith Lorber has written:
Every child is categorized as a "girl" or a "boy," every adult as a
.woman" or a "man." Once the gender category is given, the
attributes of the person are also gendered: Whatever a woman is
has to be "female"; whatever a man is has to be "male." ... Bodies
differ in many ways physiologically, but they are completely
transformed by social practices to fit into the salient categories of
a society, the most pervasive of which are "female" and "male" and
"women" and "men."148
Yet most of us believe that on some deep, metaphysical level,
biological facts exist independently of the labels we give them.
Chromosomes, genitalia and hormones are natural, and together
they make up the two natural kinds of people-males and females.
'46 FAUsTO-STERLING, supra note 144, at 218-19; see also Ken Dyer, Female Athletes
Are Catching Up, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 22, 1977, at 722, 722 (stating that in track,
athletics, and swimming, sex differentials in performance are declining). Recent
charges of steroid abuse leveled by the U.S. women's swim team at the female
Chinese athletes who performed exceptionally well at the 1994 World Games echo
the charges directed at the East German women's swim team in the 1976 Olympics.
In both cases, U.S. athletes questioned the "real" femaleness of the athletes involved.
See Neil Amdur, E. German Women's Success Stirs U.S. Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1976,
§ 5, at 3; Christine Brennan, Critics Take Chinese Swimmers to Task: Showing at Worlds
Raises Questions of Steroid Use, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1994, at C1.
The original reason for instituting "sex tests" [in Olympic competition] was
to eliminate "un-naturally" strong "women." Now it is becomingincreasing-
ly clear that strength is not gender dichotomous. This does not eliminate
the possibility that someday there might be a test to decide how much
muscle a "real" woman is allowed to have, and anything more would mean
she either was not a woman or she had been taking "male" hormones.
KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra note 25, at 54.
147 LORBER, supra note 9, at 39.
Id. at 38; see also SLAVOJ 211EK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY 96 (1989)
(noting that in the language of anti-Semitism, the term "Jew" does not connote a
cluster of supposedly true properties: "intriguing spirit, greedy for gain, and so on
... [rather the term implies that a certain group of people] are like that (greedy,
intriguing ... ) because they are Jews.").
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But in fact, the process of sexing bodies works just the other way
around. Our pregiven dimorphic concepts of gender lead to the
discovery of facts that differentiate the sexes:
Scientific knowledge does not inform the answer to "What makes
a person either a man or a woman?" Rather it justifies (and
appears to give grounds for) the already existing knowledge that
a person is either a woman or a man and that there is no problem
in differentiating between the two.
4 9
Except at that special moment when the birth attendant
exclaims, "It's a boy" or "It's a girl," real, physical body parts play
an insignificant role in both gender attribution and sex discrimina-
tion. Chromosomes play an even smaller role still. They are what
Harold Garfinkel called "cultural genitals" that play the essential
role in gender attribution and sex discrimination. 5 ' The cultural
genital is a metaphor for both the physical genital that is not
presently in view but which the person is assumed to have and the
gendered schema that constructs women as certain kinds of beings
and men as their opposite. 5' This schema is made manifest in a
system of gendered cues that communicates the signs of gender,
signs that we regard as reliable signifiers of one's "true sex."
To conceptualize both sexual identity and sex discrimination in
terms of biology at all is to ignore the role that gender stereotypes
play in the construction of sexual difference.
Whatever genes, hormones, and biological evolution contribute to
human social institutions is materially as well as qualitatively trans-
formed by social practices. Every social institution has a material
base, but culture and social practices transform that base into
something with qualitatively different patterns and constraints.152
In the end, bodies end up meaning less in the fight for equality
than the roles, clothing, myths, and stereotypes that transform a
149 KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra note 25, at 163. Recent studies purporting to find
significant differences in the size and functioning of the brains of men and women
reflect the same bias in research. They start with the presumption that there are male
brains and female brains, and then scrutinize exemplars of each kind of brain once
so labeled with the goal of discovering evidence of difference. See, e.g., Gina Kolata,
Man's World, Woman's World? Brain Studies Point to Differences, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
1995, at C1, C7 ("In the study... the investigators found that for the most part, the
brains of men and women at rest were indistinguishable from each other. But there
was one difference, found in a brain structure called the limbic system that regulates
emotions.").
1"o See HAROLD GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 116-85 (1967).
151 See id.
152 LORBER, supra note 9, at 17.
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vagina into a she. "Analyzing the social processes that construct the
categories we call 'female and male,' 'women and men,' 'homosexual
and heterosexual' uncovers the ideology and power differentials
congealed in these categories. " 15  These social processes should
be the subject of equality jurisprudence as much as, or more than,
the processes by which various costs and benefits are distributed to
members of biologically predefined sexual groups.
Biology and genitals, so it seems, operate as false proxies for the
real rules of both gender attribution and sexual identity in our
culture. Indeed, it is almost ludicrous to maintain that sex
discrimination, sexual identification,' or sexual identity takes
place on the level of biology or genitals. Yet the law continues to
insist that they do and in so doing it continues to naturalize sexual
dimorphism: the assumption that homo sapiens are divided into two
natural kinds-male and female.
III. THE ABSURDITY OF A BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATION
TO SEXUAL IDENTITY
So far, I have shown how the jurisprudential gaze in sex
discrimination cases sometimes targets biology,'55 and other times
targets illegitimate sex-role stereotyping.'56 In either case, the law
assumes a natural and biological foundation of sexual difference,
thereby distinguishing sexual differentiation from sexual discrimina-
tion. Upon examination, however, this assumption is revealed to be
a fiction: gender norms, not precultural biological facts, make up
the difference that sexual difference makes.
In this Part, I will show how the law plays an active and
important role in policing the "conditions of failure" implicit in the
process of gender attribution. Time and again, courts have stepped
in to resuscitate the myth that sexual identity is essentially biological
even when doing so flies in the face of the physical "facts."
153 Id. at 38.
1" That is, how we decide whether a person is a man or woman when we meet for
the first time:
The gender attribution process is an interaction between displayer and
attributor, but concrete displays are not informative unless interpreted in
light of the rules which the attributor has for deciding what it means to be
a female or male. As members of a sociocultural group, the displayer and
the attributor share a knowledge of the socially constructed signs of gender.
KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra note 25, at 157.
'5 See supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
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These cases illustrate how various legal devices, such as
annulment and divorce decrees, sumptuary laws, and sexual
declaratory judgment proceedings, 157 reinforce the fiction that
masculinity is a reliable sign of maleness and femininity is a reliable
sign of femaleness. Furthermore, in those circumstances in which
people present a challenge to the intrapersonal unity of biological
sex, core gender identity, and gender role identity,15 s they find
themselves legal outsiders, either suffering judicial punishment or
being refused the rights and benefits afforded as a matter of course
to people who conform to contemporary gender norms.
A. "Your Honor, My Wife Is a Man": The Matrimonial Cases
A number of courts have been called upon to decide the
meaning of "true sex" for the purpose of marriage. These cases
generally arise under one of two circumstances: i) when two people,
one of whom is transgendered, seek a marriage license, or ii) when
the marriage between two people, one of whom is transgendered,
fails and the nontransgendered spouse attempts to escape his or her
alimony obligations by challenging the legal validity of the mar-
riage.
59
As an initial matter, it is only by virtue of having limited the
marital partnership to two persons of opposite sexes16 0 that courts
find themselves in the uncomfortable position of having to define
explicitly what those opposite sexes are. 61  In virtually every
matrimonial case involving a transgendered person, the court
dismissed the possibility of same-sex marriage as impossible, not
merely as beyond the intent of the legislature. It is one thing to say
that the legislature did not think about marriage between two
persons of the same sex, as courts have said about the application
15' In sexual declaratory judgment proceedings, the court is given the power to
declare a person's true sex. See, e.g., infra notes 167-203 and accompanying text
(discussing at length the case of Corbett v. Corbett, 1971 P. 83 (1970), one of the
most important cases in Anglo-Americanjurisprudence in which a court determined
the meaning of a person's true sex in the context of marriage).
" Cf supra notes 25, 144.159 See e.g., infra notes 167-209 and accompanying text.
160 "[T]he characteristics which distinguish [marriage] from all other relationships
can only be met by two persons of opposite sex." Corbett v. Corbett, 1971 P. 83, 105-
06 (1970); see also Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1111 (1982).
16 "Since marriage is essentially a relationship between man and woman, the
validity of the marriage in this case depends, in my judgment, upon whether the
respondent is or is not a woman." Corbett, 1971 P. at 106.
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of Title VII to transgendered people; 6 2 it is quite a stronger claim
to regard such a marriage as unthinkable or oxymoronic. By
eliminating the possibility of same-sex unions from the institutional
integrity of marriage because "only persons who can become 'man
and wife' have the capacity to enter marriage,"163 courts have
found themselves uneasily fixing the contours and boundaries of
membership in the class of "men" and "wives" (or "women" as the
case may be).
Interestingly enough, most marriage statutes do not explicitly
require that a valid marriage be comprised of a man and a woman.
Instead, courts generally observe that "it goes without saying" that
a marriage is by definition the union of two people of different
sexes. Notwithstanding efforts by the gay and lesbian community
to demand nuptial elasticity from the institution of marriage, every
court, with one exception, 6 ' that has addressed the issue of
162 See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972).
163 M.T. v.J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
See, e.g., id. at 207-08 ("We accept-and it is not disputed-as the fundamental
premise in this case that a lawful marriage requires the performance of a ceremonial
marriage of two persons of the opposite sex, a male and a female .... The pertinent
statutes relating to marriages and married persons do not contain any explicit
references to a requirement that marriage must be between a man and a woman....
It is so strongly and firmly implied from a full reading of the statutes that a different
legislative intent, one which would sanction a marriage between persons of the same
sex, cannot be fathomed." (emphasis added)); B. v. B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 716 (Sup. Ct.
1974) ("Neither by statutory nor decisional law has this state defined male and female.
New York neither specifically prohibits marriage between persons of the same sex nor
authorizes issuance of marriage license [sic] to such persons. However, marriage is
and always has been a contract between a man and a woman."); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499,500 (Sup. Ct. 1971) ("The law makes no provision for
a 'marriage' between persons of the same sex. Marriage is and always has been a
contract between a man and a woman.");Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589-90
(Ky. 1973) ("[Marriage] must be defined according to common usage[] ... because
Kentucky statutes do not specifically prohibit marriage between persons of the same
sex nor do they authorize the issuance of a marriage license to such persons.... In
substance, the relationship proposed by the appellants [two women] does not
authorize the issuance of a marriage license because what they propose is not a
marriage."). But see In re Gary S. Petri, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29 (N.Y. City Surr.
Ct. Apr. 4, 1994) (rejecting a surviving gay partner's claim that he and his partner
could not have married because New York state law "has no requirement that
applicants for a marriage license be of different sexes").
16" The Supreme Court of Hawaii recently became the first court to find that its
state constitution might bar a prohibition against same-sex marriage. See Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), superseded by 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217. Every other
court that has considered the question of same-sex marriage has upheld the state's
right to limit marriage to male/female couples. See e.g., Dean v. District of
Columbia, 653 A.2d 307,331-33 (D.C. 1995) (holding that same-sex marriages are not
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matrimonially appropriate gender configurations has found that a
marriage is the union of a man and a woman, either because "the
marriage relationship exists with the result and for the purpose of
begetting offspring," 166 or because "[i]t is the institution on which
the family is built, and in which the capacity for natural hetero-
sexual intercourse is an essential element."
67
Corbett v. Corbett' is one of the first cases in Anglo-American
jurisprudence in which a court was called upon to determine the
meaning of a person's true sex in the context of marriage.
169
Judge Ormrod's opinion, cited in subsequent American cases,70
is remarkable both for its detail in discussing the facts of the
parties' lives and bodies, and for its attention to the emotional
particulars of the courtship and eventual marriage between Arthur
Corbett-a sometimes male transvestite-and April Ashley--a
transgendered woman. When the two first met, Corbett occasion-
ally wore female clothing but felt frustrated at what he was able to
achieve through these sartorial exercises: "'I didn't like what I saw;
protected by the Due Process Clause);Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky.
1973) (holding that the Constitution neither sanctions nor protects same-sex
marriages); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185-86 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S.810 (1972) (finding that a same-sex marriage falls outside the spirit, although
not the letter, of the Minnesota marriage laws); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952,
953-56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (stating that two persons of the same sex cannot enter
a common law marriage); Singerv. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 & n.11 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974) (noting that statutory prohibitions against same sex marriages are not
unconstitutional); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay
Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 204-20 (1994) (arguing that
discrimination against lesbians and gay men is sex discrimination that a state may not
practice without showing a sufficiently important state interest and that the Hawaii
Supreme Court in Baehr correctly employed formal equal protection analysis to
invalidate that state's prohibition against same-sex marriage).
' B. v. B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717; see also Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1042-
43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982) (stating that one of the possible
reasons that "Congress has determined that preferential [immigration] status is not
warranted for the spouses of homosexual marriages" is "homosexual marriages never
produce offspring").
167 Corbett v. Corbett, 1971 P. 83, 105 (1970).
168 1971 P. 83 (1970).
'"Id. at 105 ("[This] appears to be the first occasion on which a court in England
has been called upon to decide the sex of an individual .... I must, therefore,
approach the matter as one of principle.").
171 See, e.g., Olsen v. Olsen, 557 P.2d 604, 610 (Idaho 1976); M.T. v.J.T., 355 A.2d
204, 208-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); City of Columbus v. Zanders, 266
N.E.2d 602, 606 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1970); In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513
N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio P. Ct. 1987).
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you want the fantasy to appear right. It utterly failed to appear
right in my eyes. '""'
Yet when Corbett first met Ashley and invited her to lunch, "he
was mesmerised by her."17 2 As Corbett later testified, "'[tihis was
so much more than I could ever hope to be. The reality was far
greater than my fantasy .... [Ilt far outstripped any fantasy for
myself. I could never have contemplated it for myself.'
17
They dated for three years, during which time Corbett quickly
developed for [Ashley] the interest of a man for a woman. He said
that she looked like a woman, dressed like a woman and acted like
a woman.... [H]is feelings had become those of a full man in
love with a girl, not those of a transvestite in love with a trans-
sexual.'74
There were, however, some difficulties during their three-year
courtship. "[Corbett's] emotions swung about like a pendulum,
from feeling jealous of her as a woman, by which, I think, she meant
jealous of her success in adopting the female role he often wished
he could adopt also, to jealous feelings about other men who were
attracted to her."
17 5
Finally, they were married in Gibraltar in September of 1963,
but they separated after only fourteen days, in part because Corbett
was unable fully to consummate the marriage. 176  Curiously, the
legalization of their relationship destroyed the fantasy that had
made it work for more than three years. In a letter to Corbett,
informing him that she wanted a permanent separation, Ashley
wrote, "It's so funny but I felt so much more ... secure before I
married you than I did after. Then you denying what you had so
promised made me feel so sick to the stomach." 7 7 And so the
couple split, the normalizing and literalizing effect of the institution
of marriage having destroyed the fantasy that had made the
relationship initially so powerful for both parties.
178
173 Corbet, 1971 P. at 92 (quoting Arthur Corbett).
172 Id.
171 Id. (quoting Arthur Corbett).
174 Id.
175 Id. at 93.
176 Prior to their wedding, the couple had remained chaste, yet once married "they
slept together and on several occasions he succeeded in penetrating her fully but
immediately gave up saying- 'I can't, I can't,' and withdrew without ejaculation and
burst into tears.'" Id. at 94.
'7 Id. at 95.
17 See id. at 94. It is particularly interesting to note that it was Corbett (the cross-
dresser), not Ashley (the transgendered person), who was most affected by the
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After spending a number of pages recounting the narrative of
the couple's courtship and marriage-an "essentially pathetic, but
almost incredible, story"'79-Judge Ormrod turned to the primary
factual question before him: Ashley's true sex at the time of the
marriage."' Having taken extensive testimony from psychiatrists,
gynecologists, endocrinologists, physicians, and state-appointed
sexual organ inspectors, all so-called experts in transsexuality,
"anomalies in the development of sex organs,"'8 ' and "sex and
gender problems,"8 2 the court concluded that i) prior to her
surgery, Ashley had possessed male gonads and male genitals, ii)
after her surgery she registered female hormonal levels and
"remarkably good" female genitals,183 and iii) at all times she
possessed male chromosomes, a transsexual psychology, and passed
easily as a woman; indeed, "'the pastiche of femininity was convinc-
ing.'
18 4
About these "facts," the court noted little disagreement, either
among the parties or among the experts. In fact, the objectivity and
reliability of science in fixing the fact of Ashley's sex gave the court
great comfort.8 5  Yet, among the more fascinating question-
begging "objective" facts that the court took into consideration was
the fact that "individual body cells [possess] male or female
characteristics" 86 and that doctors "do not determine sex-in
medicine we determine the sex in which it is best for the individual
to live."8 " For this reason the court endorsed the pathologizing
legalization of their relationship.
179 Id. at 92.
180 See id. at 89 ("[T]he validity of the marriage... depends upon the true sex of
the respondent. . .
Ill Id. at 97.
182 Id.
18 Two court-appointed sex organ inspectors filed a report in the case recounting
that: "'The vagina is of ample size to admit a normal and erect penis. The walls are
skin covered and moist. There is no impediment on "her part" to sexual intercourse
.... [T]he surgical result was remarkably good.'" Id. at 96.
18 Id. at 104.
"" The court stated:
The quality of the medical evidence on both sides was quite outstanding,
not only in the lucidity of its exposition, but also in its intellectual and
scientific objectivity, and I wish to express to all the distinguished doctors
concerned in this case my gratitude .... The cause of justice is deeply
indebted to them.
Id. at 89.
16 Id. at 97.
'
87 Id. at 100.
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expert testimony that "[t]he purpose of [sex-change] operations is,
of course, to help to relieve the patients' symptoms and to assist in
the management of their disorder; it is not to change their sex."18
Contrast the normal scientific lens through which the court
viewed the testimony of its experts with its characterization of the
transgendered person's inherently unreliable perspective: "[Trans-
sexuals] are said to be 'selective historians,' tending to stress events
which fit in with their ideas and to suppress those which do
not."189 For Judge Ormrod, the experts' testimony described a
state of affairs, which while tragic, was not tainted by any particular
paradigmatic filter, whereas the testimony of the parties-a transves-
tite man and a transgendered woman-was given almost no
credibility given the abnormality and illogicity of the underlying
logic of their lives.
190
And so, based entirely upon the testimony of the experts, the
court reached several important conclusions. First, the correct
criteria for "womanness" should be "the chromosomal, gonadal and
genital tests .... [But] the greater weight would probably be given
to the genital criteria than to the other two." 191  Second, an
individual's sex is permanently fixed at birth and cannot be later
changed either naturally or through the intervention of science.'
92
Therefore, Ashley "is not, and was not, a woman at the date of
the ceremony of marriage, but was, at all times, a male."
19
AnticipatingJustice Scalia's observations some twenty-five years later
"8 Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
189 Id.
190 See id. at 93.
Listening to each party describing this strange relationship, my principle
impression was that it had little or nothing in common with any hetero-
sexual relationship which I could recall hearing about in a fairly extensive
experience of this court. I also think that it would be very unwise to
attempt to assess [Ashley's] feminine characteristics by the impression which
[Corbett] says she made on him .... He is an unreliable yardstick by which
to measure [Ashley's] emotional and sexual responses. As a further
indication of the unreality of his feelings for [Ashley], it is common ground
that he introduced her to his wife and family and quite frequently took her
to his house or on outings with them.
Id.
191 Id. at 106.
1 See id. at 104 ("It is common ground between all the medical witnesses that the
biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth (at the latest), and
cannot be changed, either by the natural development of organs of the opposite sex,
or by medical or surgical means.").
191 Id. at 108.
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in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 9 4 Judge Ormrod held that any
evidence that tended to show how successfully Ashley had "passed"
as a woman was therefore irrelevant. "These submissions, in effect,
confuse sex with gender. Marriage is a relationship which depends
on sex and not on gender."195 On this reading, no matter how
persuasive Ashley's performance of femininity was, it was an
inauthentic performance that could not rehabilitate her pitiful status
and confer upon her the rightful title "woman." Therefore, the
notion that sexual identity flows not from gender but from biology
was preserved.
Or was it? Curiously, Ashley's remarkably good female genitals
seemed not to be enough to give her the right to call herself a
woman. Here we witness the power, sub rosa, of the cultural, not
the physical, genitals as the essence of true sex. In order to find
that Ashley was not a woman, Judge Ormrod had to distinguish a
1966 case that one would have thought to be controlling in Corbett.
In S.Y. v. S.Y.,"9 ' a husband sought to have his marriage annulled
because he and his wife had been unable to consummate their
marriage on account of an abnormality in the wife's genitals. She
had been born with vagina atresia, a congenital condition which,
among other things, rendered her vagina roughly one or two inches
in length.19 7 The question before the court was whether the
marriage could be nullified for failure to achieve consummation as
a result of the wife's "incurable incapacity.""9 '
Although the wife was willing to undergo a medical procedure
that would enlarge her vagina and make coitus possible, the
husband objected.
In order to constitute true coitus, there must, it is said, be full
penetration by way of a vaginal passage. Here... the wife in her
present condition has no vaginal passage, and the effect of the
operation would not be to create a true vagina but merely an
artificial cavity .... [A] mere cul-de-sac leading nowhere would
not of itself be conclusive.
99
The judge, however, refused to accept the husband's construc-
tion of the inauthenticity and illegitimacy of the wife's postsurgical
194 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
195 Corbett, 1971 P. at 107.
1- [1962] 3 W.L.R. 526.
W9 See id. at 108.
1
9 Id. at 58-59.
199 Id. at 59.
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body. Having found that neither the ability to conceive nor the
degree of sexual satisfaction were necessary for vera copula, the
judge then queried "what else, it may be asked, remains to differen-
tiate between intercourse by means of an artificial vagina and
intercourse by means of a natural vagina artificially enlarged?"2"
Finding nothing, he affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the
husband's petition to annul the marriage.
20 1
In light of this precedent, Judge Ormrod was confronted with a
difficult problem. Having held that body parts determined sexual
identity, and that Ashley had what appeared to be female body
parts, he had to find a way to hold that they were not real female
body parts by distinguishing S.Y. v. S.Y. He did so by arguing that
the procedures that could rehabilitate vaginal abnormalities had
only been recently developed and that all previous cases had been
resolved as a matter of incapacity. As for the wife in S.Y. v. S.Y., the
question of her true sex was never before the court, because it was
assumed that she was a real woman. In essence, her status as a real
woman, that is her cultural genitals, authenticated whatever actual
genitals she had or could have. As such, the question was before
Judge Ormrod as a matter of first impression, 2 2 and as a matter
of principle he was compelled to rule that a person's sex was fixed
at birth. For this reason, as between Corbett and Ashley,
I do not think that sexual intercourse, using the completely
artificial cavity constructed by Dr. Burou, can possibly be de-
scribed ... as "ordinary and complete intercourse" or as "vera
copula-of the natural sort of coitus." When such a cavity has
been constructed in a male, the difference between sexual
intercourse using it and anal or intra-crural intercourse is, in my
judgment to be measured in centimetres.0 3
Therefore, notwithstanding present physical facts to the contrary,
once a person has been attributed a sex, it is not available to
subsequent alteration.
In fact, Judge Ormrod's reasoning reflects Freud's observation
that "[m]ale or female is the first differentiation that you make
when you meet another human being, and you are used to making
that decision with absolute certainty."2 4 Indeed, we are normally
200 Id. at 62.
201 See id. at 108.
202 See Corbett v. Corbett, 1971 P. 83, 105 (1970).
2" Id. at 107 (citations omitted).
20 SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 155 (J.H.
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reluctant to revise that initial attribution of gender once it is
made:
205
Once a gender status has been ascribed to a person, a belief in the
popular gender schema leads one to assume the corresponding sex
and to ignore or rationalize away any indications to the contrary.
Once an assumption of maleness has been made, the masculinity
of the individual can be stretched limitlessly without that assump-
tion of maleness being called into doubt .... [I]f an observer is
secure in the appraisal of a person's gender and sex, the observer
will resist contrary evidence because the popular schema postulates
that one's sex is, and can only be, at all times evident to all
observers .... [I]t is unthinkable that a firm and unquestioned
gender ascription might be wrong.
20 6
Nonconforming facts are not viewed as grounds for revisiting our
initial take, but rather are marginalized and deemphasized. as
anomalous variations on the norm: "Isn't it odd that that man has
what look like breasts?" or "boy, the muscles on that woman are
something, she must really work out, or use steroids" This, of
course, was Quine's point when he suggested that the totality of our
beliefs is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only
along the edges. "[Knowledge] is like a field [that] is so
underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there
is much latitude as to what statements to reevaluate in light of any
contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any
particular statements in the interior of the field."20 7
What is present in these matrimonial opinions is the underlying
logic of difference: if not male then female, and if not female then
male. Whenever any of the courts writing in this area faced the
possibility of recognizing a more complicated sexual calculus that
Sprott trans., 1933).
'*0 Recall the family's reaction to the posthumous discovery thatjazz musician Billy
Tipton was a woman. Tipton had been married and had three sons, yet when the
funeral director revealed their father's secret, one of the sons insisted: "He'll always
be Dad [to me]." Entertainer's Secret-He Was a She, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 2, 1989, at Al.
Io- Holly Devor, Gender Blending Females, 31 Am. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 12, 35-36
(1987). Kessler and McKenna have made the following similar observation about our
investment in initial gender attributions: "[1f the physical genital is not present when
it is expected (or vice versa), the original gender attribution is not necessarily altered.
When expectations are violated a change in gender attribution does not necessarily
follow. It is the cultural genital which plays the essential role in gender attribution."
KESSLER & McKENNA, supra note 25, at 154.
207 WILLARD V.0. QUINE, "Two DOGMAS EMPIRICISM," FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF
VIEw 42-43 (1963).
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would provide a third, fourth, or greater alternative,208 they
emphatically denied the possibility of such an option. "It has been
suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a
'no-man's land' [sic] for those individuals who are neither truly
'male' nor truly 'female.'" Yet the standard is much too fixed for
such far-out theories.
209
So we are left with a conception of male and female as not only
one another's opposite, but as one another's contradiction. Most
often, courts answer the question "what sex is this person?" by
resort to biological essentialism: Real men are made one way, and
real women are made another way. But this necessity easily reveals
itself to be a myth. The gesture toward body parts often operates
as a subterfuge, masking the metaphor made real by law2" and the
degree to which real sexual identities, as lived, are the effect of a
particular lens or schema of gender that authenticates some facts
and discredits others.
211
208 THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO
FREUD 11 (1990) (noting that the sex of the mind is often separated from the sex of
the body); Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough,
SCIENCES, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 20-24 (stating that there's a shocking lack of substance
behind many ideas about biologically-based sex differences).
o T. v. T., 355 A.2d 204, 210 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 364 A.2d
1076 (N.J. 1976); see also In re Anonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668, 669 (Civ. Ct. 1970)
(stating that "society recognizes only the two disparate sexes"); Anonymous v. Mellon,
398 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (stating that "with respect to gender, a person
was either male or female, and no three ways about it").
210 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and the racial categorization cases
literalized the metaphor of blood in much the same way.
In the discourse of blood, semiotic representation simultaneously becomes
inevitable and problematic-inevitable, because appearance (looking like [a
white person]) is no longer sufficient proof; problematic, both because the
appearance of social life for blacks and whites is now called into question,
and because no other evidentiarily acceptable proof of blood exists. To
substantiate blood, to substantiate what is neither a mimetic description nor
a tangible entity but instead a semiotic figure, is impossible. Caught in an
epistemological loop, courts were led right back to social codes based on
appearance, which was where the problem had begun.
Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, 8 RARITAN 39, 58 (1988).
211 A similar point is made in Note, supra note 137, at 1989-90, but by way of a
common misreading of Judith Butler's theory of gender and performativity first
introduced in Gender Trouble. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990) [hereinafter
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE]. In BODIES THAT MATTER, Butler explicitly disavowed
readings of her work that attributed to her the notion that gender is merely drag. See
JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER at x-xxi (1993) [hereinafter BUTLER, BODIES].
She does not maintain "that one woke up in the morning, perused the closet or some
more open space for the gender of choice, donned that gender for the day, and then
restored the garment to its place at night." Id. at x. In place of such a humanist
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B. "It's a Girl!": Institutional Performativity and Sex
Another way to understand the law's relationship to sexual
identity is to consider the difference between judicial statements
that describe a state of affairs and judicial statements that bring
about a state of affairs. When, for instance, a court finds that a fire
department has never hired a woman firefighter, it is describing a
state of affairs. When, however, the court finds that the fire
department is guilty of sex discrimination, it brings about a
particular legal result: the creation of liability by virtue of a legal
pronouncement. These two types of juridical speech acts are
imbued with two different kinds of normativity. When the court
describes a state of affairs it has a responsibility to do so as
accurately as possible, yet when the court pronounces a verdict or
legal judgment we understand that action to be an externally
sanctioned exercise of power. In the first case, the aspiration is that
the judge's words fit the world, whereas in the second case the
world is changed to fit the judge's words. In other words, the true
conditions of a description are independent of the speech act itself,
whereas a pronouncement of guilt is true "because I said so."
212
These locutionary distinctions are key to understanding the
relationship of law to sexual identity. Generally we have confidence
in authority when it can answer difficult and important questions in
bright line, unambiguous terms: true/false, yes/no, guilt!
innocence. Indeed, courts are most comfortable when operating
according to this kind of logic. When the stakes are high, as they
always are in disputes over sexual identity, we particularly expect,
indeed demand, clear-cut answers-for always implicated in the
question "Who or what is s/he?" is the question "Who or what am
I?"
When confronted with the question "what sex is s/he?" courts
have two choices: describe an unambiguous sexual fact of the
account of gendered subjectivity, Butler proposes a theory that regards gender norms
as part of what determines the subject. As such, construction is a constitutive
constraint. See id. at xi; infra note 218.
212 See JOHN L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson ed.,
1965); see also 1 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:
REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 277-337 (Thomas McCarthy trans.,
1984) (translating Austin and Searle's theories of language into political theory);
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979)
(discussing the law's authority to bring about a result "because I said so");JOHN R.
SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969)
(developing further Austin's notions of constative and performative speech acts).
1995]
52 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144:1
matter or invoke the power to engender the right answer by resort
to "because I said so." In either case, judges resist the notion that
in some cases this is a difficult question that requires a normative,
not a descriptive answer. As is evident in the transgender matri-
monial cases, there is no unambiguous sexual state of affairs outside
of a discourse of power. A person's sex becomes fixed by operation
of a court order, not by virtue of an ambiguous natural order.
Consequently, courts pronounce a fact of the matter and then
justify that act of declarative power by resort to the myth of
essentialism. They may say they are acting descriptively, but in fact
they are acting performatively. By naturalizing what appear to be
valid claims about sexual identity, courts are able to "cleanse
language of its productivity. "213
This exercise of power is no more evident than in the
nomenclaturial cases where a transgendered person's sexual
designation on his or her birth certificate is at issue. In In Re
Declaratory Relief for Ladrach,214 two people, a man and a
transgendered woman, sought an order from an Ohio court to
declare that they be issued a marriage license. Recognizing that it
had to pick a rule to determine true sex, the court declared that
"[i]t is generally accepted that a person's sex is determined at birth
by an anatomical examination by the birth attendant. This results
in a declaration on the birth certificate of either 'boy' or 'girl' or
'male' or 'female.' This then becomes a person's true sex."215
The court then said that once a person's true sex has been fixed in
this manner, it cannot be altered or revised by subsequent surgery
or other intervention. 6  Under this view of the performative
nature of the birth attendant's speech, Ladrach "was thus correctly
designated 'Boy' on his birth certificate" 217 because "[t]here was
no evidence that applicant at birth had any physical characteristics
other than those of a male." 18 Ladrach's sex was pronounced then
2 18 DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECON-
STRUCTION, AND THE LAW 29 (1991).
214 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio P. Ct. 1987).
215 Id. at 832.
216 id.
217 Id.
21
1 Id. It is quite interesting to note that in some instances courts consider
"female" as an adjective that modifies a noun, see, e.g., Anonymous v. Mellon, 398
N.Y.S.2d 99, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1977) ("Psychologically the petitioner is female. .. ."); B.
v. B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 713 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (stating that "'defendant was and is a
Male person and capable and qualified to marry with a female person'"), while at
other times "female" is treated as a noun. See, e.g., T. v. T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780, 781
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and forever male. In these cases, the power to name is delegated to
a medical or administrative authority; so long as that agent acts
according to the rules governing his or her office, a court will not
second guess that designation or allow the individual so labeled to
do so. In effect, the individual has been denied the authority to
describe, or declare, and thereby create, the fact of his or her own
sex, in the same way that the base runner is unable to call him or
herself safe-only the umpire has that authority. The conventions
of our gender schema control the first case, while the conventions
of baseball control the second.
Notice the relationship between the court's gender reading and
gender naming. The birth attendant is charged with reading
anatomical signs, and declaring an interpretation of those signs,
which declaration then becomes the person's true and permanently
inalterable sex. The court here is less concerned with the substance
of interpretive gender rules than with the fact that an interpretation
be made, and that it be made at a particular moment in time. Once
the body is read, two things happen: text is subordinated to
interpretation, and later re-readings are not permitted-narrative
time suddenly stops. As such, the birth attendant's declaration of
the baby's sex is performative rather than descriptive, creating
rather than describing the child's sex.
219
The same dynamic was in evidence in Corbett:
[April Ashley] was born on April 29, 1935, in Liverpool and
registered at birth as a boy in the name of George Jamieson and
brought up as a boy. It has not been suggested at any time in this
case that there was any mistake over the sex of the child. 2
(Fain. Ct. 1985) ("[T]he respondent is a female .... "); Anonymous v. Anonymous,
325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971) ("[T]he defendant was a male at the time of
the alleged marriage."). Is sex an attribute we have, or is it who we are? Is it me or
is it mine? Some courts view sex more like a sense of humor, height, or athletic
ability, while others see it as a part of who we are, like being black. Judith Butler
regards the question of whether sex is constitutive or attributional as secondary.
"'Sex' is, thus, not simply what one has, or a static description of what one is: it will
be one of the norms by which the 'one' becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a
body for life within the domain of cultural intelligibility." BUTLER, BODIES, supra note
211, at 2.
2'9 See BUTLER, BODIES, supra note 211, at 237 ("The sign, understood as a gender
imperative--'girlV'-reads less as an assignment than as a command...."). From this
perspective, the old adage "boys will be boys" could be understood as a command
rather than a description of a state of affairs.
2" Corbett v. Corbett, 1971 P. 83, 89 (1970).
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From this, the court concluded that April Ashley's sex was properly
and permanently "fixed at birth."22 '
Reflecting the inclination to deny the justiciability of sexual
naming as a matter of legal record, a civil court judge in In re
Anonymous222 considered a petition
by a "transsexual" to change petitioner's obviously male name to
a female name .... [T]he petitioner, a member of the male sex,
has undergone a series of medical treatments and operations
which were designed to, and had the effect of changing the
physical appearance of petitioner so that petitioner has, in general,
the outward physical aspects usually attributed to a female.
223
The court granted the petition on the grounds that there was no
evidence that the petitioner's use of a female name would result in
fraud or prejudice to others. 224  However, the court explicitly
declared that it did not have jurisdiction legally to change the
petitioner's sex and insisted that "the order shall not be used or
relied upon by petitioner as any evidence or judicial determination
that the sex of the petitioner has in fact been changed." 225
According to local law in most Western European countries,
when a child is born and visually categorized by the attending nurse
or midwife as male or female according to his or her genitalia, the
parents may select a name for the baby from one of two official
22 Id. at 104.
314 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Civ. Ct. 1970).
s Id. at 669. Such a discussion, emphasizing outward as opposed to inward
sexual identity, echoes Esther Newton's observations about male drag and the tension
between sartorial illusion and the myth of essential sexual identity.
[T]his assertion that "appearance is an illusion" works in two simultaneously
contradictory ways, by declaring that the outside (the performer's clothing)
is feminine and his inside (the body inside the clothing) is masculine, and,
at the same time, that the outside (the performer's body) is masculine and
his inside (his "essence" or "self") is feminine.
ESTHER NEWTON, MOTHER CAMP: FEMALE IMPERSONATORS IN AMERICA 101-03 (1972).
'4 But see In re Anonymous, 587 N.Y.S.2d 548,549 (Civ. Ct. 1992) ("[T]he change
of name from a 'male' name to a 'female' name would be fraught with danger of
deception and confusion and contrary to the public interest.").
In re Anonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 670; see also In re Rivera, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 10,
1995, at 25 (noting that an application for a name change "is granted solely upon the
condition that petitioner may not use or rely upon this order as any evidence
whatsoever of judicial determination that the sex of petitioner has in fact been
changed automatically"). Saul Kripke has developed a theory of names as designators
that rigidly identify objects across worlds by picking out their essential properties.
See SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1980); see also BUTLER, BODIES, supra
note 211, at 210-14 (applying Kripke's theory of rigid designation to sexual identity).
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birth registries: one setting forth official male names and another
setting forth official female names. Local birth registries reflect
both the child's gendered name and civil status. Crossing over is
not allowed.
This performative aspect of gendered naming, in which law
operates to fix a person's sex through the instruments of the
modem bureaucratic state, was eliminated by the German Constitu-
tional Court in 1979 in a case involving a male-to-woman
transgendered person who sought to have her civil status and birth
registry entry changed from male to female. Relying upon the
German Constitution's provision that "[e]veryone shall have the
right to the free development of his [or her] personality," but only
"insofar as he [or she] does not violate the rights of others or offend
against the constitutional order or the moral code[,]" 22 6 the
Constitutional Court held that
[h]uman dignity and the constitutional right to the free develop-
ment of personality demand, therefore, that one's civil status be
governed by the sex with which he is psychologically and physically
identified. Our law and society are based on the principle that
each person is either "masculine" or "feminine" and that this
identification is independent of any possible genital anomalies.
2
Thus, in 1979 the German Constitutional Court interpreted the
German Constitution as protecting a degree of human agency with
respect to sexual identity that could not be imagined in the United
States even today, some sixteen years later.
Again, the analogy to racial identity is instructive in understand-
ing the relationship between identity and the authority of law. In
State ex rel. Plaia v. Louisiana State Board of Health,2 28 a mother
brought a mandamus action to compel the state to issue a birth
certificate for her newborn girl declaring the child's race to be
white. In accordance with state law, the mother had filed a
certificate of live birth with the local registrar in which she
designated the child's race as white. The registrar, however, refused
to issue a birth certificate because he believed the child's mother to
be one-half black, thereby rendering the child legally black accord-
ing to the official formula which established that "'a person having
26 GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. II, § 1 (F.R.G.).
227 See Transsexual Case, 49 BVerfGE 286 (1979), reprinted in DONALD P.
KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 341, 342 (1989).
228 296 So. 2d 809 (La. 1974).
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one thirty-second or less of Negro blood shall not be deemed,
described or designated by any public official in the state of
Louisiana as colored.'
229
Reversing the lower court, the Louisiana Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiffs argument that the racial classificatory statute
was both irrational and vague insofar as it gave the registrar the
power to declare a person's race. The lower court had noted that
one of the problems with the classification system was that the
registrar's decision reflected
a mathematical result by using an equation consisting of many
unknowns, namely, the terms used on old documents in his
possession classifying the ancestors of the child as 'colored,'
'mulatto,' 'French,' 'mixed race,' 'brown,' which terms are
uncertain insofar as they call for any specific fractions of Negro
blood in the individuals so designated.23 0
In this case, the local registrar assumed that any relative categorized
"colored" or "mulatto" on any document he deemed relevant must
be at least one-half black.
231
The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, found that the state
had properly vested in the local registrar the authority to declare a
person's race and that the registrar had not abused his power by
applying this test of racial identity. Having so held, the court then
concluded that birth certificates on file may not be altered, except
upon receipt of acceptable evidence that left no room for doubt that
an error had been made.232 Mirroring both Plessy v. Ferguson
2 3
and the sex cases, the Plaia court affirmed the bureaucratic author-
ity of the local registrar to change legally a person's race "because
he said so," even if the reasons given were irrational or vague.
These cases show how judicial and administrative efforts to
make essential sexual meaning are anything but descriptive. Rather,
Id. at 810 (quoting Act 46 of 1970 (R.S. 42:267)).
"s State ex rel. Plaia v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 275 So. 2d 201,203 (La. Ct.
App. 1973), modified 296 So. 2d 809 (La. 1974).
23' State ex rel. Plaia, 275 So. 2d at 203.
2
-
2 Id. at 810. Louisiana's "one thirty-second" statute was repealed in 1983;
however, in Doe v. State, 479 So. 2d 369 (La. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 485 So. 2d
60 (La. 1986), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1002 (1986), a Louisiana appellate court
dismissed a mandamus action brought by the children and grandchildren of a married
couple who were "erroneously designate[d] ... 'colored,' when in fact they were
white." Id. at 371. The plaintiffs sought to have their parents'/grandparents' birth
certificates posthumously changed to white, but the court regarded the Plaia case as
controlling. See id. at 372.
-1 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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these efforts represent a performative exercise whereby the world
is brought into conformity with the word. As such, the sign
"woman" is not a mirror of nature or a label that attaches to a
pregiven constituency" 4 but instead attaches to a set of subjects
whose legal identity is the contingent effect of the act of naming.
Consider the similarities between the signs "woman" and "man"
and the signs that appear on bathroom doors-stick figures, one
wearing a dress and the other wearing pants. If one reads those
bathroom signs literally, women wearing pants will make a serious
category mistake and risk prosecution for violating the laws that
enforce the essential differences between women and men.
23 5
Instead, we know to read them symbolically: notwithstanding how
I look, I understand that the figure wearing a dress stands for,
rather than reflects, me. In this sense, the sign does more than
refer to women; it constitutes the feminine identity that it enunci-
ates. 216 Judith Butler made a related point when she wrote that
"[p]olitical signifiers, especially those that designate subject
positions, are not descriptive; that is, they do not represent pregiven
constituencies, but are empty signs which come to bear
phantasmatic investments of various kinds."
237
In this sense, gendered signs have a kind of performative qual-
ity. They make the vagina into a she, and they make a person who
executes the gender cues correctly and articulately into a woman.
This social fact is evidenced by a cultural phenomenology in which
' As Judith Butler explains:
The "subject-position" ofwomen, for instance, is never fixed by the signifier
"women"; that term does not describe a preexisting constituency, but is,
rather, part of the very production and formulation of that constituency,
one that is perpetually renegotiated and rearticulated in relation to other
signifiers within the political field.
BUTLER, BODIES, supra note 211, at 195.
' In Houston, Texas in 1990, Denise Wells was arrested for using the men's
room at a country western concert under an ordinance that prohibited entering "any
public restroom designated for the exclusive use of the sex opposite to such person's
sex.., in a manner calculated to cause a disturbance." See Lisa Belkin, Seeking Some
Relief, She Stepped Out of Line, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1990, at A6 (quoting HOUSTON,
TEX. MUN. CODE § 72-904 (1972)). She was ultimately acquitted of all charges. See
Woman Is Acquitted in Trialfor Using the Men's Room, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1990, at A8.
236 Of course, the analogy applies with even stronger force to many phenotypically
white persons who had to choose between white and negro drinking fountains in
states that defined a person as non-white if he or she possessed one drop of "African
blood." See, e.g., 1866 Tenn. Pub. Acts XL § 1 ("[A]II Negroes, Mulattoes, Mestizoes,
and their descendants, having any African blood in their veins, shall be known in this
State as 'Persons of Color.'").
237 BUTLER, BODIES, supra note 211, at 191.
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one's true sex is merely evidenced, not constituted, by the genital
that is physically present, and a legal rule of evidence by which the
genital is regarded as probative, but by no means dispositive or
irrebuttable evidence of one's true sex.218 It is the cultural genital,
the metaphoric "something extra," the presence of which is proven
by the signs of gender, that makes a woman and makes a man and
that cannot be rebutted by physical facts to the contrary.
C. Chromosomal Surgica or Sartorial Accessorizing: Can
Clothes Really Make the Man?
The law has been a well-worn tool in the normalization and
protection of the signs of sexual differences. By policing the
boundaries of proper gender performance in the workplace and in
the street, both civil and criminal laws have been invoked to punish
gender outlaws, and thereby reinscribe masculinity as belonging to
men and femininity as belonging to women.
Part of the socialization necessary for membership in a particu-
lar community is a fluency in the signs of gender.239 Kenneth
Karst described it as a process by which
238 Eva Saks made a similar observation about race and phenotype when she
discussed Jones v. State, 47 So. 100 (Ala. 1908), a case in which the court regarded
the question of whether a party "looked like a white woman" as a potentially different
question of fact than whether she "was a white woman." Id. at 102.
Did the fact that "Ophelia Smith looked like a white woman" equal the fact
that she "was a white woman," or did it merely provide evidence for the fact
that she "was" one? Perhaps the fact that she "looked like" a white woman
distanced her somewhat from being white, and, by suggesting that her skin
was not her identity but a representation of an identity, opened the door to
the disturbing possibility of misrepresentation-a forgery by Nature? If
Nature was forging, what was being forged? ... [H]ow did he know that she
"was" a white woman, if not by the fact that she "looked like" a white
woman? What does a white woman look like?
Saks, supra note 210, at 56-57.
239 See HOLLY DEVOR, GENDER BLENDING: CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF DUALITY
25-26 (1989).
[T]he evidence is strong, clear, and regularly replicated that all of us
contribute, purposefully or not, to the process of giving consistent social
meaning to the biological facts of sex.... One way that this is manifested
is in adults' strong social need to attribute membership in a sex status, and
sex differences, to newborn infants. This tendency is so strong that they will
often do it even when they have little or no concrete information on which
to base their actions. Adults seem almost unable to relate to an
"ungendered" child.
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children are "familiarized by ritualization with a particular version
of human existence," and thus instructed in what it takes to be a
respected member of the community. The child, by this process
of socialization, comes to "grasp the symbolic meaning of
behavior"; the child comes to belong, to be a full participant in a
particular culture. The assignment of meaning to behavior is one
definition of culture.
240
While these signs are anything but universal,2 41 within most
Western communities, and particularly the United States, there is a
strong desire that these signs be both articulate and unambiguous.
Fluency in the semeiotics of gender within one's community means
that one can read bodies and provide good reasons for labeling one
person a "man" and another person a "woman."
In addition to being a literate reader of gender signs, communi-
ty membership also requires that one project or articulate one's own
gender in terms that are comprehensible to others. Failure to do
so, either intentionally2 42 or unintentionally,243 generally leads
Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64
N.C. L. REV. 303, 307 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
241 Anthropologists have documented numerous ways in which cultures "display"
and "read" gender differently. In one Native American village, a son displayed a
dislike for what were considered men's tasks and enjoyed so-called women's tasks.
His parents decided to conduct a test and placed him in a small structure together
with a bow and arrow and some basket weaving material. They then set the structure
on fire and watched to see which of the objects he picked up when he ran out.
Because the child grabbed the basketry materials he became, from that time on, their
daughter. See In AMADIUME, MALE DAUGHTERS, FEMALE HUSBANDS: GENDER AND SEX
IN AFRICAN SOCIETY (1987) (stating that in pre-colonial Nigeria, in the absence of
sons, daughters performed roles normally designated to sons and vice versa); ERNEST
CRAWLEY, THE MYSTIC ROSE 317-75 (1960);JOHNJ. HONIGMANN, THE KASKA INDIANS:
AN ETHNOGRAPHIC RECONSTRUCTION 121-26 (1954); W.W. Hill, Note on the Pima
Berdache, 40 AM. ANTHROPOLOcIST 338, 339 (1938).
242 See Devor, supra note 206, at 31 ("I'm not really interested in stiletto heels,
nylons, and short skirts, or any of those things, because I feel strongly about freedom
of movement and being comfortable at the same time."); Mary E. Perry, The Manly
Woman: A Historical Case Study, 31 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 86, 86 (1987)
(describing two seventeenth-century women who passed as men and thus gained
social and economic status).
24
3 See LESLIE FEINBERG, STONE BUTCH BLUES 20-21 (1993).
I didn't look like any of the girls or women I'd seen in the Sears catalog.
The catalog arrived as the seasons changed. I'd be the first in the house to
go through it, page by page. All the girls and women looked pretty much
the same, so did all the boys and men. I couldn't find myself among the
girls. I had never seen any adult woman who looked like I thought I would
when I grew up. There were no women on television like the small woman
reflected in this mirror, none on the streets. I knew. I was always searching.
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to both violence 244 and humiliation 245 once the imposter is
found out.
246
The example of the rape and murder of Teena Brandon in Falls
City, Nebraska illustrates the degree of anger and social opprobrium
that can be unleashed when a gender outlaw's fraud is revealed to
the public. In an article entitled Her Fatal Deception? Mystery of
Cross-Dresser Slaying,247  Newsday began a story recounting
Brandon's rape and murder with the line: "A woman dressed as a
man, Teena Brandon wooed and won one of the prettiest young
women in this small town beside the Missouri River." 248 That this
information formed the lead of the article framed it not as a story
about a brutal murder but as an example of the outrage that results
when a woman passes as a man and succeeds in getting dates that
are not rightfully hers. Both the title and the body of the article
distracted attention away from Brandon's murder and focused the
reader instead on the fraud she perpetrated against the community
in general, and her dates in particular.
244 See id. at 62-63, 257-59 (recounting the violence that butches suffered at the
hands of the police and gangs of boys during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, either
because they looked and dressed like men or because their gender was not easily and
immediately recognizable).
245 See Devor, supra note 206, at 29:
"I've been chased out of washrooms. Old ladies with umbrellas, a cleaning
lady with a broom stick, like I don't have a chance. I walk in there and all
of a sudden they ... just bang me on the head and I'd go running ....
Then I'm out of there and they go on and on ... saying boys aren't
supposed to be in women's washrooms. I didn't have a chance to say
anything."
Id. (quoting a woman who sometimes passed or was mistaken for a man).
246 The controversy surrounding the crowning of the homecoming queen in
Cherry Grove, Fire Island, New York illustrates how the semeiotics of gender
apply with equal force, although according to different rules, even in subcultures
within the United States. For almost 20 years, Cherry Grove has chosen a homecom-
ing queen every Fourth ofJuly weekend, and every year the queen has been a male
drag queen. In 1994, however, Joan van Ness, a biological woman dressed in high
female drag, was crowned queen. "'I'm used to wearing pants,' she said. 'Wearing
a dress was cross-dressing for me.'" Diane Ketcham, Long Island Journal: A First for
Cherry Grove, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1994, § 14, at 3. Many men in the community
were quite upset by van Ness's elevation to the throne and argued that she should
have been disqualified. One of the judges commented, "'I prefer a more traditional
homecoming queen.'" Id. Another member of the community added, "'It's not fair
to enter the contest if you're helped out by biology or plastic surgery.'" Elizabeth
Wasserman, Cheriy Grove Queen Proves She's No Drag, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), July 5, 1994,
at A4.
247 Chris Burdach, Her Fatal Deception? Mystery of Cross-Dresser Slaying, NEWSDAY
(N.Y.), Jan. 5, 1994, at 6.248 id.
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For some people, cross-dressing can be understood as a kind of
private rebellion against public forms of gender attribution. These
forms, curiously, both define and control cross-dressing or transves-
tite behavior. Again, the law has played an important role in
enforcing these gendered rules. Contemporary sumptuary laws
249
have been used to enforce rigid gender norms, and these laws
represent a legal attempt to minimize the possibility of confusion or
fraud occasioned by misreading gender when the sexually anoma-
lous person misbehaves by performing his or her gender role
ambiguously or incorrectly.25 °  By establishing and enforcing
appropriate sartorial norms, these laws are designed to ensure social
and sexual legibility within a language of difference that regards sex
and gender as synonymous. 251 Those people who present them-
selves in a way that conflicts with, or at a minimum draws into
question, the epiphenomenal relationship between sex and gender
are either punished for trying to get away with something or
pathologized as freaks.
Indeed, some courts have been willing to go so far as to stake
the survival of the species on the ability to read gender correctly.
"[The] inability of the male and female of the species to recognize
each other's differences may lead to frustration of the reproductive
urge."252 Much is at stake in the enforcement of contemporary
249 For a detailed description of these laws, see, for example, VERN L. BULLOUGH
& BONNIE BULLOUGH, CROSS DRESSING, SEX, AND GENDER 23-93 (1993). Marjorie
Garber also discusses the historical origin and use of sumptuary laws in Vested
Interests: Cross Dressing & Cultural Anxiety:
The medieval and Renaissance sumptuary laws ... appear to have been
patriotic, economic, and conservatively class-oriented; they sought to restrict
the wearing of certain furs, fabrics, and styles to members of particular
social and economic classes, ranks, or "states." While protecting, at times,
such native industries as the wool trade or the linen trade, and purporting,
at least, to guard the public morality against excess and indulgence, these
statutes ... at the same time attempted to mark out as visible and above all
legible distinctions of wealth and rank within a society undergoing changes
that threatened to blur or even obliterate such distinctions. The ideal
scenario-from the point of view of the regulators-was one in which a
person's social station, social role, gender and other indicators of identity
in the world could be read, without ambiguity or uncertainty.
MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: CROSS DRESSING & CULTURAL ANXIETY 21-26
(1992). Judith Lorber has similarly noted that "[c]ross-dressing and wearing clothes
'above one's station'.. . thus were important symbolic subverters of social hierarchies
at a time of changing modes of production and a rising middle class...." LORBER,
supra note 9, at 87.
2 That is, when sex and gender are stripped apart.
21 See supra notes 240-42, infra notes 256-81 and accompanying text.
22 People v. Simmons, 357 N.Y.S.2d 362, 365 (Crim. Ct. 1974) (reprimanding a
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sumptuary laws. "For man, success in sexual reproduction requires
... suitable behaviour for the sex in training for the adult role
[and] suitable secondary sex characteristics" 253 so that we may
recognize suitable sex partners and thereupon reproduce the
species. 254 Marjorie Garber has summarized this kind of thinking
as follows:
[I]f there is a difference [between male and female], we want to be
able to see it, and if we see a difference (a man in women's
clothes), we want to be able to interpret it. In both cases, the
conflation is fueled by a desire to tell the difference, to guard against
a difference that might otherwise put the identity of one's own
position in question.
25 5
Of course, if somatic gender norms are to be enforced through
the use of sartorial rules, clothing must be understood to communi-
cate gender clearly. And of course, it does. We have very clear
notions of men's clothes and women's clothes, down to a level of
detail that assigns gender to the direction in which shirts button and
zippers zip. Indeed, one of the only ways that many people are able
to discern the gender of infants is through the color of their
clothes-blue for boys, pink for girls.
256
transvestite prostitute prosecuted for criminal impersonation of a woman).
"5 Christopher Ounsted & David C. Taylor, The Y Chromosome Message: A Point
of View, in GENDER DIFFERENCES: THEIR ONTOGENY AND SIGNIFICANCE 241, 243
(Christopher Ounsted & David C. Taylor eds., 1972).
254 See D.I. Perrett et al., Facial Shape and Judgements of Female Attractiveness, 368
NATURE 239, 239-41 (1994) (suggesting that notions of female beauty are soft-wired
cross-culturally).
Japanese and caucasian observers showed the same direction of preferences
for the same [female] facial composites, suggesting that aesthetic judge-
ments of face shape are similar across different cultural backgrounds....
Attractive facial features may signal sexual maturity and fertility, emotional
expressiveness or a 'cuteness' generalized from parental protectiveness
towards young.
Id.
255 GARBER, supra note 249, at 130.
" While our common folk understanding is of pink as a naturally feminine color
and blue as a naturally masculine color, these attributions are, of course, highly
contingent.
In the early years of the twentieth century, before World War I, boys wore
pink ("a stronger, more decided color," according to the promotional
literature of the time) while girls wore blue (understood to be "delicate" and
"dainty"). Only after World War II... did the present alignment of the two
genders with pink and blue come into being.
Id. at 1.
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Butch lesbians experienced the weight of these rules every day
during the 1950s when police would arrest them if they could not
prove that they were wearing at least three pieces of women's
clothing.257 Gay men who cross-dressed suffered the same treat-
ment from the police as far back as the turn of the century when
police enforced a New York state law prohibiting people from
appearing in public in disguise or masquerade. 58 The New Jersey
Commissioner of Alcoholic Beverage Control adopted a rule in 1934
that prohibited female impersonators from congregating in public
licensed premises.259
That aspects of gendered identity might reveal themselves to be
nothing more than convincing gendered performance is what these
laws stand ready to deny: "The desire of concealment of a change
of sex by the transsexual is outweighed by the public interest for
protection against fraud."260 Recall the Corbett court's discomfort
with the fact that April Ashley's "pastiche of femininity was [so]
convincing.
"261
Just as we saw in the matrimonial cases, in this context the rights
and lives of transgendered people have provided the battleground
upon which the war over gender normativity has been fought.
These cases illustrate even more clearly the judgments about sex
and gender that were at work in the more "regular" cases. In
257 
See LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS: A HISTORY OF
LESBIAN LIFE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 185 (1991) (noting that "any woman
wearing pants was suspect"); ELIZABETH L. KENNEDY & MADELINE D. DAVIS, BOOTS
OF LEATHER, SLIPPERS OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF A LESBIAN COMMUNITY 180 (1993);
Patricia A. Cain, Litigatingfor Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV.
1551, 1564 & n.85 (1993).
m See GEORGE A. CHAUNCEY, JR., GAY NEW YORK: URBAN CULTURE AND THE
MAKING OF A GAY MALE WORLD, 1890-1940, at 307 (1989) ("The law had originally
been enacted in the mid-nineteenth century to control labor organizers and rural
agitators who sometimes disguised themselves to elude the authorities, but by the
turn of the century the police used it primarily to harass cross-dressing men and
women on the streets." (citing CAHILL'S CONSOLIDATED LAW OF NEW YORK: BEING
THE CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF 1909, AS AMENDED TO JULY 1, 1923, at 1415 (James C.
Cahill ed., 1923))); see also HENRY CHRISTMAN, TIN HORNS AND CALICO: A DECISIVE
EPISODE IN THE EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 132 (1945); DAVID M. ELLIS, LANDLORDS
AND FARMERS IN THE HUDSON-MOHAWK REGION, 1790-1850, at 271-72 (1946);
Newsletter of the Mattachine Society of New York, Jan-Feb. 1967 at 5-7.
"' See One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, 235 A.2d 12, 18 (N.J. 1967) (declaring the rule unconstitutional).
'o Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (quoting the
findings of the Committee on Public Health of the New York Academy of Medicine
that were later cited by the court in a mandamus action ordering the Board of Health
to change the petitioner's name and sex on her birth certificate).
261 Corbett v. Corbett, 1971 P. 83, 104 (1970).
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addition to Ulane,262 other transgender employment cases have
presented the opportunity for courts to consider the relationship
between sex and gender and to question the notion that it is
"normal" for men to wear masculine clothing and for women to
wear feminine clothing, and that it is permissible to prohibit people
from dressing incorrectly. What is more, they provide the perspec-
tive to question the social norms that perpetuate the view that it is
ultimately masculinity that makes a male a man, and femininity that
makes a female a woman.
In Terry v. EEOC,2 6' a Big Boy Restaurant refused to hire a
pre-operative transgendered woman as a hostess because of her
transgendered identity. The court dismissed the complaint because
"[h]e is still a male; at this point he only desires to be female. He
is not being refused employment because he is a man or because he
is a woman.... The law does not protect males dressed or acting as
females and vice versa."
26
More recently, in Doe v. Boeing Co., 265 the Washington Su-
preme Court considered a disability discrimination claim brought
by a pre-operative transgendered woman. Boeing refused to
accommodate Doe's transgendered condition, imposing the
following requirements on her in the workplace: she could not use
the women's bathroom, and she was permitted to wear only male
clothing or unisex clothing, despite her doctor's orders that she
should live at least one year as a woman before she could undergo
surgery. Curiously enough, unisex clothing was defined as "blouses,
sweaters, slacks, flat shoes, nylon stockings, earrings, lipstick,
foundation, and clear nailpolish."266 Doe was instructed, however,
not to wear "obviously feminine clothing such as dresses, skirts, or
frilly blouses."
267
Both compliance with and enforcement of Boeing's "transsexual
dress code" was, needless to say, somewhat difficult given the
vagueness of the standards "unisex" and "obviously feminine."
268
262 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
263 No. 80-C-408, 1980 WL 334 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 1980).
i Id. at *3 (emphasis added); see also Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 636
F.2d 1047, 1049 (5th Cir. Unit B Feb. 1981) (dismissing a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 complaint
brought by a pre-operative transgendered woman when she was fired for refusing to
dress in accordance with her biological gender).
' 846 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1993).2
6 Id. at 533.
267 id.
2
' The policy applied not only to Doe but to Boeing's eight other transgendered
employees.
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Boeing, however, adopted the following standard by which to
measure Doe's compliance: "her attire would be deemed unaccept-
able when, in the supervisor's opinion, her dress would be likely to
cause a complaint were Doe to use a men's room at a Boeing
facility."269 Recall that she was not permitted to use the women's
room. She, therefore, was faced with the problem of presenting
herself in a way that was feminine, as per her doctor's orders, but
not so feminine that she could pass as a woman, thereby offending
her male coworkers in the men's room.
Doe successfully walked this gender line for some time. One
day, however, she decided to test the boundaries of the policy. She
wore an outfit that previously had been approved by her supervisor
but accessorized it with a set of pink pearls. Boeing immediately
fired her for changing her attire "from unisex to 'excessively'
feminine."
270
On these facts, the court determined that Boeing had not
discriminated against Doe on account of her disability because they
had reasonably accommodated her condition. 7 ' While the legal
standards imposed upon a disability discrimination plaintiff are
somewhat different from those imposed in a sex discrimination
case, it is reasonable to assume from the court's handling of Doe's
complaint that she would have fared no better under sex discrimina-
tion standards for relief. In general, the court regarded Boeing's
"transsexual dress code" as a reasonable response to the needs of
the plaintiff, and the court did not question either the legitimacy or
the coherence of a policy that distinguished between unisex and
excessively feminine clothing or that used the "offended patron in
the men's room" standard of compliance. Indeed, that Doe was
placed in the difficult position of having her deliberate deviation
from "normal masculinity" policed by "real men" in the most
protected and exclusive site of masculinity-the men's room-
certainly illustrated the degree to which both Boeing and the law
refused to question the legality or normativity of enforced gender
rules. The transgendered woman, recall, is a person who directly
challenges the immutability of sexed bodies. She challenges the
notion that biologically male persons must or should be masculine
and that healthy, normal gender identity is the acceptance of one's
"9 Doe v. Boeing, 846 P.2d at 533-34.
2
0 Id. at 534.
27' See id. at 536.
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gender as a sociopsychological construction that parallels acceptance
of one's biological sex.
On the criminal side of the law, in the early 1970s, a number of
midwestern cities witnessed a spate of sumptuary law prosecutions.
In City of Columbus v. Zanders,272 a biological male was arrested on
three different occasions. The first time, he wore "a short dress[,]
... panty hose, women's shoes, women's coat, jewelry, women's
purse, and a wig."273 The second time, he wore "a woman's black
wig, lipstick, eye shadow, very short light blue dress, shoulder strap
pocketbook, several bracelets on each arm, a long chain around the
neck, stockings, shoes and breasts." 274 On the third occasion he
wore "makeup, eyelashes, a purse, a bra, a girdle, women's shoes,
panty hose, a long wig that hung over his face, and an 'artificial
chest.'
275
On the second and third arrest, Zanders was convicted of
violating a provision of the Columbus City Codes which stated that
"[n]o person shall appear upon any public street or other public
place ... in a dress not belonging to his or her sex, or in an
indecent or lewd dress."276 Rejecting Zanders's argument that the
statute was unconstitutional on its face, the court found that
"[w]hatever the purpose, the ordinance must be construed as
prohibiting a person from disguising his or herself as a member of
the opposite sex or, in other words, prohibiting a person from
impersonating a member of the opposite sex."
277
Zanders argued that the statute should not be applied to her as
she was a pre-operative transgendered woman and her dress
represented a part of her therapy. In an amazing display of
taxonomical slippage between transsexuality, transvestism, and
homosexuality, the court rejected this assignment of error as well.
[T]he sex object of the transvestite is female while the sex object
for the transsexual is a male, as is the sex object of the homo-
sexual. We must reject the defense argument on the grounds that
our laws must be uniformly applied, and that no class of persons
has privileges not enjoyed by the general public. To hold
otherwise would be to place a transsexual, if defendant be one as
No. 74AP-88 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1974) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
27 Id. at *3.
274 Id. at *4.
275 Id. at *5.
276 COLUMBUS, OHIO, MUN. CODES § 2343.04 (1954-1972).
277 Zanders, at *6 (quoting City of Columbus v. Arnold, Nos. 72AP-146, 72AP-147,
72AP-148 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 12, 1972)).
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he maintains, above all other persons.... In other words, a
homosexual person has no constitutional rights not shared by the
public in general. The constitutional rights that a homosexual has
are possessed because he is a person and not because he is a
homosexual.
2 78
For the Zanders court, the "improper dress" statute served as a
"juridical dike" that prevented the crime of categorical seepage. Or,
as Marjorie Garber has observed: "Both the energies of conflation
and the energies of clarification and differentiation between
transvestism and homosexuality thus mobilize and problematize,
under the twin anxieties of visibility and difference, all of the culture's
assumptions about normative sex and gender roles."27 After all,
"[c]lothing... often hides the sex but displays the gender,"211 and
"gender attribution, rather than 'gender' differentiation, is what
concerns those who fear change."
28'
In City of Cincinnati v. Adams,28 2 however, an Ohio trial court
took a different view of Cincinnati's sumptuary ordinance, which
prohibited any person from appearing in public "in a dress or
costume not customarily worn by his or her sex ... when such dress
... is worn with the intent of committing any indecent or immoral
act."
283
In Adams, the defendant had been arrested in a blouse,
brassiere, women's slacks, a woman's wig, and earrings, while
carrying a purse. The court rejected the defendant's claim that
one's dress was a form of expression protected by the First
Amendment because there had been no testimony to the effect that
Adams's attire expressed a philosophy or ideal.214 In so doing, the
court ignored the obvious: that an overarching ideology or
philosophy was necessary to justify the norm of certain clothing
belonging to one or another sex.
The court did find, however, that the sumptuary ordinance was
both overbroad and vague. The law was overbroad because it
could be read to prohibit behavior in the "privacy of one's
home,"2 8 5 and "goes so far as to [apply to] the woman who wears
278 Id. at *g.
278 GARBER, supra note 249, at 130.
280 LORBER, supra note 9, at 22.
281 KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra note 25, at 167.
282 330 N.E.2d 463 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1974).
283 Id. at 464.
284 See id. at 465.
285 Id. at 466.
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one of her husband's old shirts to paint lawn furniture, the trick-
or-treater, the guests at a masquerade party, or the entertainer."28 6
Further, employing a rather curious logic, the court determined
that the intent requirement set an "unascertainable standard" since
the prohibition could apply to "a female Christian Scientist
wearing a tie and pants suit who enters a physician's office seeking
treatment." 287  Presumably, sartorial fraud for the purposes of
escaping the norms of one's religion is permissible, while sartorial
fraud for the purposes of escaping larger societal gender norms is
not.
Finally, the court attempted to mitigate any damage it might
have done to the sartorial order by noting that, notwithstanding
the infirmity of the cross-dressing ordinance, transvestites could
still be arrested for "soliciting, importuning, pandering obscenity,
public indecency, trespassing, or soliciting rides or hitchhiking."
288
Yet, the necessary association of cross-dressing with these types of
crimes conflicts with the court's express holding that wearing "the
wrong clothing" is not in and of itself perverted or deviant. Clearly
the court believed that transvestites were gender outlaws, otherwise
why assume a nexus between one's clothing and these sorts of
"morality crimes" rather than securities fraud, speeding, or tax
evasion?
Only one year after Zanders, the Ohio Supreme Court consid-
ered a facial challenge to the Columbus "improper dress" ordinance
in City of Columbus v. Rogers.2 9 Declining to recite the minutiae
of the defendant's attire at the time of arrest, the court found
that
[m]odes of dress for both men and women are historically subject
to changes in fashion. At the present time, clothing is sold for
both sexes which is so similar in appearance that "a person of
ordinary intelligence" might not be able to identify it as male or
female dress. In addition, it is not uncommon today for individu-
als to purposely, but innocently, wear apparel which is intended
for wear by those of the opposite sex.
2 0
By effectively invalidating the statute for its failure to include a
specific scienter requirement, the court distinguished between those
288 Id.
"2
7 
Id.
"TM Id. (statutory citations omitted).
289 324 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio 1975).
2' Id. at 565.
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who cross-dress for the purpose of passing as something they are
not091 and those who cross-dress "innocently" because it has
become fashionable or convenient, 92 but who have no intention
of blurring sexual boundaries.
The ubiquity of efforts to criminalize persons who are caught
wearing clothing that does not belong to their sex represents
something of an overreaction to what might otherwise be consid-
ered minor, victimless crimes. David Hume observed that often
when a social rule is violated, our outrage seems to exceed greatly
the particular offense in the individual case. This dynamic can be
explained, observed Hume, by the recognition that the minor
violation often carries the greater weight of the value of the more
general principle which was violated in the particular case. 293 In
the sumptuary cases, the individual violation is usually quite minor,
while the investment in the general system of gender differences is
quite great. Therefore any violation of the gender laws creates great
anxiety and offense, thereby provoking the full opprobrium of the
criminal law.
Sumptuary laws and bathroom signs, in the end, serve the same
function. They create and reinforce an official symbolic language
of gendered identity that rightfully belongs to either sex. "Real
women" and "real men" conform to the norms; the rest of us are
deviants. Curiously, in life and in law, bathrooms seem to be the
site where one's sexual authenticity is tested. When a woman
wearing pants approaches the women's room sign depicting a stick
figure wearing a skirt, we don't attribute the symbolic gap between
body and sign to any inarticulateness on the part of the sign but to
the individual woman's failure to conform to a legible and coherent
norm. Again, the world must conform to the word, not the other
way around.
29 In these instances, courts discuss the issue as a matter of fraud. Cf. Anony-
mous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (holding that a transsexual's
desire to change the sex designation on his birth certificate from male to female "is
outweighed by public interest for protection against fraud"). One wonders what the
Rogers court would say about the Christian Scientist who dresses in disguise in order
to visit a doctor's office.
Such as when painting lawn furniture. See City of Cincinnati v. Adams, 330
N.E.2d 463, 466 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1974).
293 See DAVID HUME, Book 3 of Morahs, in TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 399 (L.A.
Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford 1896). I thank Thomas Nagel for bringing this principle to
my attention.
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IV. HISTORY OF SEXUAL CATEGORIES
[Y]ou see a star in the evening and it's called 'Hesperus'.... We
see a star in the morning and call it 'Phosphorus.' Well, then, in
fact we find that it's not a star, but is the planet Venus and that
Hesperus and Phosphorus are in fact the same. So we express this
by 'Hesperus is Phosphorus.' Here we're certainly not just saying
of an object that it's identical with itself. This is something that
we discovered.
94
Our contemporary notion of the sexes is that women and men
are different kinds of human beings, so different physically as to be
like two kinds of human species that are at once the opposite and
the contradiction of one another. 295 Either a person is a woman
or a man; there are "no three ways about it." 29 5 Yet, how do we
have the confidence to say that this conception of the logical
relationship between "the sexes" is prepolitical, natural and
timeless?
Imagine for a moment four people sitting around a table upon
which has been placed a drinking glass. Each person is asked to
describe the shape of the top of the glass. Each person indepen-
dently responds, "Round, of course." The questioner pushes a little.
"But is round what you actually see?" "Well, no, I see it as oval, but
it's real shape is round," they all concur.
Every day, in life's most trivial and momentous moments, we
interpret our experiences in ways that create not only facts, but
meaningful facts. Most often, this is accomplished through the
acquisition and internalization of publicly agreed upon points of
view or reference. So, we all agree that the glass's true shape is
determined from the perspective of an idealized point of view
directly above the glass. Our assent to the use of such an idealized
' KRIPKE, supra note 225, at 28-29.
2' An opposite is not the same thing as a contradiction. Hot and cold may be
opposites, but they are not one another's contradictions. To be contradictions, two
entities must be the negation of one another, such as True and False. According to
the law of the excluded middle-a principle that applies to contradictions, but not to
opposites-no middle ground can exist between the two entities in question. Thus,
hot and cold cannot be contradictions because the qualities warm, tepid, and cool
exist between hot and cold. See Alonzo Church, Law of Excluded Middle, in
DIcTiONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 102 (Dagobert D. Runes ed., 1942) (stating that the law
of the excluded middle, or tertium non datur, is given by traditional logicians as "'A
is B or A is not B' ... usually identified with the theorem of the propositional
calculus, p v -p, to which the same name is given").
' Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (noting that "with
respect to gender, a person was either male or female").
THE DISAGGREGATION OF SEX FROM GENDER
point of view allows us to answer the question in an intelligible way,
and on a deeper level, it makes a right answer possible. That is, our
assent creates truth conditions. It determines what it would mean
to get the answer right.
For the most part, we have so thoroughly internalized the points
of view that allow us to "get factual questions right" we no longer
notice that right answers frequently contradict our direct observa-
tions of the world. What if we were to consider, if only for a
moment, that sex is to bodies just as shape is to drinking glasses?
What if we could truthfully say from an idealized point of view that
"she is a woman" and "this is what it means to be a woman," and
have implicit in the truth conditions of both of these statements:
"She is not a man"? To do so would require that we place in the
foreground the institutional point of view that both produces a
sexual fact and determines what it means to get questions about a
person's sexual identity right.
This is not to say that we should ignore the body. Instead, "the
body can no longer be seen as a biological given which emits its own
meaning. It must be understood instead as an ensemble of
potentialities which are given meaning only in society."297
Almost 2400 years ago Plato told a story about three sexes, each
one a pair. One consisted of two women, one of two men, and one
of a man and a woman. In order to decrease their power and, at
the same time, increase the number of humans giving the gods
offerings, Zeus cut each pair apart. Forever separated, all individual
humans are destined to devote their lives on earth to a search for
their other half with whom they can (re)merge in love. "And so,
gentlemen, we are like pieces of the coins that children break in half
for keepsakes-making two out of one, like the flatfish-and each of
us is forever seeking the half that will tally with himself."
2
1
The dominant view of sexual identity, however, from Plato's
time through the Enlightenment was quite different from the story
Plato used for rhetorical advantage in the Symposium. For centuries
the male body was the exclusive subject of scientific inquiry.
Indeed, it was not until 1759 that a female skeleton appeared in
anatomy books to distinguish the female body from the male.
299
2
7
JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 122-23 (1985).
M PLATO, Symposium, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 526, 544 (Edith
Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
m See LAQUEUR, supra note 208, at 10.
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Prior to the Enlightenment, the accepted view was that men and
women were merely variations on the same human body, a human
body which manifested its perfection in the male form. Sexual
difference was therefore conceived as a matter of degree and
gradations on one basic type. "The more Renaissance anatomists
dissected, looked into, and visually represented the female body, the
more powerfully and convincingly they saw it to be a version of the
male's."
3 00
Thus conceived, the male body represented the manifestation of
a kind of metaphysical perfection located at the apex of an axis that
placed the female body, an inferior simulacrum to that of the male,
lower down the evolutionary line.
[T]here was but one sex whose more perfect exemplars were easily
deemed males at birth and whose decidedly less perfect ones were
labeled female. The modem question, about the "real" sex of a
person, made no sense in this period, not because two sexes were
mixed but because there was only one to pick from and it had to
be shared by everyone .... 301
In this schema, it was understood in the fourth century that female
genitals merely mirrored that of the male, except "'theirs are inside
the body and not outside it.'"' 2 The vagina, therefore, was
depicted in sixteenth-century anatomy books as an inverted penis,
and the ovaries were seen as recessed testicles: "[T]he neck of the
uterus is like the penis, and its receptacle with testicles and vessels
is like the scrotum.
30 3
From this perspective, which Thomas Laqueur terms "the one-
sex model,""0 4  sexual difference was viewed vertically/
isomorphically, in contrast with the contemporary two-sex paradigm
which regards sexual difference horizontally/dimorphically. Against
this backdrop, Laqueur recounts numerous stories from the Middle
Ages to illustrate how bodies did strange things when women acted
like men and men acted like women. 0 5 He concludes that
so Id. at 70.
s01 Id. at 124.
s Id. at 4 (quoting NEMESIUS OF EMESA, ON THE NATURE OF MAN 369 (William
Tefler ed., 1955)).
so Id. at 78 (quotingJACOPO BERENGARIO DA CARPI, A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO
ANATOMY 80 (L.R. Lind trans., 1959)). See generally id. at 79-96 (discussing the history
of the representation of the female genital anatomy as an "inferior version of the
male's").
s°' Id. at 8.
305 See id. at 122-27.
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in these pre-Enlightenment texts, and even some later ones, sex, or
the body, must be understood as the epiphenomenon, while gender,
what we would take to be a cultural category, was primary or
"real." Gender-man and woman-mattered a great deal and was
part of the order of things; sex was conventional, though modern
terminology makes such a reordering nonsensical.3 "
What would be regarded as a kind of metaphysical slippage from
our modern point of view was rendered possible by virtue of the
alignment of the sexes upon a continuum within a culture in which
national, social, and class standing were understood as anything but
mutable.
Yet, sometime in the eighteenth century the one-sex model was
abandoned, and the body was no longer understood to display
hierarchy, but rather incommensurable differences. No longer was
the vagina considered a failed phallus. Under the two-sex model,
the vagina became one of the essential characteristics that affirma-
tively determined female identity.
One might expect that this radical change in the sexual
paradigm was due to advances in anatomical research and the
elevation of science and reason over religion and superstition. At
one time the world was believed to be flat, now we know it to be
round. So too with sex: the shift in paradigm would be expected
to reflect new knowledge about human sexual kinds.
However, the evidence to which Laqueur points provides a
different explanation for the shift in paradigm: politics.
There were endless new struggles for power and position in the
... enlarged public sphere of the eighteenth and particularly the
postrevolutionary nineteenth centuries: between and among men
and women; between and among feminists and antifeminists.
When, for many reasons, a preexisting transcendental order or
time-immemorial custom became a less and less plausible justifica-
tion for social relations, the battleground of gender roles shifted
to nature, to biological sex. Distinct sexual anatomy was adduced
to support or deny all manner of claims in a variety of specific
There are numerous accounts of men who were said to lactate and pictures
of the boy Jesus with breasts. Girls could turn into boys, and men who
associated too extensively with women could lose the hardness and
definition of their more perfect bodies and regress into effeminacy.
Culture, in short, suffused and changed the body that to the modern
sensibility seems so closed, autarchic, and outside the realm of meaning.
Id. at 7.
3°6 Id. at 8.
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social, economic, political, cultural, or erotic contexts....
Whatever the issue, the body became decisive 0 7
The analogy, therefore, to flat-earthers does not work. All the
evidence that was produced to prove the fact of sexual dimorphism
had always been there; bodies had not changed nor had science
advanced in a manner that revealed previously unknown funda-
mental facts about human anatomy.8 ' Rather, the gender schema
had changed. Previously anomalous evidence that had been ignored
because it did not conform to the paradigm suddenly was cited to
uphold the new paradigm. Our idealized point of view had shifted,
thereby causing a shift in the meaning we attributed to the data
before us. And so, the notion that "there are some real differences
between men and women"0 9 was inscribed as truth within the new
"normal science" that regarded bodies as essentially male or
female.
3 1 0
Imagine again for a moment, that we are all standing before
April Ashley, and we are asked, what sex is this person? What facts
will count? What will those facts mean? Who gets to decide? The
answers to each of these questions are largely predetermined by the
dimorphic logic of sexual difference. That logic assumes a universe
populated only by two different and opposite kinds of beings. By
contemporary standards, the right answer is either male or female.
To suggest a more nuanced answer to the question is simply
illogical.
So7 Id. at 152.
308 One significant change in the lens of science that did produce a radical change
in the sexual paradigm was the "discovery" in the mid-nineteenth century that, unlike
the male, the female orgasm was not necessary for conception. Something quite
important happened in response to this discovery: "[W]omen's sexual nature could
be redefined, debated, denied, or qualified. And so it was of course. Endlessly." Id.
at 3. And so it continues to be.
' Faulkner v.Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552, 563 (D.S.C. 1994), afTd, 51 F.3d 440 (4th
Cir. 1995).
" "Normal science" is a term originating with Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, which is contrasted with "abnormal discourse." See KUHN, supra
note 109, at 10. "'Normal' science is the practice of solving problems against the
background of a consensus about what counts as a good explanation of the
phenomena and about what it would take for a problem to be solved." RIcHARD
RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 320 (1979). By contrast, "abnormal
discourse" is undertaken according to unconventional or revolutionary accounts of
what it would mean to answer scientific questions correctly. See id.
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V. THE ERROR OF DISAGGREGATING SEX AND
GENDER IN MORE CENTRAL CASES
The marginal cases show that the error of contemporary sexual
equality jurisprudence is its inclination to disaggregate sex and
gender, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of fairness. Yet this
flaw in the doctrine does not merely represent an interesting yet
inconsequential distortion at the margins of sexual intelligibility.
Rather, it extends to far more routine sex discrimination cases at
the center.
A. Sex and Gender at Work
Between 1970 and 1980, when the second wave of feminism was
at its apex and the threat of unisex bathrooms was successfully used
to defeat the ERA,311 the federal courts witnessed a spate of Title
VII litigation over the legitimacy of workplace hair length rules that
set different standards for men and women. Recall that at that time
long hair for men was quite fashionable.
In Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 12 one of the first such
cases to reach an appellate court, a man claimed that his employer
had discriminated against him because of his sex when he was fired
for violating a workplace rule that required male employees to keep
their hair neatly trimmed and cut above the collar. The court
rejected the plaintiff's sex discrimination argument, finding that
"[c]learly Fagan had not been denied employment because he was
a male,"313 and that one's choice in hair style could hardly be
considered immutable. The court, therefore, upheld the employer's
grooming regulations as a legitimate exercise of managerial
.. Reflecting this fear, several states have included express language in their
public accommodation laws excluding the application of sex discrimination
protections to bathrooms. See, e.g., ILL. COMp. ANN. STAT. ch. 775, § 5/5-103 (Smith-
Hurd 1993) ("Nothing in this Article shall apply to... [any facility, as to discrimina-
tion based on sex, which is distinctly private in nature such as restrooms, shower
rooms, bathhouses, health clubs and other similar facilities.. .. "); IND. CODE § 22-9-
1-3(p)(1)) (1986) ("[I]t shall not be a discriminatory practice to maintain separate
restrooms... ."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(c)(1) (1993) (stating that discrimination
is prohibited "except where a distinction because of sex is necessary because of the
intrinsic nature of such accommodation"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.146 (West
1991) ("Rooming facilities at educational, religious, charitable or non-profit
institutions or organizations, and restrooms and locker room facilities in places of
public accommodation may be separated according to sex.").
-12 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
3's Id. at 1121.
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discretion, particularly with regard to employees who have contact
with the public.
3 1 4
In Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.,3 15 the Fifth
Circuit was presented with the same claim, but this time under the
"sex-plus" paradigm of sex discrimination."' Even under this
standard, however, the plaintiff was unsuccessful. "[D]istinctions in
employment practices between men and women on the basis of
something other than immutable or protected characteristics do not
inhibit employment opportunity in violation of [Title VII]. " ' 7
Numerous other federal1 8 and state31 9 courts have rejected
31 See id. at 1125.
315 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
"16 As defined by Schlei and Grossman:
"Sex plus" refers to a situation where an employer classifies employees on
the basis of sex plus another characteristic [such as marriage, race, or
appearance]. In such cases the employer does not discriminate against the
class of men or women as a whole, but rather disparately treats a subclass
of men or women.
BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 403 (2d
ed., 1983); see also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969),
vacated and remanded, 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
317 Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092.
"18 See, e.g., Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977)
(holding that an employer's grooming code, which limited the manner in which men's
hair could be cut, did not violate the civil rights statute prohibiting sex discrimination
in employment); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976)
(holding that an employer who required short hair on men but not on women did not
violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Earwood v. Continental S.E. Lines, 539 F.2d
1349, 1350 (4th Cir. 1976) (same); Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1249
(8th Cir. 1975) (same), aff'g Wamsganz v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 391 F.Supp. 306, 307
(E.D. Mo. 1975); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896 (9th Cir. 1974)
(same), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333,
1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (same); Thomas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 392 F. Supp.
373, 375 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (same); McConnell v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 389 F. Supp.
594, 595 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (same); cf. Peter F. Ziegler, Note, Employer Dress and
Appearance Codes and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 965,
973-81 (1973) (indicating that, as of early 1973, federal district courts were split on
whether employer grooming regulations limiting the length of male employees' hair,
without placing similar restrictions on female employees, violated Title VII, and that
there had been no appellate decisions on point).
"' See, e.g., Pik-Kwik Stores v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 365
A.2d 1210, 1212 (Conn. 1976) (holding that an employer's grooming code that
restricted males, but not females, to collar-length hair did not unlawfully discriminate
on the basis of sex); Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Sutherland Lumber, 394 N.E.2d
949, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that a private employer's grooming policy that
forbade moustaches was not discriminatory to the extent that it denied equal
employment opportunities); Planchet v. New Hampshire Hosp., 341 A.2d 267, 268
(N.H. 1975) (holding that enforcement of a differential hair length standard between
male and female employees did not constitute discrimination because of sex); Page
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similar sex discrimination challenges to sex-based grooming
standards, even as recently as 1992.20
The haircut cases formed the jurisprudential speedbump for the
next series of cases that sought to connect the signs of gender to sex
discrimination. In Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain,.21 a female
secretary was fired for wearing a pantsuit to work in violation of
office policy. Finding no Title VII violation, the court held that the
"plaintiff's affection for pantsuits is not an 'immutable characteris-
tic,'"3 22 that "there is no principled distinction between the
rationale of the 'haircut' cases and this case,"323 and that "her
contention that the policies perpetuate a stereotype is simply a
matter of opinion."
324
In a slight variation on what was becoming a pattern in the Title
VII boundary wars, the Fifth Circuit held in Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. 3 25 that a man who was refused employment because the inter-
viewer considered him effeminate had no recourse under Title VII.
"Here the claim is not that Smith was discriminated against because
he was a male, but because as a male, he was thought to have those
attributes more generally characteristic of females and epitomized
in the descriptive 'effeminate'. " 126 Relying upon the authority of
Willingham,27 the court affirmed the dismissal of Smith's com-
plaint.32 For these courts, social norms with regard to hair styles,
clothing, or gender role identity were not appropriate targets for
sex discrimination statutes.
329
Airways v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 376 N.Y.S.2d 32, 34 (App. Div.
1975) (same), aff'd 352 N.E.2d 140 (1976); Albertson's, Inc. v. Washington State
Human Rights Comm'n, 544 P.2d 98, 99 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a state
discrimination statute did not invalidate a private employer's reasonable hair length
rule for male employees).
120 See Bedker v. Domino's Pizza, 491 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
' 466 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
32 Id. at 1391.
3
2
3 Id. at 1392.
324 Id.; see also Fountain v. Safeway Stores, 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977)
(finding no Title VII violation where a man was fired for refusing to wear a tie).
325 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
3
26 Id. at 327.
'" Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en
banc).
321 See Smith, 569 F.2d at 27.
" See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) ("Title VII was [not] designed to bring about a magical
transformation in the social mores of American workers.").
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In Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings and Loan Association,"'0 the
Seventh Circuit clarified the jurisprudential significance of gender
in a way that brought to the foreground deeply held beliefs about
sex and gender that remain intact today. In Carroll, a class of
women employees challenged an employer dress policy requiring
that female employees wear a uniform consisting of color-coordin-
ated skirts or slacks and either ajacket, tunic, or vest. Male employ-
ees, on the other hand, could wear business suits. The employer
justified this clothing policy on the assumption that in the absence
of a dress code, competition among female employees to be
fashionable would compromise their judgment about proper
business attire.
33 1
This justification was found by the court to "reveal that [the
policy] is based on offensive stereotypes prohibited by Title
VII." 3 2 The court declined, however, to strike down all workplace
personal appearance rules that differentiated between men and
women, on the theory that "[s]o long as they find some justification
in commonly accepted social norms and are reasonably related to
the employer's business needs, such regulations are not necessarily
violations of Title VII even though the standards prescribed differ
somewhat for men and women." 333
This notion, that employers, courts, or anyone for that matter,
can, or should, distinguish in any principled manner between
impermissible cultural stereotypes and permissible commonly
accepted social norms underlies much of our modern equality
jurisprudence. In fact, it can be understood as the sociological
corollary to the more scientific postulate adopted by courts when
they distinguish real from constructed or unauthentic women and
real from stereotypical differences between men and women.
The standard promulgated by the Seventh Circuit in Carroll
provides an interesting way to understand the gender-based Title
VII cases that have followed, despite, or perhaps because of, its
apparent lack of coherence. For instance, when female employees
have been required to wear sexy uniforms, courts have found a
0 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980).
See id. at 1033 n.17 ("What is offensive is the compulsion to wear employer-
identified uniforms and the assumption on which the employer openly admits that
rule is based: that women cannot be expected to exercise goodjudgment in choosing
business apparel, whereas men can.").
332 Id. at 1033.
-"' Id. at 1032. "[W]e do not view the recognition of different dress norms for
males and females to be offensive or illegal stereotyping." Id. at 1033 n.17.
THE DISAGGREGATION OF SEX FROM GENDER
violation of Title VII because the uniforms clearly fall outside the
ambit of commonly accepted social norms."3 4 So too with employ-
er grooming standards that required female employees to wear
smocks 55 or uniforms33 6 when no such requirements were im-
posed upon male employees, as was the case in Carroll.
Although it is easy to dismiss these cases as representing old and
outdated views about sex roles, the reasoning they employ is alive
and well today. As recently as 1990, an Oregon appellate court
relied upon these early cases when it denied a man's sex discrimina-
tion claim after he had been discharged for wearing an earring in
violation of a grooming rule that prevented male employees from
wearing facial jewelry while on the job.337
Similarly, in Hines v. Caston School Corp.,33 8 a ten-year-old male
student was suspended from school for wearing a gold stud earring
in violation of the school's dress code that stated: "Students are not
to wearjewelry or other attachments not consistent with community
standards .... ." Ruling on the plaintiff's due process challenge
to the rule as applied, which banned boys from wearing earrings,
the court noted evidence presented that "under local community
standards of dress, earrings are considered female attire, and that
' See, e.g., Marentette v. Michigan Host, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909, 911-12 (E.D.
Mich. 1980) (distinguishing the haircut cases and holding that sexually provocative
waitress uniforms violate Title VII); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599,
608-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (distinguishing the haircut and dress code cases and finding
that a female lobby attendant could not be required to wear a uniform that exposed
her thighs and portions of her buttocks). Butsee id. (stating that "[t]he court does not
question an employer's prerogative to impose reasonable grooming and dress
requirements on its employees, even where different requirements are set for male
and female employees").
... See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 656 F. Supp. 263,
266 (S.D. Ohio 1987) ("In contrast to the 'hair length' standards for male employees,
the smock requirement finds no justification in accepted social norms.").
s See, e.g., EEOC v. Clayton Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 841, 842 (E.D. Mo. 1981) ("The case at bar is unlike the 'grooming cases,'
however, in that more than a minimum standard of appearance is required.").
sa7 See Lockhart v. Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 795 P.2d 602, 604 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
Plaintiff advances the argument that employer may not prohibit him from
wearing an earring, if it allows female employees to wear jewelry. As his
argument is cast, plaintiff cannot demonstrate impermissible discrimination
unless eveiy difference in dress or grooming requirements for men and
women under an employer's rules is impermissibly discriminatory.
Id.
3- 651 N.E.2d 330 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
s39 Id. at 331.
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the earring rule discourages rebelliousness."" 0 Accordingly, the
earring ban could be found to serve a rational and legitimate
purpose related to the educational function of the school. 4
Further, with regard to the plaintiff's equal protection challenge to
the dress code, the court stated that "[t]he enforcement of commu-
nity standards of dress to instill discipline has been shown to be a
legitimate educational function."142 Therefore, the dress code was
substantially related to a legitimate government objective.
3 43
Here, as in the haircut and dress code cases that preceded Hines,
commonly accepted social norms about how men and women
should exhibit their gender are not found to run afoul of either
statutory or constitutional protections against discrimination based
on sex.
These sartorial Title VII cases demonstrate the law's commit-
ment to normalizing and objectifying the cultural value that there
is a right way to "do one's sex." Yet, it is difficult to reconcile cases
which enforce a standard of "commonly accepted social norms,"
44
thus perpetuating the notion that men are naturally masculine and
women are naturally feminine, with a legislative mandate intended
"to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women"3 45 resulting from sex stereotypes.
B. Sexual Difference and Military Education
Recent litigation challenging the legitimacy of all-male state-run
military colleges in South Carolina and Virginia also illustrates the
error of disaggregating sex and gender in discrimination cases. The
courts in both Faulkner v. Jones3
46 and United States v. Virginia 47
employed a conception of what it means to be discriminated against
because of one's sex that is typical of sexual equality jurisprudence.
These cases define sex-based equality principles in terms of the
340 Id. at 335.
341 See id.
342 Id. at 336.
343 See id.
14 Caroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980).
" Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (quoting Mertor Say.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
" 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994), affd as modified, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3270 (U.S. 1995).
7 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. 1995) (No. 94-
1941).
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notion that there are real, that is, objective and thereby non-
normative, differences between the class of people we call women
and the class of people we call men. Discrimination, from this
perspective, amounts to a failure of rationality; archaic stereotypes
or untrue generalizations about a class of people replace objective
facts. 4 In this sense, invidious discrimination takes up where
legitimate differentiation leaves off.
When Faulkner, a female high school honor student, was refused
admission to the Citadel, an exclusively male military college, a
federal court found that the Citadel had discriminated against
Faulkner because of her sex. Finding, as an initial matter, that
women and men are created differently, Judge Houck held that
[a]ll classifications based on sex are not unconstitutional. The law
recognizes that there are some real differences between men and
women and permits different treatment that provides a legitimate
accommodation for those differences. What the law will not allow,
however, is classifications based on fixed notions, archaic and
stereotypical notions, concerning the relative roles and abilities of
females and males.
3 49
The court went on to say that when "a gender classification is
justified by acknowledged differences, identical facilities are not
necessarily mandated. Rather, the nature of the difference dictates
the type of facility permissible for each gender.""'0 What follows
this statement of principle is quite telling, however, with respect to
the integrity of the principle itself. The court proceeded to provide
an example of when separate but equal facilities for men and
women are appropriate. One would expect that the court, citing
only one example, would produce a particularly salient illustration
of the principle as applied. Yet, as an exemplar of differentiation
that does not rise to the level of discrimination, the court used
" Gary Peller has similarly characterized the wrong of racism, from an
integrationist perspective, as "the distortion of reason through the prism of myth and
ignorance." Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuKE LJ. 758, 768.
9 Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. at 563. Judge Houck's language echoes that of the
Fourth Circuit affirming his preliminary order enjoining the Citadel from denying
admission to Faulkner: "[Males and females are] created differently.... Legislative
distinctions based on gender may thus be justified by an important governmental
interest in recognizing demonstrated differences between males and females. But
intermediate scrutiny will reject regulations based on stereotypical and generalized
conceptions about the differences between males and females." Faulkner v.Jones, 10
F.3d 226, 230-31 (4th Cir. 1993).
1 Faulkner, 10 F.3d at 232.
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"separate public rest rooms for men and women." 5 1 The justifica-
tion the court produced on behalf of the normativity, or lack
thereof, of segregated public restrooms was privacy concerns:
The need for privacy justifies separation and the differences
between the genders demand a facility for each gender that is
different.... In the end, distinctions in any separate facilities
provided for males and females may be based on real differences
between the sexes, both in quality and quantity, so long as the
distinctions are not based on stereotyped or generalized percep-
tions of differences.
3 52
Yet there are no significant differences in male and female
anatomy that require separate and distinct sanitary facilities.
Although privacy may be an important cultural value, it is not a
"real difference" of the kind courts demand when it requires that
separate facilities be justified by real and demonstrative differences,
as in race discrimination jurisprudence. Rather, it is a generally
agreed upon cultural norm that justifies separate restrooms, and
while it may be a norm that we all want enforced, it is not a real,
biological difference. That separate restrooms are the best example
that the Fourth Circuit could provide of separate facilities justified
by real sexual differences illustrates once again that sexual differen-
tiation takes place according to cultural gender norms, not biology.
In the end, the trial court ordered Shannon Faulkner's admis-
sion into the Citadel. 53 Whatever real differences might exist
between males and females, these differences could not be used to
justify the dejure denial to women of the opportunity to gain from
the Citadel's unique environment, which is designed to produce the
"Whole Man." 54 Following the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in
351 Id.
352 Id.
" See Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. at 569.
" See Susan Faludi, The Naked Citadel, NEW YORKER, Sept. 5, 1994, at 62, 64
("[The freshman year] is a nine-month regimen of small and large indignities
intended to 'strip' each young recruit of his original identity and remold him into the
'Whole Man.'").
On the heels of such an important legal victory for the right of women to equal
educational opportunities, the plaintiff's attorneys turned their own argument on its
head. When the Citadel made it clear that they planned to shave Faulkner's head on
her first day of classes, in keeping with the school's tradition for all incoming first-
year male students, Faulkner's attorneys returned to court and sought to have the
haircut enjoined as sex discrimination. Could it be that the real differences between
the sexes justify different grooming standards for male and female cadets? Faulkner's
attorneys argued that "[f]orcing Ms. Faulkner to adopt a haircut that many men view
as symbolizing male prowess and female degradation does nothing to provide Ms.
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United States v. Virginia,55 the court compelled Faulkner's admis-
sion to the Citadel because there was no comparable military-style
educational institution in the state of South Carolina that could
provide single-sex military education for women.
35 6
Faulkner was subsequently admitted to the Citadel but withdrew
when she succumbed to the emotional and physical exhaustion
attendant to the stress of litigating her case under conditions of
tremendous hostility in South Carolina. The male cadets' elation at
the announcement of Faulkner's withdrawal clearly reinforced the
ethos of the institution-that only men could successfully survive the
Citadel's demanding regime. This belief was fully reinforced by the
failure of the lone woman cadet and was not in the least discredited
by the fact that thirty male cadets also withdrew within the first few
days after matriculation.
5 7
In United States v. Virginia,"'8 the Justice Department initiated a
challenge to the all-male admissions policy of the Virginia Military
Institute ("VMI"), a state-run military academy quite similar to the
Faulkner with the mutual respect afforded to male cadets .... Instead, they seek to
strip Ms. Faulkner of her hair and force her to 'become a man.'" Plaintiff Shannon
Richey Faulkner's Memorandum in Support of Certain Portions of the Motion by the
United States to Reconsider the August 1, 1994 Remedial Order at 6, Faulkner v.
Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994) (No. 2:93-0488-2). Similarly, the Justice
Department, coplaintiff in the litigation, argued to the court that the Citadel's
requirement that Faulkner shave her head would "deny her female identity." Motion
of the United States for Reconsideration of Approval of Defendant's Contingency
Plan and Disapproval of Plaintiff's Proposed Remedial Plan or Alternatively for Stay
of Disputed Provisions of Defendant's Plan Pending Appeal at 6 n.1, Faulkner (No.
2:93-0433-2) [hereinafter Faulkner Motion]. In the first phase of the litigation,
Faulkner argued that women and men should be treated equally for the purposes of
admission to a state-run military college. See Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. at 554. Upon
winning that argument, however, Faulkner maintained that she must be treated
differently for some purposes not only as a matter of equality, but in order to avoid
an assault on her "female identity." See Faulkner Motion, supra, at 6 n.1. The
plaintiffs' instrumental use of the notion of an essential female identity that would be
violated by the imposition of a particular grooming standard is a rather dangerous
strategy in equality litigation. While this disaggregatory approach may have had
strategic advantages, in fact it merely reinforced the idea that women cannot be
masculine, or worse, that femininity is an essential aspect of female identity.
'5' 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
11 See Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. at 568.
S7 See Catherine S. Manegold, Female Cadet Quits the Citade4 Citing Stress of Her
Legal Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1995, § 1, at 1.
m 766 F. Supp. 1407 (1991), vacated and remanded, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir.), reh'g
en banc denied, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 30490 (4th Cir. Nov. 19, 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2431 (1993), on remand and motion granted, 852 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Va. 1994),
affTd and remanded, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), reh'gen banc denied, 52 F.3d 90 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
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Citadel. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found that "single-gendered-
ness in education can be pedagogically justifiable" 59 because of
the "established differences in the educational needs of the two
genders.""' The different needs identified by the court were
based on expert testimony claiming that women would not respond
in the same way as men to the educational methodology at VMI-an
"adversative methodology" founded upon the "grating of mind and
body ... with the intended purpose of breaking individual spirit
and instilling values."3 61  For this reason, the Fourth Circuit
permitted Virginia to set up the Virginia Women's Institute for
Leadership, which provided a substantially comparable education to
that at VMI, but which was methodologically different in ways which
women, qua women, would appreciate. In the VMI and Citadel cases,
the demonstrated, established, or real differences that justified
separate but equal treatment of women's and men's educational
needs were not in any sense biological but rather were clearly
cultural in nature, reflecting and perpetuating normative gender
rules.
In order to justify the need for single-sex education, the
defendants in both the Citadel and VMI cases argued that women
and men learn differently. In support of this proposition, both
schools cited the research and writing of Carol Gilligan, the author
of the highly influential In a Different Voice. 62 They argued that
Gilligan's work established
that males and females develop differently, have different learning
styles, and have different psychological and educational needs; that
the educational programs at The Citadel and Virginia Military
Institute are geared specifically to meet male developmental and
educational needs; that these programs are particularly effective
and provide unique benefits for both for [sic] the male students
who attend and for society at large; and that introducing women
into these particular settings would be counterproductive for
women and would deprive men of an unique and valuable
opportunity3
63
... United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 897.
' Faulkner v.Jones, 51 F.3d 440,443 (4th Cir. 1995) (summarizing United States
v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3861 (U.S. May 26,
1995) (No. 94-1941).
61 United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1241.
62 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
Affidavit of Carol Gilligan at 2-3,Johnson v.Jones, Civ. No. 2:92-1674-2 (D.S.C.
filed Jan. 7, 1993).
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Gilligan provided an affidavit to the court in the Citadel case
disavowing any endorsement of the defendants' readings of her
work in both the VMI and Citadel cases:
Neither my book, In a Different Voice, nor my other research or
writings support the defendants' position. The defendants
misapprehend and misstate critical concepts discussed in my
published works .... In particular, my observations about
psychological development patterns that are generally associated
with gender are not based on any premise of inherent differences
between the sexes, but solely on the different nature of their
experiences .... [M]y observations in no way support defendants'
conclusions that an educational program for men designed to
maximize certain ostensibly "masculine" characteristics is neces-
sary, effective or beneficial, or that men necessarily profit from an
all-male college setting. My research leads me to conclude that
this is not the case.3 64
Having disavowed support for the defendants' position, Gilligan
went on to criticize VMI and the Citadel's educational methodology
which promoted an environment in which men allegedly thrived and
women allegedly withered:
The educational program at the Citadel ... is based on an
extreme characterization-almost a caricature-of what is popularly
designated as 'masculine' ....
Defendants embrace and perpetuate a false male/female
psychological and behavioral dichotomy and a set of sex-based
stereotypes that create an unreal and unhealthy situation, or a
'psychologically noxious' environment. Indeed, I believe that
recent research demonstrates that concrete harms flow to both the
individual and society from such unrealistic, inaccurate and rigid
sex-based descriptions and expectations.
I see no basis in experience or psychological research to
conclude that the official dedication to 'masculinity' apparent at
the Citadel itself produces, as defendants claim, leadership skills
or any other socially desirable personal characteristics 65
As Gilligan make clear, real, demonstrable sexual differences cannot
be looked to to justify sexually segregated education. Rather,
mutable and, she argues, harmful norms of hyperfemininity and
364 Id. at 3-4.
65Id. at 5-7.
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hypermasculinity can explain what the Citadel and VMI cases are
about, as well as what they do.
The Citadel and VMI cases, certainly two of the most publicized
sex discrimination cases in recent years, juxtapose notions of
equality, difference, and identity in a manner that suggests today's
Scylla and Charybdis of feminist jurisprudence-the on-going
equality and difference debate." 6 But they also do much more.
They raise the mobius-like connection between identity and
equality: the nature of the female legal subject constrains in
significant ways the shape of equality jurisprudence, while at the
same time our theories of equality have a powerful effect upon what
it means to be a woman.
The military academy cases provide an interesting opportunity
to consider the wrong of sex discrimination, not because they
present a conspicuous example of de jure sex discrimination
rendered familiar by their similarity to racial segregation cases, but
because of their idiosyncrasy. The Citadel and VMI are much more
than all-male educational institutions; they are artifacts dedicated to
the parodic celebration of, and ritual indoctrination in, the ways of
masculinity for men. 6 7 That a woman might gain access to such an
'See; e.g., LindaJ. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy:
Equal Treatment Positive Action and the Meaningof Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REv. 513, 518 (1983) (maintaining that the traditional equal treatment
conception of equality must expand to support a positive action approach to the
equality problems presented by pregnancy and childbirth); Ann C. Scales, Towards a
Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. LJ. 375, 377 (1980-1981) (suggesting that legislative
and judicial policies should incorporate women's childbearing and breastfeeding
capacities into the legal and social mainstream); Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the
Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and
Critical Race Theoy, 1991 DUKE LJ. 296, 299 (stating that postmodern theory
reformulates the sameness and difference arguments to facilitate the discussion
regarding which differences really matter); Williams, supra note 74, at 176 (suggesting
that feminists are at a crisis point in their evaluation of women and the quest for
equality).
367 Upon Shannon Faulkner's departure from the Citadel, the male cadets she left
behind
"[k]nob-surfed," throwing themselves onto mattresses after a running start
and sliding through puddles left from the storm. They ran in circles and
chanted slogans, arms raised in victory.
An upperclassman handed out cigars. Somebody shouted, "God bless
the all-male South Carolina Corps of Cadets!" One platoon sang the ditty
often used by victorious sports fans to chide their vanquished opponents:
"Na-na-na-na, Na-na-na-na, Hey, Hey, Goodbye."
Debbi Wilgoren, The Citadel Reasserts Its All-Male Tradition, WASH. POST, Aug. 20,
1995, at A3.
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institution without changing its essentially masculine character
presents a profound challenge to the essential virility and cultural
metaphysics that epitomize the Citadel and VMI-that masculinity is
the natural expression of male subjectivity.
Consequently, Shannon Faulkner's brief attendance at the
Citadel is still revolutionary because it creates the cultural condi-
tions for masculinity to be separated from maleness and be re-
mapped onto the female body. This is a deeply radical move given
the accepted cultural norm that regards masculinity as a reliable and
coherent signifier of maleness and femininity a reliable and
coherent signifier of femaleness. Both the Citadel and VMI cases
provide an opportunity to reevaluate the entire notion of essential
differences between men and women by considering what legal
doctrines reinforce the notion that females cannot and should not
be masculine.
If Faulkner is a heroine, her bravery should be understood not
only to inspire women to learn to be "Whole Men" but also to
inspire the legal imagination to question the coextensivity of sex
and gender, thereby impelling Title VII to prohibit all forms of
gender-based discrimination.
C. Sex Stereotyping in the Wage-Labor Market
The enduring facts of the sexual division of labor indicate, in
significant part, the degree to which the cutting edge of the Title
VII blade has shown itself to be something less than razor-sharp in
eradicating workplace sex segregation. Despite myriad affirmative
action programs and significant legal gains for women through the
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, U.S. workplaces remain
grossly sex-segregated. Figures from the 1990 census reveal that
one in fifty-three auto mechanics is a woman, 68 one in fifty-eight
carpenters is a woman, 69 one in thirty-nine electricians is a
woman,3 70 one in sixty-three roofers is a woman,37 1 one in twen-
ty-four construction laborers is a woman, 72 one in twenty welders
's 936,977 men, 17,646 women. 1990 U.S. Census, supra note 2, job category
505).
's 1,337,544 men, 23,163 women. Id. job category 567.
370 619,358 men, 15,659 women. Id. job category 575.
37 194,098 men, 3085 women. Id. job category 595.
"s 1,103,482 men, 46,298 women. Id. job category 869.
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is a Woman,"' and one in thirty-three loggers is a woman.
3 74 Of
course, the chance to be a supervisor in any of these trades is also
quite bleak for women: one in one-hundred forty-six brickmasonry
supervisors is a woman, 75 one in eighty-five carpentry supervisors
is a woman,3 76 and one in forty-eight plumbing supervisors is a
woman.
377
In contrast, men make up 92% of civil engineers,
3 78 89% of
electrical engineers,37' 85% of physicists,"8 ' 96% of airplane
pilots or navigators, 8 ' 97% of firefighters,8 2 and 87% of police
officers and detectives.38 3 Women, on the other hand, make up
98% of kindergarten and pre-kindergarten teachers, 8 4 98.5% of
family child-care providers," 5 and 93% of dressmakers.8 6 Fi-
nally, men make up 79% of physicians8 7 and only 6% of regis-
tered nurses, 38 8 87% of dentists8  and only 1.6% of dental
hygienists,"' 76% of lawyers 9 ' and only 1.3% of secretaries.
9 2
Is there any biological or physical reason for the persistence of
a profoundly sex-segregated labor force in this country? Of course
not.139  Yet the labor force remains clearly divided between men's
work and women's work despite the so-called demise of the separate
spheres doctrine.
Sexual biological differences have frequently been used to
explain why men and women are inclined toward, and best suited
' 613,596 men, 30,382 women. Id. job category 783.
374 112,076 men, 3448 women. Id. job category 496.
' ' 12,880 men, 88 women. Id. job category 553.
576 45,096 men, 529 women. Id. job category 554.
7 20,103 men, 415 women. Id. job category 557.
s 235,162 men, 17,646 women. Id. job category 053.
" 420,471 men, 46,552 women. Id. job category 055.
s80 24,238 men, 3604 women. Id. job category 069.
"' 105,929 men, 3897 women. Id. job category 226.
218,763 men, 5998 women. Id. job category 417.
457,078 men, 62,106 women. Id. job category 418.
'"5920 men, 263,410 women. Id. job category 155.
6234 men, 428,409 women. Id. job category 466.
6421 men, 90,837 women. Id. job category 666.
17 465,468 men, 121,247 women. Id. job category 084.
'"107,244 men, 1,777,885 women. Id. job category 095.
"' 135,588 men, 19,941 women. Id. at job category 085.
390 1174 men, 71,220 women. Id. job category 204.
391 564,332 men, 182,745 women. Id. job category 178.
"9 52,492 men, 3,966,179 women. Id. job category 313.
'" See Kathryn Abrams, Social Construction, Roving Biologis, and Reasonable
Women: A Response to Professor Epstein, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1021, 1022-29 (1992)
(arguing that sex segregation in the work force is due to gender socialization rather
than biological differentiation).
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to perform, different kinds of work. Richard Epstein's recent
writings on the biological foundation of sexual difference clearly
reflect this belief:
If there are important differences in initial individual endowments,
then these should express themselves in any well-ordered work
force. If women are better at some tasks than men, and men
better at some tasks than women, we should expect that the search
for gains from trade will lead to specialized patterns of employ-
ment. Even if men and women fall into the same broad occupa-
tional categories-say lawyers and doctors-a closer look is likely to
reveal major differences in the subspecialties that they pursue.
Hence, there are more female pediatricians and more male
neurosurgeons, more male contingent-fee lawyers and (relatively)
more female pension lawyers.
3 94
So, according to Epstein, when I go to have my car repaired, and all
of the mechanics who work on my car are men, while all of the
secretaries who handle the paperwork are women, this ordering of
the wage-labor market reflects not discrimination but the expression
of individual preferences that can be traced to biological aptitude
or inclination. It reflects a natural and inevitable order: no man
has ever applied to be a secretary at this establishment, and only
men have sought to work under the hoods of cars.
Yet, many of these supposedly normal distinctions reflect the
discriminatory attitudes that the law is designed to eliminate.
Under current law, however, in the absence of direct or indirect
proof of intentional discrimination, the employer bears no responsi-
bility for the sexual configuration of his two shops. Nor will this
sex-based division of labor be viewed as an effect of, rather than as
evidence of, the initial act of sexual differentiation.
In response to this unfortunate and enduring reality, a number
of brave women have used the law to try to integrate male-
dominated workplaces. Either by suing in order to gain entry into
a particular job or industry,"9 ' or by looking to the law to put a
s Epstein, supra note 43, at 997 (footnote omitted). For responses to Epstein's
construction of sex, identity, and equality, see David A. Strauss, Biology, Difference, and
Gender Discrimination, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1007 (1992) and Abrams, supra note 393,
at 1021; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REAsON (1992).
... See e.g., Mitchell v.Jones Truck Lines, 754 F. Supp. 584, 592-93 (W.D. Tenn.
1990) (holding that, although the plaintiff had established that she was the victim of
intentional gender discrimination, she was not entitled to a job as a truck driver
because of her lack of experience); Cobb v. Anheuser Busch, 793 F. Supp. 1457,1484-
85 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (holding that female plaintiffs in a beer manufacturing plant had
failed to establish a Title VII violation by alleging a "Protected Group" of male
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stop to workplace sexual harassment once they have been hired,
9 6
these women have had to endure enormous humiliation and
violence, much like that visited upon Shannon Faulkner since she
initiated her lawsuit to gain entry to the Citadel-all suffered in the
name of furthering equality. 97
However, unlike men who wear women's clothing, or
transgendered people who seek to bring their bodies and their attire
into conformity with their gendered identity, women who challenge
discriminatory treatment in male-dominated professions have had
their claims recognized as sex discrimination only when they enter
male-dominated workplaces as women-that is, only so long as they
do not present a challenge to the death grip that unifies sex and
gender. Under this limited judicial recognition of women's sex
discrimination claims, the rules of gender, attribution remain intact.
The jurisprudence of sex discrimination accomplishes this
through various evidentiary devices that provide specificity to the
wrong of sex discrimination. Henson v. City of Dundee,"'8 an early
hostile-environment sexual harassment case cited heavily and
approvingly by the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson,3 99 set forth that a sexual harassment plaintiff must prove,
inter alia, that "but for the fact of her sex, [the plaintiff] would not
have been the object of harassment," because Title VII does not
apply to cases in which "the conduct complained of is equally
offensive to male and female workers.""' According to this
employees who received better work assignments because both male and female
employees with less seniority than those in the "Protected Group" were similarly
disadvantaged).
" See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1491, 1534
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that a female employee of a shipyard had established aTitle
VII violation in the "hostile work environment" created by her employer,
coemployees, and supervisors and granting injunctive relief).
117 See Faludi, supra note 354, at 72-73 (recounting the death threats, vandalism,
and harassment that Shannon Faulkner and her family have suffered).
3- 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
399 477 U.S. 57, 63-67 (1986) (holding that the language of Title VII is not limited
to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination and that thus a claim of "hostile environ-
ment" is actionable).
' Henson, 682 F.2d at 904; see also Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611,
620 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[I]nstances of complained of sexual conduct that prove equally
offensive to male and female workers would not support a Title VII sexual harassment
charge because both men and women were accorded like treatment."), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987); McKee v. Ram Products, Inc., No. 1:92-CV-481, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7346, at *8-9 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 1993) ("[T]he foul language that [plaintiff]
claims gave rise to the hostile work environment.., was vulgar language directed
toward both sexes .... [N]either plaintiff as an individual nor women as a group were
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formulation of the wrong of sex discrimination, the victim of
harassment must have been selected by the harasser because of her
biological sex, and the conduct complained of must have been
harmful only to members of one biological sex. This approach
therefore links both the motivation of the harasser and the specific
harm experienced by the victim to the victim's biological sex. This
is an absurd result. Women who are sexually harassed in the
workplace do not experience discriminatory harm because of their
biology but because of the manner in which sex is used to exploit
a relationship of power between victim and harasser. This relation-
ship of power is based either upon supervisor/subordinate roles or
upon cultural gender roles which encourage men to use sex to
subordinate women." 1 Biology has absolutely nothing to do with
either one of these material grounds for workplace sexual harass-
ment, yet the law insists that it does.
Since Title VII will not reach conduct that "is equally offensive
to, or directed at both, men and women.., because both female
and male employees are accorded the same (albeit offensive)
treatment,"40 2 the conduct must be offensive to or directed
exclusively at i) a woman or women, or ii) a man or men 403 by a
member of the opposite sex in order to be actionable as conduct
singled out by [defendant]."); Linebaugh v. Sheraton Mich. Corp., 497 N.W.2d 585,
588 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (finding no sexual harassment where a sexually explicit
cartoon was equally offensive to male and female employees); cf. Bradford v. Sloan
Paper Co., 383 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (dismissing a racial harassment
claim because the supervisor's practices were found to be equally offensive to black
and white workers). But see Hutchison v. Amateur Elec. Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037,
1043 (7th Cir. 1994) ("It blinks reality to claim that sexual conduct which demeans
women by a man in a position of power, even if not directed at a specific woman
victim, equally impacts male and female subordinates.").
40' See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979) (examining sexual harassment from
a social and legal perspective and arguing that it should constitute a violation of both
Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause).
' Halasi-Schmick v. City of Shawnee, 759 F. Supp. 747, 752 n.2 (D. Kan. 1991)
(following Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
4°3Tide VII has been interpreted on numerous occasions to apply to
"discriminat[ion] against a member of a historically favored group." EEOC v.
Wendy's of Colorado Springs, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 1375, 1382 (D. Colo. 1989); see also
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (holding that Title
VII prohibits racial discrimination against whites as well as Blacks); Livingston v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that in
disparate impact cases, a member of a favored group (e.g. whites) must show
background circumstances supporting the inference that a facially neutral policy is,
in fact, a vehicle for discrimination).
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"based upon sex."4  Conduct that affects or offends both men
and women does not fall within the wrong of sex discrimination.
To limit the "because of one's sex" element of a prima facie sex
discrimination/harassment case to conduct of this kind is, of course,
to conceive of sex biologically-to carve up the population into two
different kinds of people, only one of which can be adversely
affected by the conduct in question. Only in this way can a person
show that the conduct took place "because of one's sex."
40 5
The law's treatment of sexual harassment claims filed by women
who do not act femininely in the workplace further illustrates the
absurdity of disaggregating sex from gender. In these cases a
biological explanation of the wrong of sex discrimination clearly
fails to account for discrimination against women. The misconstruc-
tion of the wrong of sexual harassment has been taken to bar the
sexual harassment claims of women who work in male-dominated
workplaces and who decide to act like "one of the boys," either as
a matter of survival, or because it is a role they feel comfortable
playing.4 6  When these women suffer outrageous verbal and
physical sexual harassment from their coworkers, courts find that
they have not been sexually discriminated against because the
banter went in both directions. This behavior, the argument goes,
40' Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619.
" This view of the wrong of sex discrimination was evidenced in the rather odd
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir.
1990):
[W]hile it is clear that an individual plaintiff may pursue a sexual discrimina-
tion claim under the fourteenth amendment based solely upon acts of
discrimination directed towards her, it is also clear that such a claim must
show an intent to discriminate because of her status as a female and not
because of characteristics of her gender which are personal to her.
Id. at 1151 (second emphasis added).
o Organizational psychologists call these women "the instigator-in-kind." See
Louise F. Fitzgerald & Suzanne Swan, Why Didn't She Just Report Him? The
Psychological and Legal Implications of Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J.
Soc. IssuEs 117, 131 (1995). In Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991), a case
in which there was an undisputed showing that Reed, a female jail employee, had
been handcuffed to the toilet, the drunk tank, and inside the elevator, had been made
the subject of lewd jokes and remarks, had her head forcefully shoved in her co-
workers' laps, and had an electric cattle prod forced between her legs, the trial court
reasoned that "[b]y any objective standard, the behavior of the male deputies and
jailers toward Reed... was, to say the least, repulsive. But apparently not to Reed.
... [S]he not only experienced this depravity with amazing resilience, but she also
relished reciprocating in kind. ... [T]he conclusion ... must be that [she]
participated in many of these antics and in fact instigated some of them." Id. at 486-
87.
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could not have been harassing to the women because of their sex
and therefore the "but for" test was not met.
These courts find that when women act in masculine ways they
invite whatever sexually abusive conduct comes their way and
thereby fail to make out the unwelcomeness element of a prima
facie sexual harassment case. In a sense, they have waived any claim
for damages.407 By resorting to the doctrine of unwelcomeness,
these cases establish that a person who acts masculinely, regardless
of his or her sex, cannot be harmed by sexually abusive remarks or
conduct from men. In this context the view seems to be that only
women who act ladylike can be harmed or intimidated by the grossly
offensive and violent sexual conduct of coworkers.
The favor with which the law looks upon women who satisfy our
expectations of female behavior is present at the Citadel as well:
[Olne of the [attitudes of cadets toward women] would be old
chivalric attitude in which a sharp distinction is placed between
nice girls and sluts .... They don't like a situation in which "nice
girls" talk like sluts, use the same vulgarity, four letter words and
banter in the same way to which they've become accustomed in
coed life of adolescent society.... And that doesn't mean that
they could not also be predatory to women that they did not
regard as "nice girls."
48
According to this logic, "nice girls" want to be the cadets' dates,
whereas "sluts" want to be cadets themselves. While the courts in
See Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (M.D. Fla.
1990) (finding that a female quality control inspector at a space shuttle tile
manufacturing plant who engaged in "sexual innuendo" could not be the object of
harassment by virtue of her sex), aff'd, 949 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir. 1991); Loftin-Boggs
v. City of Meridian, 633 F. Supp. 1323, 1327 n.8 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (finding that the
"[p]laintiff's participation in the creation of the conductleading to the alleged hostile
environment does not permanently bar a successful claim of sexual harassment. [But]
[o]nce her participation is established... she must be able to identify with some
precision a point at which she made known to her co-workers or superiors that such
conduct would hencefore be considered offensive"), aff'd, 824 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988); Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., 28 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639, 641 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (finding that a female circuit board
wrapper who "actively contributed to the distasteful working environment by her own
profane and sexually suggestive conduct ... failed to prove that her working
conditions were personally intolerable or that they caused her to quit herjob"). But
see Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir.
1994) (finding that plaintiff's unladylike behavior neither justified the harassing
conduct of her male coworkers nor exonerated her employer).
4o Deposition of David Riesman at 80-81,Johnson v. Jones, Civ. No. 2:92-1674-2
(D.S.C. Feb. 3, 1993).
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Weinsheimer, Gan, and Loftin-Boggs. 9 did not refer to the foul-
mouthed female plaintiffs as sluts, their opinions revealed the same
regard for female gender outlaws as that attributed to male Citadel
cadets.410
Just as Doe v. Boeing Co.,411 Terrny v. EEOC,412 and Kirkpatrick
v. Seligman & Latz, Inc. 411 stand for the proposition that only "real
women" can suffer the wrong of sex discrimination, these sexual
harassment cases seem to be saying that only certain kinds of
women can suffer the harm of sexual harassment. In this regard,
the only people who can be harassed or discriminated against
because of theirsex are those people whose biological sex, core gender
identity, and gender role identity meet the expectations of our
contemporary gender schema-that is, the social criteria for real
women and real men. When people who violate or confound these
traditional expectations suffer adverse treatment, their claims,
although unfortunate, are not actionable under sex discrimination
statutes.4 14
To frame the problem this way establishes, as a matter of law,
that the wrong of sex discrimination can never include sex-role
stereotyping which affects both men and women alike. According
to this construction of Title VII, men can never be considered
similarly situated to women with regard to enforced gender norms.
Thus, if a particular employer demands, prefers, or rewards a
certain kind of demeanor from its employees, demeanor that could
be characterized as masculine in nature, and this condition of
employment adversely affects both women and men who are not
sufficiently masculine, only the women would have standing to
allege a violation of Title VII.
409 See supra note 407.
410 EvenJudge Richard Posner has indicated disagreement with the assumptions
underlying the "girls who talk dirty" cases given "the asymmetry of positions" when
one woman tried to "act like one of the boys." Carr, 32 F.3d at 1011.
411 846 P.2d 531,536 (Wash. 1993) (finding no employment discrimination in the
discharge of a transgendered woman for disregarding company rules prohibiting her
from wearing excessively feminine attire to work).
412 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1395, 1397 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (holding that Title
VII "does not protect males who dress or act as females and vice versa").
413 636 F.2d 1047, 1049 (5th Cir. Unit B Feb. 1981) (affirming the district court's
dismissal of a transgendered plaintiff's complaint that he was a "male" at the time he
began wearing women's garb and stating that the defendant employer's refusal to
permit this course of conduct could not be discrimination against a "woman").
414 1 develop more fully this critique of the dominant paradigm of sexual
harassment in a forthcoming article in which I examine the problem of same-sex
sexual harassment.
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This problem of standing is a profoundly important one for
equality jurisprudence. Yet, by relying so heavily upon sisyphean
Title VII litigation that propels lone women into deeply inhospit-
able, male-dominated workplaces kamikaze-style, we reaffirm, over
and over again, the dominant paradigm of sex discrimination that
elevates bodies over gender roles. Instead, Title VII should
recognize the primacy of gender norms as the root of both sexual
identity and sex discrimination, and thereby the law should prohibit
all forms of normative gender stereotyping regardless of the
biological sex of any of the parties involved.
Under this conception of the wrong of sex discrimination, Title
VII should be understood to encompass sex discrimination suits by
men against men when the plaintiffs have resisted participation or
indoctrination in compulsory masculinity. To do so, of course,
would require courts to question the assumptions that male
subjectivity is properly expressed as masculinity and that female
subjectivity is properly expressed as femininity.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins415 provides the inspiration to make
such a move. In Price Waterhouse, the defendant accounting firm
denied a partnership to the plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, because she was
"macho" and used profanity and because her superiors thought that
she should take "a course at charm school," "walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have
her hair styled, and wear jewelry."416 The Court held that Title
VII prohibits discrimination against women who are not sufficiently
feminine, stating that "an employer who acts on the basis of a belief
that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has
acted on the basis of gender."4 17 This decision represented an
important advance in Title VII law. Employment decisions made on
the basis of gender role identity are now included within the meaning
of discrimination "because of one's sex." That being the case,
bodies have dropped out of the equation. The law, therefore,
should no longer require, as ajurisdictional matter, that discrimina-
tory conduct be directed exclusively at one or the other biological
sex. Any adverse action in the workplace on account of a person's
gender should be cognizable under Title VII, regardless of the body
parts of the plaintiff or the defendant.
415 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
416 Id. at 235.
417 Id. at 250.
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Price Waterhouse stands for the proposition that a committee of
men cannot refuse employment opportunities to a woman because
of her failure to comply with relevant gender norms. This decision
is an invitation to consider how some men may suffer harm when
they work in settings that not only expect, but demand, extreme
masculine behavior from all male members in the workplace. If a
woman cannot be punished or harassed for failing to demonstrate
her femininity in accordance with some acceptable norm, then the
same can and must be said about men and masculinity.
Notwithstanding the direction in which Price Waterhouse seems
to urge equality jurisprudence, many courts are reluctant to
relinquish the conventions that femininity belongs to women and
that masculinity belongs to men. In fact, there is no principled way
to distinguish Doe v. Boeing Co.418 or Weinsheimer v. Rockwell
International Corp.419 from Price Waterhouse. Yet Price Waterhouse
is not even mentioned in any of the foul-mouthed women,
transgender, or workplace-grooming Title VII cases decided after
the Supreme Court issued this momentous decision.
The fact that courts have resisted the invitation of Price
Waterhouse to question gender roles is manifest in opinions finding
that hostile environment sexual harassment cannot take place in a
unisex workplace.4 21 Only when a member of the "opposite sex"
enters the space does the specter of a sexually hostile environment
arise. For instance, never is it suggested in any of the harassment
cases that the crude, macho, and hypermasculine "environment[s]
replete with sexual innuendo, joke telling and general vulgarity"
42 1
constitute a hostile environment prior to the introduction of female
41 846 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1993).
4" 754 F. Supp. 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1990), aftd, 949 F.2d 1162 (l1th Cir. 1991).
420 By this I mean workplaces replete with sexual pictures, innuendo, or sex talk.
See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that harassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate does not
state a claim under Title VII, even if the harassment has sexual overtones); Hopkins
v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822,834 (D. Md. 1994) (granting summary
judgment for defendant employer on the ground that Title VII does not provide a
cause of action for a color photographic technician who claimed he was sexually
harassed by a supervisor of the same gender). The exceptions to this observation are
quid pro quo cases, or cases where a male employee is sexually propositioned by a
male supervisor. See, e.g., Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F.
Supp. 1545, 1551 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (holding that quid pro quo homosexual sexual
harassment is actionable under Title VII on the allegations that defendant supervisor
required sexual favors in return for continued employment and that this treatment
was based upon plaintiff's gender).
421 Weinsheimer, 754 F. Supp. at 1561.
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employees into the workplace. 2 Discrimination based upon
gender role identity only exists in the presence of biological
diversity.
Nowhere is this legal reality more evident than at the Citadel, an
institution that, if nothing else, is devoted to the celebration of and
the indoctrination in the ways of masculine excess and anxiety.
Indeed, sexism is the allusive patois of an enclosed system like the
Citadel. In classes, students are told "[n]ever [to] use the passive
voice-it leads to effeminacy and homosexuality .... So next time
you use the passive voice I'm going to make you lift up your limp
wrist."4 2 The professor who made those remarks proves my
larger point: "If Shannon were in my class, I'd be fired by March
for sexual harassment."4 24  Under this view, men are merely
observers, not victims, of sexually discriminatory policies that
assume a hypermasculine point of view or standard of perfor-
mance.
425
In order for Title VII to play a more effective role in increasing
job opportunities for women in male-dominated sectors of the labor
market, its target must include commonly accepted social norms
about what it means to be a woman and what it means to be a man.
After all, "everything one wants to say about sex-however sex is
understood-already has in it a claim about gender."426  This
means expanding the focus of Title VII beyond strategies designed
to integrate women into traditionally male territory. While the
outside-in strategies are certainly important, they cannot remain our
only strategy for dismantling the sex-segregated wage-labor market.
Title VII must and can do better by forcing the question of the
behavioral aspect of sexual identity and discrimination. In this way
it will not seem unnatural, idiosyncratic, or an affront to the
integrity of male identity when a woman like Shannon Faulkner
seeks entry into an institution where she could be masculine, or
when other women seek to do what might otherwise be regarded as
" Indeed, many of the egregiously hostile conditions which the women shipyard
workers complained about in Robinson v.Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486
(M.D. Fla. 1991), had been part of the shipyard culture well before women began
working there. See id. at 1523.
"' Faludi, supra note 354, at 79.
424 Id. at 78.
4
' But see Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007,
1010 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[I]t is a lot more uncomfortable to be the target of offensive
words and conduct than to be merely an observer of them." (citing WILLIAMS, supra
note 40, at 129)).
426 LAQUEUR, supra note 208, at 11.
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men's work, but which is, more realistically, masculine work. When
the Citadel refused to make Shannon Faulkner a cadet and when the
cadets celebrated after her departure, the school engaged in sex
discrimination not because it refused admission to a woman and all
her attendant femininity, but because it was unwilling and unable to
conceive of anyone other than men being masculine.
When considered this way, one wonders which result of
Faulkner's admission the Citadel would find more disturbing: that
her female presence destroys the special masculine environment the
school has worked so hard to protect, or that her presence does not.
That a woman might be just as successful at being masculine as a
man calls into question the dominant, although often unstated,
paradigm of sexual identity and difference: that male subjectivity
is essentially and naturally expressed as masculinity, that female
subjectivity is essentially and naturally expressed as femininity, and
that men and women are two different kinds of human beings.
Unless and until Title VII strikes at the foundations of this para-
digm, our efforts to combat sexual segregation and hierarchy in the
U.S. labor market will continue to have limited success.
CONCLUSION
Law has to start somewhere, and as we have seen, with
antidiscriminationjurisprudence it starts with essential sexual differ-
ence. Yet the assumption that courts are merely describing a sexual
state of affairs when they identify real differences between men and
women is clearly false. Rather, courts produce a truth of sexual
identity through judicial fiat when they determine to what degree
men and women are similarly situated for the purposes of equality
protections.
Close examination of the cases reveals that biology is both a
wrong and dangerous place to ground antidiscrimination law
because it fails to account for the manner in which every sexual
biological fact is meaningful only within a gendered frame of
reference. Indeed, every observation about biology ultimately
collapses into normative gender roles, both as a matter of history
and as a matter of contemporary social reality. Furthermore,
biology is a dangerous place to ground the jurisprudence of sexual
equality because of its implications for the possibility of sexual
agency. Caught between the determinism of biological fact and the
legitimate enforcement of commonly accepted social norms about
masculinity and femininity, the law allows very little room to
THE DISAGGREGATION OF SEX FROM GENDER
embrace a sexual identity that departs from these social norms.
Under our current scheme, those who seek to transgress these
norms are more abjects than subjects.4 2 That is, one becomes a
viable and culturally intelligible subject only to the extent that one
conforms one's gender performance to commonly accepted social
norms. Given this, it is not surprising that antidiscrimination laws
provide little protection for gender outlaws-whether they be
transgendered people who wish to marry or women like Shannon
Faulkner who seek to participate in masculinized academies or
institutions.
The second order question, what does it mean to treat women
unfairly, always has buried within it the first order question, what
does it mean to be a woman? Biology is the wrong answer two
times over, yet the law goes to great lengths to deny this fundamen-
tal fact. Instead, both sexual identity and sexual inequality are
better understood as the products of normative social practices that
allow us to attribute gender to individuals according to normative
gender schema. Antidiscrimination law must take account of this
social fact. Biology must be discarded in favor of a more behavioral
definition of both the meaning of sexual identity and the wrong of
sex discrimination. When the law steps in, as it did for April
Ashley, Karen Ulane, Shannon Faulkner, and the women who
wished to attend the Virginia Military Institute, and imposes a right
of sexual identity in order to deny a wrong of sex discrimination, it
significantly constrains the possibility for sexual agency for all
people. Ultimately, sexual equality jurisprudence must abandon its
reliance upon biology in favor of an underlying fundamental right
to determine gender independent of biological sex.
42 See BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 211, at 133-34 (describing how
cultural norms create an "inner" and an "outer" world, sanctioning the former and
rejecting the latter as a "defiling otherness").
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